“Now, among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, We must set down in the beginning that whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed” (Summa Contra Gentiles, I. 9, 5.).
Part one can be found here.
Part two can be found here.
As I have been thinking through some of the differences between Reformed epistemology and classical theism (generally, the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Christian Aristotelian tradition), I think I have found a couple ideas which sets these two positions apart. I think there are real differences between the two schools of thought but I also think there is some equivocation in terms that needs to be explored and clarified that might help bring understanding to the issue and point out where the differences really are. Once the terms are identified and properly understood it will be apparent why my journey to classical foundationalism was an easy and logical path to take. Keep in mind that although I primarily refer to Alvin Plantinga, I am just pointing out that he is the chief proponent of Reformed epistemology but often when I refer to Reformed epistemology, I am including such thinkers as Wolterstorff, Alston, Clark among others. I also understand that defining Reformed epistemology is a very difficult thing since many Reformed epistemologists hold to conflicting epistemologies (as pointed out previously, some are coherentists, some hold to a form of correspondence, and others are reliabilists).
First, I think I have two major positions that now separate me from Reformed epistemology. The first is classical realism, the other is the ontological priority of reality, and the resulting laws of logic and first principles. Both positions are related. The laws of logic are simply properties and reflections of being. So, one difference would be that I do not start with intuitions or moods about reality but take reality as a given (because to deny it would be absurd) and the fact that we concretely live in a world in which reality is the determinant of order, not existentially person relative impressions, nor notions – nor even our epistemology. The perennial philosophy of realism is the philosophy of being and is the reason I start with metaphysics.
Plantinga and other Reformed epistemologists believe that the nature of how we know things needs to be reworked. Plantinga’s position is an epistemology (theory of knowledge), not a metaphysical framework that starts from the nature of reality itself. At least for realists, one’s theory of knowledge acquisition is a different question from reality itself. To collapse or conflate the two positions is idealism. This actually happens a lot in the philosophy of science. The best book to read on this is Roger Trigg’s text, Beyond Matter. I am not suggesting that Plantinga is an idealist. I simply want to point out that if one starts with epistemology rather than with being itself and first principles, things can get weird and circular very quickly. Now, back to Plantinga.
He suggests that Reformed epistemology is reasonable because he thinks it is possible to be rational and believe in God without any evidence. In order to build his case, and avoid fideism, he must redefine the traditional philosophical terms of reason and evidence.
The central concern to Reformed epistemology is the worry over Enlightenment evidentialism and the definition used is attributed to W. K. Clifford, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Plantinga 25).
According to Reformed epistemologists, all evidentialists hold to this position since they generally collapse the distinction, or at least blur the relationship, between foundationalism and evidentialism.
As one who is interested in and regularly engages with classical writers such as Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and others, I never really understood why Reformed epistemology calls such a strict definition of evidentialism “classical.” Aristotle, for example, never held such a position due to his conception of the potentiality of the human mind.
In fairness though, it should be kept in mind that Reformed epistemologists are generally concerned with undermining the legitimacy of Enlightenment rationalism, which is what they mean by classical foundationalism. Since some Enlightenment thinkers fantastically misread Aristotle, it would be a mistake to claim that the Enlightenment is the “classical” position. Aristotle was not a 17th-century empiricist. Although an empiricist in a loose sense, Aristotle held to the capacities and potentialities of the human mind which are closely connected to his hylomorphism, epistemology, and anthropology. (Aristotle never rejected the Forms of Plato, he just arrived at them by way of induction and abstraction, a different way than his teacher). Aristotle would not say the human mind was a “blank slate” or purely passive.
As Kretzmann correctly points out, Plantinga misreads Aristotle. In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle is not attempting to provide a method that scientists are to use to discover knowledge. Rather, Aristotle is simply providing a way for scientists to categorize and classify their discoveries (Kretzmann 27). Finally, Aristotle does not attempt to claim that all knowledge must be subject to the scientific method.
Aristotle would definitely leave room for memory beliefs, beliefs about the past, and beliefs about the external world. These are simply the results of induction, abstraction, and common sense. He would also remind us that these rest in a matrix of metaphysical commitments grounded in the nature of being (reality). As A. N. Whitehead reminds us:
“Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history until your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise, your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations.” (Science and the Modern World, 55)
The irony to me regarding Reformed epistemology is that although it claims to be an anti-evidentialist argument it certainly provides a lot of evidence and reasons for its position. It simply broadens the scope of what kind of evidence is epistemically acceptable. There is no argument here, from the genuinely classical position of Aristotle.
Honestly, Reformed epistemology is a weird way to argue—one is rational, warranted, and justified in believing in God without evidence, and here are all the reasons and evidence why you do not need evidence. (I can hear the objector now … “So, you are saying I should use my reason to say I do not need reasons”? The circularity is starting to make my head hurt.)
In all seriousness, Reformed epistemologists are correct to point out the errors of Enlightenment rationalism. The Enlightenment was a time of very serious intellectual error. And the broad foundationalism that is argued for is correct, and on a closer investigation, it is not that different from true classical Aristotelian epistemology. However, it is how Reformed epistemologists redefine their terms that is not helpful.
Aristotle was among the first to point out the need for basic first principles upon which it would be folly to argue against. He believed it was the mark of a foolish person not to understand that. Classical Aristotelian evidentialists are foundationalists. Reformed epistemologists are simply arguing for a broad foundationalism. In my own trajectory, adopting a classical Aristotelian foundationalism based on first principles was the logical and more intellectually honest step from Reformed epistemology. Although, I’m not really sure how the sense of the divine qualifies as a first principle and some of Plantinga’s approach reminds a lot of Bergsonian intuitionism.
A few questions still remain, however.
It is not completely clear to classical Christian Aristotelian foundationalists, however, that the sensus divinitatus (a Calvinist idea which indicates the innate sense of divinity all humans are supposed to have) qualifies as a basic belief (a first principle?) or that it is helpful to the argument. How is it included in one’s foundational basic beliefs? If there is a sensus divinitatus, it was horribly disfigured and became self-centered rather than God-centered or other-centered due to the fall. It is not clear how that factors into one’s properly functioning cognitive structure.
Some concluding thoughts are in order. It is a mistake for Reformed epistemologists to call their critics wrong because they are holding to “classical foundationalism” when they are not using a definition that would apply to the classical Aristotelian foundationalist. It is important to avoid equivocation if one wants to have a clear and careful discussion.
There is a final, slight, but important difference between traditional Aristotelian foundationalists and Reformed epistemology. Christian Aristotelians hold to the first principles of reality. Among these first principles are the laws of logic (law of identity, law of noncontradiction, law of excluded middle). These first principles of reality are undeniable since they cannot be denied without employing them. They are properties of Being. It is uncertain whether or not the sensus divinitatus has these qualifications. Theism, therefore, is something that can be reasoned to. To reason from it, runs the risk of circularity.
Works Cited
Kretzmann, Norman. “Evidence Against Anti-Evidentialism.” Our Knowledge of God, edited by Kelly James Clark, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 17 – 38.
Plantinga, Alvin. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. University of Notre Dame Press. 1983.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge University Press. 1929
For further reading:
William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. Crossway. While Dr. Craig is not a Reformed epistemologist, he believes elements of Reformed epistemology can be a valid source of confirmation for the Christian and it can work with external evidence for Christianity.
RC Sproul, John Girstner, Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics. Academie Books. One of the absolute best introductions to classical apologetics. Craig Parton (in his book, The Defense Never Rests) is in error when he says that Dr. Sproul is a presuppositionalist. Having worked with Dr. Sproul personally for six years, I can testify that he was never a presuppositionalist. Dr. Sproul was much closer to St. Thomas Aquinas and the Protestant Scholastics.
Daniel J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition. The single best introduction to general philosophy from a Thomistically inspired realist. The references and footnotes are fantastic.
Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics. Center for Thomistic Studies. The best volume on Christian metaphysics. Not always easy reading but well worth it if the reader actively engages with the text. I think it is slightly better than Clarke’s The One and the Many.
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