Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence: Conclusion

by Dave Seng

Part three of three.

Part one can be found here.

Part two can be found here.

Other philosophers, such as Aristotle, disagree with Hegel and think that is important to maintain the being of the mind and the being of concrete physical reality. The distinction between the being of the mind and the being of physical reality aids in understanding what ideas are and how they help one in understanding reality and the various modes or “acts” of existence. It is important to understand what an “act” is according to classical metaphysics. Aristotle uses the notion of “act” to describe things that exist in reality. Things of the mind, such as ideas, memories, fictional characters in narrative or verse, concepts, perceptions, and things of the imagination like unicorns, are objects or “acts” of the mind. Things that exist external to one’s mind exist as an “act” of physical reality. Both mental and physical objects are real acts of existence. That which is in act is simply that which exists. An act of the mind is real because the individual has real existence. In external existence, the act of a physical thing is its primary way of being or its objective existence. Aristotle points out that mental existence, or things of the mind, are different in kind from physical existence yet, both ways of being are real because they are in act (here, Aristotle is applying the term “movement” to that which physically undergoes change):

The word ‘actuality’, which we connect with ‘complete reality’, has, in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement. And so people do not assign movement to non-existent things, though they do assign some other predicates. e.g. they say that non-existent things are objects of thought and desire, but not that they are moved; and this because while ex hypothesi they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually if they were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but do not exist, because they do not exist in complete reality. (572)

Aristotle points out that the objects of the mind and objects of physical reality do not exist in the same way. That which exists in “complete reality” is different from the existence of the things of the mind. The being of mind and being of objective reality are a basic feature of reality, and should not be overlooked or confused, because the distinction points to the plurality of existence and, what will be developed, the foundation for intentional existence. Aquinas makes the point that the knower and the thing known are not the same, “…the eye knows the stone according to its being outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the thing known according to the being it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its being outside the knower, the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible being it has in the intellect …” (81). The knower and the thing known, then, are not the same. They have actuality in different ways. Hegel, however, rejects this distinction, “…philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas, without reference to actuality” (163). According to Hegel, then, there is no need to reference external reality because all of reality consists of mind and is mind-dependent. Nonetheless, because the being of reality and the being of the mind are real, and exist in different ways, there must be a better way of understanding the nature of idea. Ideas are that which signify something. Ideas point to something that is, or has being. They signify something that exists either in the mind or objective reality, and it is conceptually incoherent to confuse the two aspects of being, or make them one. Idealism is ultimately circular in nature because it assumes the ultimate nature of mind before concluding that mind is ultimate in reality. In such a system, one could never grasp the nature of physical reality. If all is mind and there is no reference to actuality, one is forever locked inside Plato’s cave.

Two points need to be clarified. The first is the fact of being. The preceding, of course, assumes the existence of an external reality. It is unnecessary to prove the existence of external reality. The starting point that classical metaphysicians use is—being is. It is impossible to deny reality or the fact that something exists. Even the solipsist has to admit that, “I exist.” Further, there are several modes of being at work should the solipsist write a sentence. Both the solipsist and the sentence, itself, would have different kinds of being. Something exists. The second point is that mental existence does not necessarily mean subjective existence. It is a mistake to confuse mental existence with that which is subjective because not all things of the mind are subjective or person-relative. Subjective experiences are those that belong to the individual alone, things like memories, personal and bodily feelings, and personal experience. Mental existence such as characters like Hamlet or Tom Sawyer are not subjective but objective through imagination and the written word. (If this were not so, there would be no point in having literature classes in universities. Many wonderful works of literature can be discussed objectively.) Similarly, historical figures that live on in memory like Benito Mussolini or Abraham Lincoln are not subjective, but objective. They once existed in reality but now live in the mental reality of memory. They have left objective effects of their lives for historians to discover and explicate. Furthermore, one can make a subjective experience objective as when a husband explains to his wife that she hurt his feelings, making the subjective experience objective through intentional existence (more on that below). Subjective existence belongs to the individual alone, but has mental existence because the individual is real. To be clear, subjective existence has real being, but is different in kind from other types of mental existence like historical figures and characters of fiction. The overall point, however, is that reality has a structure to it. There is a composition to Being that involves both the mind and physical reality. An object of being can be said to exist in many ways, and to reduce reality to one thing, as Hegelian idealism does, does nothing to help one understand the essential structure and nature of reality. Monism cannot account for the plurality of existing things or the way they exist (modes of existence).

Reality has three modes of being or existing. To quickly summarize the first two modes of being, there is objective existence and rational or mental existence. Objective existence is real existence. It is the physical world of mountains, animals, trees, and buildings. It is the world outside one’s head—independent of the mind and unaffected by it. It would exist even if there were no humans on the planet. The second mode of being is mental existence or that which exists in the mind. Since individual minds are real, mental existence is a type of real existence. The being of the mind and the being of reality are two different modes of being. The third modality of being is intentional existence. Intentional existence brings both the mental and physical ways of being together. Intentional existence points to the fact that the mind can be “about” something, it can describe something, or communicate something to another mind. Intentional being depends on a plurality of minds, but not on any one in particular. An intentional object can be real existence or mental existence. Intentional being can be anything discussed or communicated based on shared experience and existence. Intentional being shares both real and mental properties, but depends on a plurality of minds for existence. Intentional being is an act of existence that is dependent on minds in general. It is different in kind from strictly real or mental existence. If there are no minds in existence, there is no intentional existence, only real existence. If there was only one mind on the planet, there would be mental and real existence, but no intentional existence. For example, three scientists are discussing an atom. The three scientists are discussing the same atom existing in real existence. Their communication with one another indicates that they are discussing the same atom based on their shared perceptual experience. There are three individual and particular mental existences of the same atom, yet the atom is one intentional existence among the three scientists. Intentional being makes possible the fact that three different individual mental experiences can communicate about one object. The multiplicity of shared experience makes this possible. Long ago, Plato was among the first philosophers to point this aspect of reality out, “…if every man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to another” (270). Intentional existence has its foundation in things and is communicable through a plurality of minds based on objectively shared real existence. Hegelian idealism, on the other hand, reduces all reality to mind and ideas, and therefore collapses the structure of reality. Hegel reduces being and becoming, the subjective and the objective, real and mental existence to one construct of the mind.

The scope and breadth of Hegel’s philosophy is admirable. The attempt to organize all reality into a systematic whole that makes sense of all experience is a project which many philosophers in the speculative tradition engage in, from Plato and Aristotle to Aquinas and Whitehead. Hegel certainly has a high regard for philosophy and believes in mankind’s innate rationality to discover the ultimate truths of reality. He believes that metaphysics can unlock the deepest and most perennial questions and was correct in pointing out that there is a mental or nonmaterial aspect to reality. Hegel’s mistake, however, is making all reality into an immaterial mind. Immaterial monism fails to make sense out of the plurality of existence and the modes of being. A true speculative philosophy, one that seeks to make sense out of reality as a whole, needs to correctly explicate all the ways something can exist. Hegelian idealism and monism are too simplistic and does not properly make sense out of reality.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 7. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Aquinas. The Suma Theologica. Translated by Father Laurence Shapcote. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 21. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Plato. Georgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 6. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence, Part Two

by Dave Seng

Part one of this series can be found here.

When it comes to understanding history, according to Hegel, the goal of the philosopher of history is to discover the progress and development of reason as an immaterial and spiritual force which simply uses human events to achieve its goals and purposes (116). For example, Hegel explains how mind is revealed in world history, “The history of the world begins with its general aim, the realization of the idea of spirit, only in an implicit form, that is, as nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of history (as already observed) is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one” (171). According to Hegel, the role of the philosopher is to show how mind or reason is at work in the world. Hegel continues:

The only thought which philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of history, is the simple conception of reason; that reason is the sovereign of the world; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process. This conviction and intuition is a hypothesis in the domain of history as such. In that of philosophy it is no hypothesis. It is there proved by speculative cognition, that reason—and this term may here suffice us, without investigating the relation sustained by the universe to the divine being—is substance, as well as infinite power; its own infinite material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the infinite form—that which sets this material in motion. (163)

Hegel believes that reason (or the world-mind) is an infinite power and material form, a type of first principle of reality, not a hypothesis. Additionally, he explains that reason is the substance and infinite energy, “that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence … That this “idea” or “reason” is the true, the eternal, the absolutely powerful essence; that it reveals itself in the world, and that in that world nothing else is revealed but this and its honour and glory—is the thesis which as we have said, has been proved in philosophy, and is here regarded as demonstrated” (163).

In sum, reason is “the infinite complex of things, their entire essence and truth (163). For Hegel, the universe is one organic whole, an all-powerful and continuous substance of mind or spirit.

Overall, Hegel makes a compelling case for presenting reality and the universe as a complete whole. Each person, object, and event has a position and role in the grand narrative and unfolding of the world-mind. People and events have value because they belong to a greater cosmic plan and through reflection and their innate ability to reason, can discover the grand narrative and design of the world-spirit at work in the universe (116). People and events are the outworking of the world-spirit. In terms of Hegelian idealism, the human race is imbued with meaning and purpose and not a product of chance or blind impersonal mechanistic forces, because the universe is an entire logical system working itself out to greater perfection, significance, and importance due to the all benevolent world-mind or Idea. Individuals can find comfort, solace, and be “at home” in the universe because the self is not isolated or insignificant but a genuine part of the world process. In many ways, Hegel’s idealism is deeply existentially meaningful. In this system, values, ethical principles, and determinations of right or wrong are not transcendent, obscure, or impossible to reach, but are inherently discoverable because all knowledge and value lies within the universe and within every single individual. There is no transcendent reality to concern oneself with. The self is not adrift alone in the cosmos, but anchored firmly within the comfort and purpose of the world-spirit.

While Hegel’s grand quest for the meaning of reality is a noble one (and worth pursuing), it remains to be seen whether or not his foundational notion of reality is correct. If it turns out that his first principles of reality are incorrect, his overall system fails. As Thomas Hobbes reminds us, “Where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin” (132). It is important, therefore, to evaluate Hegel’s philosophical system in light of his basic premises and conclusions. If the premises are faulty, the conclusion will be too. Therefore, Hegel’s metaphysical system should be evaluated in the context of other great thinkers of the Western intellectual tradition in order to discover whether or not his foundation is firm. Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas can help bring further clarification to the nature of existence, the plurality of existence, and the role of “mind” in understanding the world.

One interesting point about Hegel’s idealism is that he conflates the existence of mental realities such as ideas and objectively physical ways of knowing reality (123). The external conditions of reality should become internal ones (231). According the Hegel, in order to have complete self-consciousness one must collapse the distinctions between what one knows objectively with what one knows by way of the mind, “Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly what I know. In self-conscious these are merged in one; for spirit knows itself” (167). The world-mind, which, according to Hegel incorporates everyone and everything must be merged into one ultimate entity. That which I know (ideas of things) gets merged into that by which I know (sense experience and objective reality).

This is the basis of the Hegel’s metaphysical monism. Next time, we will look at how Aristotle and other great thinkers would respond to Hegelian idealism.

Works cited in this series

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 7. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Aquinas. The Suma Theologica. Translated by Father Laurence Shapcote. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 21. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Plato. Georgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 6. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Ontology

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence: Part One

by Dave Seng

The prologue to this series can be found here.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is a fascinating figure in the history of philosophy. Hegel provides a grand metaphysical system that encompasses all elements of reality and perennial questions. For example, Hegel believes that the role of philosophy is to explicate the development of “reason,” or “idea” as it unfolds in world history, political life, and every aspect of culture and society. According to Hegel, when exploring the philosophy of history (how one is to understand the meaning and significance of history), it is important to understand that human events are the ordered development and process of the Idea or world-mind, “The concrete Ideas, the minds of the nations, have their truth and their destiny in the concrete Idea which is absolute universality, i.e. in the world-mind” (116). Whether Hegel is discussing the philosophy of right (systems of right actions, ethics, and contractual law) or the grand purpose of human affairs in history, it is “reason,” “idea,” and world-mind that fundamentally guides reality and leads to all truth, and in fact, knows all things (165-166). Hegel explains further, “This vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the world-spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it” (171). Hegel’s far-reaching metaphysics touches on all reality. To further grasp Hegel’s metaphysical system, however, it is important to more closely examine his concept of the “world-mind” and its implications for understanding the world.

In both his Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of History, Hegel uses the terms “world-mind” or “world-idea” and “reason” as a kind of immaterial guiding force for all reality and Being. Sometimes, he even uses the theological German term “geist” to capture this notion (88, 147, among others). For Hegel, world-mind is the one ultimate substance that binds and guides all things in the universe (163). The one essential nature or character of Being is mind. One of the great questions Hegel explores is the nature and character of reality (or what is known as “Being”). Being is the formal object of study for the metaphysician and it involves exploring reality, itself, along with how and why things exist as they do. In metaphysics, the study of being seeks to explore the ultimate foundations and causes of all that exists. The study of Being is a far-reaching inquiry which explores what it means for a thing to exist, the various ways in which a thing can exist, and the metaphysical principles which make possible a thing to exist in the first place. Being, then is not the study of one thing among the already existing things which exist; it is the study of why and how the universe is the way it is and explores the fundamental principles of its existence. In the classical Aristotelian sense, the study of reality (being) takes being as it is and attempts to carefully demonstrate the first principles of reality and describe what it means for a thing to exist.1 Through a careful understanding of ontology (what it means for a specific thing to exist), philosophers find clues for what it means for the universe to exist.

Hegel, however, does not take the classical approach of examining the properties of reality such as the logical laws of noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle, or the various modes of existence (rational, mental, and intentional being and the relationships among being), and develop a metaphysical system from there, rather, he begins with the “world-spirit” and its organic processes and development in the universe. Hegel reduces all being to mind, idea, or world-spirit and this is why his conceptual scheme for reality is known as “idealism.” In metaphysics, idealism is any theory which reduces all reality to mind and its ideas. Idealism makes the mind or “world-mind” (in Hegel’s case) the ultimate character, or substance of reality and makes all reality mind-dependent.

As pointed out, Hegel believes that all reality is driven by a world-spirit or world-mind. This world-spirit, is not the transcendent Christian God, but a nonphysical spiritual force that is immanent, indwelt, and part of the universe itself—what is known as metaphysical monism. Since Hegel reduces all reality to only one thing, mind or spirit, his position can also be identified with theological pantheism or panentheism (the idea that all is in God). The universe is in continual change and development due to the careful guidance of the world-spirit. Hegel’s position is known as idealism because he believes that all reality is based on, or consists of spirit, idea, or mind. Hegel connects this notion to his overall understanding of idealism, “Now it is the interest of spirit that external conditions should become internal ones; that the natural and the spiritual world should be recognized in the subjective aspect belonging to intelligence; by which process the unity of subjectivity and being generally—or the idealism of existence—is established” (231). Hegel argues that idealism is established if one can reduce all reality to the subjective aspect of intelligence or mind. He believes that the subjective intelligent individual serves as a kind of microcosm of the universal world-spirit or intelligence (162-163). If the universe is reasonable, there must be an ultimate intelligence or “reason” that is at work, infused into, and guiding the universe. Humans have the intellectual capacity of discovering reason at work in reality. Hegel applies this notion of “reason” to all aspects of life and the world, including this unfolding of idealism to history and human events.

In part two we will explore how Hegel applies the notion of the world-spirit to history itself.

1 Aristotle takes the primacy of being, or the fact of existence, as his philosophical point of departure. This is the point of his famous phrase “being as being” in book IV of his Metaphysics (522).

Works Cited

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Being, Intellectual History, Philosophy

Excursus: Pascal And The Inescapable Nature of Being

by Dave Seng

Have you ever come across children arguing about something on playground? One says “is so” and the other “is not”? Each is emphatically stating that something is or is not the case. Each is attempting to persuade the other about reality. Perhaps unknowingly, each is making a metaphysical statement and assuming an ultimate truth belonging to reality. Each is tacitly assuming there is a reality to argue about. Reality is assumed. To say something is the case is to already assume “what is,” to assume reality. No one can deny that Being is. The question arises, however, because Being is so fundamental to our human experience, how does one go about presenting a definition of Being?

The inquiry into Being is the most foundational question of all. It is the basic starting point of ontology, or the study of Being and existing things. It is the study of reality. This fundamental and most basic feature of reality, that Being is, perplexed the great mathematician and philosopher, Blaise Pascal. He thought that any attempt to define what is, or Being, amounts to a tautology. In On Geometrical Demonstration, Pascal writes:

There are even those who go to the absurdity of explaining a word by the word itself. I know of some who have defined light in this way: “Light is a luminary motion of luminous bodies,” as if we could understand the words luminary and luminous without understanding the word light [lumière].

We cannot undertake to define being without falling into this absurdity, for we cannot define any word without beginning with these words it is, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore to define being we would have to say it is, and thus use the word defined in the definition.

It is sufficiently clear from this that there are words incapable of definition. And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused; whereas we make use of them with the same assurance and the same certainty we should have if they had been explained in a perfectly unambiguous way, because nature itself has given us, without words, a clearer understanding of them than we gain through art with all our explanations.1

The perplexity Pascal is pointing to is that Being, or “what is” is defined as that which is and seems to be circular because the words “it is” belong to the definition of Being. In a very strict sense, Pascal is correct. It is difficult to precisely define Being without using the terms “what is.” The reason, logically, is that Being is the most fundamental aspect of reality. It is the most basic point of departure for the metaphysician. No one can deny that Being, or something, is. Long ago, Aristotle pointed out that philosophy must have some very basic starting points and it is the mark of ignorance to not recognize this fact. We must have these first foundational starting points in order to avoid an endless regression of explanations. So, when the metaphysician starts from the basic assumption of what it is, and then explicates what is, he is not engaging in circular reasoning. Being is the fundamental principle of reality and why Pascal points out that it is difficult to define. The most fundamental aspects of reality are difficult to define ontologically. Pascal correctly points out that Being is so basic that it is intuitively correct—And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused. Being is both the logical and intuitive starting point for the metaphysician.

Being, is not as much a tautological worry as Pascal feared. And he partially answered his concern. I do believe that Being can be correctly defined even if it is a little imprecise. As Aristotle pointed out, Being can be said in many ways. Different kinds of being exist in different ways. Fictional characters such as Hamlet exist in a different way than my writing desk. But the philosopher is not alone regarding the difficult nature of ontology, or being. The physicist can give a definition of energy (a capacity for change) but can not explain its ontology (being). Definitions are elusive indeed. No one, however, denies that things that things like fictional characters exist in one way, while things like energy, or tables exist in another. The nature of Being forces us to re-examine the claims of children who passionately question what is or what is not.

Next time, we’ll begin our study of Hegelian idealism and the nature of Being. Hopefully, this excursus helped to clarify the foundational nature of Being.

1 Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters; Pensées; Scientific Treatises, ed. Mortimer J. Adler and Robert McHenry, trans. W. F. Trotter, Second Edition., vol. 30, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1990), 432.