Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Philosophy

Berkeley, Classical Realism, and the Metaphysical First Principles of Being, Part One

by Dave Seng
George Berkeley

Introductory Note: In 1995 Dr. Mortimer Adler wrote that idealism is “the greatest of all modern philosophical mistakes” (Adler 118). I believe that Dr. Adler is correct. Today, much of postmodernism, post-structuralism, and critical theory in all its forms is the result of idealism. To echo Richard Weaver, ideas have consequences. The next few posts will examine a particular form of idealism as represented by the Anglican bishop George Berkeley (1685 – 1753). The following posts will only look at Berkeley’s subjective idealism in general terms and then follow with the classical realist response. Berkeley’s most important and specific errors will be addressed later (such as his implicit Gnosticism). For now, just keep St. Athanasius in mind — That which is not assumed is not redeemed.

When it comes to understanding what is ultimately real (metaphysics), many of the truly great authors in the Western intellectual tradition can be divided between those who hold to idealism (that reality consists of mind and its ideas), and realism (that objects of sense perception exist independently of their being known). For the idealist, the mind is ultimate in determining reality, while the realist holds that being, or reality itself, is the proper starting point for philosophical reflection. The realist asserts that the realms of both consciousness (mind) and external objects exist and belong to the overall structure of Being. In one form or another, idealists believe that the contents of the mind are all that can be really known and the mind is the arbiter and, in some ways, creator of reality. In the history of Western thought, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel hold to forms of idealism, and Aristotle, Aquinas, and Whitehead represent realism.1 The next few posts will explore George Berkeley’s subjective idealism in light of classical realism (understood from the perspective of Aristotle and Aquinas), and assess the merits of holding to both mind and matter as the essential structure of reality, and explores whether or not Berkeley’s metaphysical position takes into account the first principles of being.

It is helpful to understand Berkeley’s version of subjective idealism before presenting and explicating classical realism. For Berkeley, perception is not simply direct sensation, it includes all the physical senses and mental ideas, including thinking, memory, imagination, and other faculties of the mind. In other words, perception extends to ideas, thoughts, consciousness, or mind. In fact, Berkeley specifically includes thinking with perception, “But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it” (414). He further explains, “For the existence of an idea consists in being perceived” (413). For Berkeley, every thought, imagination, and memory, constitute perception and, further, all that one really has access to is idea or mental experience. The cognitive faculties of the mind—our images (including memory, imagination, or imaginary figures such as unicorns), concepts (conceptual truths such as mathematics and the laws of logic), and physical percepts all reside in the mind, and it is mental experience that is all one can know. All reality is ultimately reducible to mind or consciousness. Perception is mental experience and all reality equates to perception, “What do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensation” (413)? Accordingly, Berkeley insists that something must be perceived by the mind in order for it to be considered real, “It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding” (414). For Berkeley, the individual perceiver is all-determining, since every thought, idea, and object is included in Berkeley’s definition of perception. This is Berkeley’s subjective idealism because all reality ultimately depends on the personal mental experiences of the perceiver.

Berkeley further explicates this notion with his famous phrase “esse is percepi”—to be is to be perceived, “For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them” (414). For Berkeley, the idea of an external reality that exists independently of the mind, or perception is conceptually incoherent. If a thing is not perceived, it does not exist. Essentially, Berkeley’s idealism follows this line of reasoning—all perceptions, concepts, and thoughts are ideas and can only exist in the mind. Therefore, everything exists only in minds. This does not mean, however, that something does not exist, or goes out of existence if it is not perceived or is no longer perceived. As an Anglican bishop, Berkeley believes God perceives everything and is the foundation of all reality. Because God perceives something, it is real and exists in reality (as part of God’s mind) even if no other individual is around to perceive it:

Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit—it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. (414)

In this manner, Berkeley suggests, as he does throughout his Principles of Knowledge, that he really does believe in an external reality because God or an Eternal Spirit perceives all things. For Berkeley, reality of a sort is possible and he narrowly escapes solipsism, which is often the end result of subjectivism. Nonetheless, all reality is fundamentally a mental perception or experience of the mind. For Berkeley, all reality is immaterial and ultimately exists in the mind of God.

As reality is not based on external matter, but on mind or a perceiving spirit, matter itself is illusory (429, 439-440). Only the most ignorant would believe that matter actually exists (423). In fact, Berkeley rejects the notion that a material world exists apart from mind, “But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable” (416)? Further, “The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance” (419).2 Berkeley posits that immaterial mind is the foundation of all reality. For Berkeley, if there is a conflict between mind and matter, the subjective and objective, or appearance and reality, all one needs to do is simply eliminate external material existence and the problem is solved. What is left is mind-dependent subjective appearance.

In the next post, we will explore why Berkeley thought it was important for something to be perceived in order to exist which is the point of contention for classical realists.

1Both idealism and realism show up in Western thought in various forms. The categorization of these thinkers is for the purpose of a general grouping while acknowledging that particular differences and emphases can be found in each individual thinker. Neither school is monochrome in its outlook.

2Italics in the original. It is not clear to which specific philosophers Berkeley is referring. However, it is likely he has something like Aristotle’s definition of substance as a combination of matter and form in view.

Works cited

Adler, Mortimer. Adler’s Philosophical Dictionary: 125 Key Terms for the Philosopher’s Lexicon. Scribner, 1995.

Berkeley, George. The Principles of Human Knowledge. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Ethics, Great Books, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Plutarch, Moral Excellence, And History: An Examination of the Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, Part Three

by Dave Seng
Roman Statesman and Philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero, 106 – 43 BC, detail of a marble bust; in the Capitoline Museums, Rome.

This is part three of three posts on Plutarch’s Lives. Part two can be found here.

That Plutarch and Aristotle connect morality with politics or society is neither uncommon nor hard to understand. For the ancients, the purpose of virtuous action aims at “eudaimonia” which means “well-being” or “happy-life.” The virtues are habits of conduct that provide happy well-being. Essentially this is achieved by finding the mean in ethical reflection and action. However, Aristotle’s starting point (along with much of ancient political philosophy) is that man is primarily a political animal. Moral excellence is not only necessary at the individual level but also at the social level because society is made up of individuals and all forms of moral excellence (individual and social) strive for the common good – that which is good for everyone. Ancient moral philosophy stresses the idea of the “polis,” or social community, which is formed for the realization of the common good and, as in the individual, the virtues are conducive to the common good, or well-being of the community (Miller 557). In other words, the polis or state is then responsible for nurturing moral excellence and enacting laws contributing to the common good and well-being. The morally responsible individual contributes to the common good by encouraging the state or community to pass laws and behave in ways that support moral excellence and human well-being.

A core value for the ancient Romans was the Stoic notion of “officium.” This was a strong sense of commitment to fulfill the responsibilities the individual was born to fulfill within the state for the common good. Stoic moral philosophy is also based on the view that the world, as one great city, is a unity. Man, as a world citizen, has an obligation and loyalty to all things in that city. He must play an active role in world affairs, remembering that the world exemplifies virtue and right action (Britannica 2006). Therefore Stoic political philosophy corresponds with much of Aristotle’s political thought in the emphasis of virtuous action aimed toward the common good, natural law, and a moral life based on rational reflection.

From the classical perspective, modern American individualism looks very strange. Classical ethical theory is focused on the larger community and the shared, common good to which the individual participants in that community contribute through their virtuous activity (Miller 558). Much more holistic in its approach, classical virtue theory would question much of modern American individualism focused simplistically on the rights of individuals. No one can pursue their own good completely isolated and independent from their social community or government.

It would go beyond the scope of this post to fully analyze every ethical system conceived in Western thought. I have simply tried to show the intellectual climate and historical background in which Plutarch wrote and outline a few implications from his ideas. There are several important insights we can learn from Plutarch and the first is that in classical virtue philosophy, moral values are inextricably fused to political values. The emphasis on virtue holds larger implications on the social community and state, which is why Plutarch wrote his biographies.

Also, a recovery of virtue ethics has practical ramifications for today. Society and the world of commerce should be interested in recovering the virtues. Capitalism itself should be aware of corporate leaders who lack virtue and make thousands of dollars while at the same time their company stock prices fall and workers are laid off. A recovery of the common good and virtue will be a healthy corrective to predatory capitalism. Some kind of recovery of classical virtue theory is needed in contemporary social and ethical thought.

Finally, Plutarch helps one to understand the intersection of history and moral philosophy. Plutarch falls within the tradition of the Roman historians Livy, Pliny the Younger, and Tacitus (among others) who insisted that the purpose of history is to teach us something by contemplating examples of morality. The first-century Greek philosopher Dionysius Halicarnassus even said, “History is philosophy, teaching by example” (Lukacs 40). When a historian such a Plutarch places before his readers examples of virtuous action it is natural to inquire what exactly is meant by moral excellence. It is helpful to use the analytical tools of reason and logic developed by philosophers to investigate moral conduct.

History also helps one to think philosophically in another sense. By contrasting and comparing (as Plutarch does with his lives) one discovers how to make similar comparisons to his or her own time. By looking across time and investigating the past, one discovers a broader perspective and will be able to offer correctives to one’s own contemporary situation. Sometimes the ancients made the same mistakes that we make today. Other times they do things in a superior manner which we should learn from. The study of history opens one to new ways of thinking and offers possibilities of viewing the world that spans across time and space.

History strengthens and enriches the human spirit. There seems to be something ennobling and inspiring when one reads Herodotus’ account of the battle of Marathon or the three hundred Spartans at Thermopylae. These ancient Greeks understood what it meant to sacrifice for the common good. Likewise, Plutarch’s accounts of Alexander or Caesar are equally edifying. History takes on existential implications when one reads Thucydides’ account of human nature and realizes that humans have always been driven by the same passions, desires, and appetites. History has a way of showing us who we are and what it means to be human. Plutarch understands history as a way to improve the human spirit and has a way of making his readers think through some of the enduring questions of life. For this Plutarch is correctly listed among the great authors.

Works cited/consulted

Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. ed. by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, Inc., 2001.

Lukacs, John. A Student’s Guide To The Study Of History. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2001.

Miller, Ed. Questions That Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy. 4th ed. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1996.

Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.

Pojman, Louis. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong. 2nd ed. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995.

“Stoicism.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 2006. Encyclopedia Britannica 2006 Ultimate Reference Suite DVD 5 July 2006.

Thornton, Bruce. Humanities Handbook. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 2001.

Ethics, Great Books, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Plutarch, Moral Excellence, And History: An Examination of the Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, Part Two

by Dave Seng
Aristotle

Part one can be found here. This post reflects on Plutarch’s emphasis on moral excellence and Aristotle’s sense of virtue when it comes to ethical foundations.

Plutarch believes that not any example of excellence will sufficiently induce his readers to moral virtue. A painting or work of art may be excellent and perfectly executed but the painter or artist may be wretched person. Plutarch explains,

For it does not necessarily follow, that if a piece of work pleases for its gracefulness, therefore he that wrought it deserves our admiration. Whence it is that neither do such things really profit or advantage the beholders, upon the sight of them, nor any impulse or inclination, which may prompt any desire or endeavor of doing the like. (121 – 122)

It seems to be Plutarch’s position that an artist or painter may or may not be a moral person, but the best use of art is to inspire great and good actions. What Plutarch really wants his readers to be inspired to perform is great deeds. He tells us that the best things his readers can contemplate for moral improvement are “acts of virtue.” He explains, “such objects we find in the acts of virtue, which also produce in the minds of mere readers about them an emulation and eagerness that may lead them on to imitation” (121). For Plutarch, then, moral excellence is connected to virtuous action.

Finally, Plutarch summarizes his argument by stating the importance of recognizing virtuous actions as a way to moral improvement:

But virtue, by the bare statement of its actions, can so affect men’s minds as to create at once both admiration of the things done and desire to imitate the doers of them. The goods of fortune we would possess and would enjoy; those of virtue we long to practice and exercise. We are content to receive the former from others, the latter we wish others to experience from us. Moral good is a practical stimulus; it is no sooner seen, than it inspires an impulse to practice, and influences the mind and character not by a mere imitation which we look at, but by the statement of the fact creates a moral purpose which we form. (122)

Again, we see the pragmatic emphasis in Plutarch. Moral improvement comes from observing expressions, actions, or events of moral excellence which influences the mind and character to move one towards a more excellent life. A virtuous character is formed by practicing good and honorable deeds. At many points, Plutarch states that virtue is a matter of practice and exercise. Moral excellence comes from a mind or character that is inspired to perform and practice good actions.

Plutarch is reflecting the classical Aristotelian idea of virtue and character development as habit. For Aristotle, humans have an inherent natural capacity to become virtuous. One becomes virtuous through practice and habit as he explains:

Virtue comes about as a result of habit … From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times. … Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. (Nicomachean Ethics, 952)

Along with Aristotle, Plutarch believes moral good is a practical stimulus and reasons that humans can be inspired to practice moral excellence by habit and example. Plutarch, however, never defines what virtue is. He seems to assume that his readers already know what he means by virtue. However, it is helpful to give a definition of what Plutarch might have in mind. Ethicist Louis Pojman defines the classical virtues as “excellences of character, trained behavioral dispositions that result in habitual acts” (166). There were essentially four cardinal virtues in ancient ethics – temperance (self-control), justice, courage, and wisdom (Thornton, 138). Plutarch states his desire to promote moral excellence but it will be helpful to explore how one might determine proper moral conduct and to better understand what he is saying.

Aristotle provides a compelling account of what virtue is and provides a helpful guide to understanding Plutarch and the larger questions of ethics and morality. Aristotle is also important because his ideas provided much of the intellectual context in which Plutarch wrote. For Aristotle, ethical virtue is a balance or proportion between excess and deficiency, intemperance and temperance, virtue and vice. Moral philosophers have called his position the “golden mean.” Aristotle states his position using examples from the physical world,

Drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly, the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean. (954)

The morally virtuous life, then, consists of living in moderation according to the mean between virtue and vice, excess and deficiency. Plutarch seems to be in agreement with Aristotle. The men he most admires are leaders that have exhibited temperate and noble character. Plutarch tells us that this is precisely why he wrote the lives of Pericles and Fabius Maximus,

And so we have thought fit to spend our time and pains in writing of the lives of famous persons; and have composed this tenth book upon that subject, containing the life of Pericles and that of Fabius Maximus, who carried on the war against Hannibal, men alike, as in their other virtues and good parts, so especially in their mild and upright temper and demeanour, and in that capacity to bear the cross-grained humours of their fellow-citizens and colleagues in office, which made them both most useful and serviceable to the interests of their countries. (122)

Plutarch believes the virtues these men exhibited had important ramifications for the state. It was their virtues that made them “serviceable to the interests of their countries.” Plutarch then is not only interested in ethics at the individual level but also at the social and political level.

Works Cited:

Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. ed. by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, Inc., 2001.

Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.

Pojman, Louis. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong. 2nd ed. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995.

Thornton, Bruce. Humanities Handbook. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 2001.

Ethics, Great Books, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Plutarch, Moral Excellence, And History: An Examination of the Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, Part One

by Dave Seng
Plutarch 46 – 119 AD

This is part one of a three part examination of Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans

The reason Plutarch is listed among the great authors is his ability to make his readers think about enduring human questions across academic disciplines. Plutarch is not merely a good historian but he also helps his readers think about truly significant questions of human existence. Some of the great questions of the Western intellectual tradition are – What does it mean to live a good life? In particular, what does it mean to determine right from wrong human conduct? What is the virtuous life and how does one attain it? And how do my actions affect the larger community? One of the reasons Plutarch wrote his Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans is to encourage his readers to pursue moral excellence. He wants his readers to examine the lives he is writing about and then spur them on to virtuous action. Since Plutarch does not give a clear definition of what kind of moral improvement he is discussing or what kind of virtue he is thinking of, it is helpful to explore the history in which he is writing and some of the ideas he could have been drawing from. Plutarch was writing in a particular time and place and he assumed his readers understood what he was writing about regarding moral improvement. However, because his notion of virtue is different from much of modern thought, it is helpful to re-examine Plutarch’s fundamental assumptions about moral and political behavior. By examining Plutarch’s historical and intellectual context, one will discover how individual virtue is related to the broader community and how different classical ethics are from modern American presuppositions.

Plutarch seeks the moral improvement of his readers but does not give a particularly philosophically rigorous ethical system as would Plato or Aristotle. Nonetheless, he does give some interesting and valuable ideas to think through when one is weighing ethical and moral systems. It is also important to understand the intellectual climate in which Plutarch wrote. Although there were many different ethical systems in fashion when Plutarch was writing (Epicureanism, Stoicism, and various mystery religions), his ethical ideas most closely parallel Aristotle’s teachings. Both Plutarch and Aristotle believed human beings were capable of rational ethical reflection and moral action. And they understood virtuous behavior, or its absence, to have ramifications for politics and community. Plutarch was not simply writing for the betterment of his readers, but for the improvement of the state.

Plutarch states in the opening paragraphs of his life of Pericles the moral purpose of his writing. He believes that by providing examples of good and noble deeds, his readers will be induced to similar great and good actions. In other words, he believes that by describing the noble deeds of the great men he is writing about his readers will intellectually ponder these deeds and then be prompted to act in morally excellent ways. Plutarch is a practical writer focused on human action and is convinced that moral reflection must be connected in some way to action. He is reflecting the classical idea that one’s words, thoughts, and deeds must be interconnected. Noble thought should be attached to noble action. If one’s words did not match their deeds, they were considered to be an inferior person or hypocrite. Also, Plutarch is concerned that many do not spend the kind of time on moral or ethical reflection that would be profitable to them. He believes human beings have a natural tendency for inquiry and observation but misuse these natural abilities. He explains,

…We blame those who misuse that love of inquiry and observation which nature has implanted in our souls, by expending it on objects unworthy of the attention either of their eyes or their ears, while they disregard such as are excellent in themselves, and would do them good. (121)

Plutarch is concerned that although humans have a capacity for moral reflection they may not use that natural ability for their own good. For various reasons, human beings seem to have a proclivity to either disregard genuine moral reflection or divert themselves from the great questions of life. Perhaps Plutarch is reflecting the ancient equivalent of T.S. Eliot’s poetic statement in the Four Quartets that as human beings, we distract ourselves from distraction by distraction. Often, we do not use our natural intellect for good, and we feel a need to distract ourselves from true and genuine intellectual reflection. This problem, however, seems to be inherent to the human condition itself judging from the fact that in no society do we find a majority of the population given over to important intellectual pursuits. (Philosophers and other intellectuals are often, with Socrates, in the minority.) Plutarch is merely pointing us to a very basic human element that transcends time and place. Nonetheless, if Plutarch is right in asserting that everyone has a natural capacity for intellectual inquiry and observation, then one wonders if it is possible to live an authentic or genuine existence by not pursuing intellectual and moral excellence. Plutarch shares this sentiment when he says, “He who busies himself in mean occupations produces, in the very pains he takes about things of little or no use, an evidence against himself of his negligence and indisposition to what is really good. (121)

Plutarch seeks to correct this human tendency by placing in front of his readers, great deeds that will cause moral reflection and virtuous actions. Though our senses take in everything from good to bad, he believes humans have an innate ability to discern good from bad and make value judgments. By focusing on the good, however, one may come closer to moral virtue. Plutarch writes “… It becomes a man’s duty to pursue and make after the best and choicest of everything, that he may not only employ his contemplation, but may also be improved by it” (121).

It is important to remember that ethical reflection is basic to human beings. It is part of what it means to be human. Ask anyone about any issue or news event of the day and you will find that they will immediately tell you what they find right or wrong about the situation. Moral reflection is a way of life whether we think it is or not. Plutarch is correct in pointing out that reflecting on moral excellence will aid us in exploring the deepest questions of human life and conduct.

Works cited:

Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 13, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1993.