Evil, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Uncategorized

The Metaphysics of Evil

by Dave Seng

Metaphysically, in the classical and Western tradition of Christianity, evil is defined as the absence or lack of a good quality in a thing or being. When we say a knife is dull, we are saying that it is lacking the good quality of sharpness and the ability to cut. When someone chooses to act morally reprehensibly, we are saying that something good is lacking in the individual. Evil can only be measured against what is good. In his Confessions, St. Augustine defined evil as a privation of goodness. Evil is not a positive substance but is the absence of being and goodness (as darkness is the absence of light). Evil can only be parasitic on the good (that is, the prior conception of good is always needed in order to determine something evil). The world and human souls are seen as created by the highest being, God (who is goodness), “from above,” but at the same time as corruptible by nonbeing (or evil) “from below.” God is, thus, responsible for the isness and goodness in the world, but not the nonbeing and evil. According to the classical Christian understanding of evil, the universe is good and is the creation of a good God for a good purpose. Evil—whether it be moral (rooted in the will resulting in pain and suffering), or natural evil—is not placed there by God but represents the distortion of something inherently good. Evil is always ontologically nothing or a privation of goodness.

Here we are only dealing with the metaphysics of evil and what kind of thing it might be. Of course other issues regarding evil remain.

For further reading consult the works of St. Augustine. His Confessions, The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love, and On Free Choice of the Will are very helpful.

Book Reviews, Culture, Philosophy, Philosophy of Technology

Review: New Romantic Cyborgs: Romanticism, Information Technology, and the End of the Machine.

by Dave Seng

Mark Coeckelbergh. New Romantic Cyborgs: Romanticism, Information Technology, and the End of the Machine. MIT Press 2017. 320 pp. $00.00 USD (Hardcover ISBN 0262035464 ); $00.00 USD (Paperback ISBN ).

The question is often asked in humanities classes or philosophy courses that examine the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, “which movement has had the most profound impact on our culture today – the Enlightenment or Romanticism”? It is often fun to hear students argue for either the Enlightenment or Romanticism because it is not hard to find evidence for either position in today’s contemporary intellectual climate. Mark Coeckelbergh, (Professor of Philosophy of Media and Technology in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna) addresses this question as it relates to technology and its effects on culture and society. Coeckelbergh clearly falls into the romantic camp with his book New Romantic Cyborgs: Romanticism, Information Technology, and the End of the Machine. Interestingly, a history of Romanticism and how it effects our relationship with technology has not been clearly discussed or defined in the field of philosophy of technology.

Much of the early philosophy of technology has examined the existential implications of technology on the individual and society—Marcuse One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, Barrett, The Illusion of Technique—or it has focused on the ways that human making is a way of understanding the world and therefore our being and becoming in it. Our contemporary technological mindset, not just the technology itself, has become a metaphysics all its own and has become the driving ontology of our age—Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, Grant, Technology and Justice. While it is certainly worthwhile to understand what technology is (ontologically or metaphysically) and its effects on the person and society, Coeckelbergh points out the interesting ramifications of romanticism on contemporary culture and technology.

Romanticism is a very difficult term to define precisely because writers such as Rousseau, Keats, Shelly, Wordsworth, and Coleridge often relied on concepts and elements that were not uniquely romantic and even changed their views as they developed and progressed. Nonetheless, in general terms, Coeckelbergh uses a standard understanding of romanticism which begins with Rousseau and includes many nineteenth-century poets and writers who emphasize the imaginative, intuitive, mysterious, exotic, and uncivilized aspects of the human condition against the perceived rational, balanced, logical, ordered, and perhaps totalizing views of the generation that came before them—those of the Enlightenment and Neo-classical period. The idea is, at least from the romantic view, that these Enlightenment ideas of formal rules, logic, and strict empiricism were inhuman and oppressive to genuine human authenticity, creativity, and emotion. In addition, Coeckelbergh takes an additional step to demonstrate that romanticism and the Enlightenment were never really that far apart when it came to science and technology.

Essentially, New Romantic Cyborgs presents and defends the idea that romanticism has ultimately won the day in today’s technological society. At the same time, however, he provides a critique of the more extreme forms of Romanticism which he believes are not helpful in understanding technology and its role in culture. In Coeckelbergh’s view, it is important to find a kind of romanticism that goes beyond a Platonic dualistic understanding of reality and technology and at the same time, argues that it is impossible, or at least difficult, to completely escape the romantic world-view. He explains, “This book explores how people today, albeit unintentionally, try to realize their romantic craving for freedom, self-expression, spirituality, utopia, and authenticity by electronic means and how companies unscrupulously respond to these romantic desires with electronic gadgets that become … romantic technologies” (4). Furthermore, Coeckelbergh phenomenologically examines how people use their devices in ordinary ways, and from that vantage point provides a discussion of the effects of technology on society. For example, when exploring the romantic impulses of the twentieth century, he states, “As children of twentieth-century romantic counterculture, we seamlessly fuse technology and romanticism. Engaging with our many screens and smart gadgets and shielded from the inner, machine-like workings of our devices (developed by science), we try to satisfy our romantic desires and are more like Rousseau, Novalis, or Wordsworth than we think” (4). To support this argument, Coeckelbergh divides New Romantic Cyborgs into three parts: 1. Romanticism against the Machine, 2. Romanticism with the Machine, and 3. Beyond Romanticism? Beyond the Machine? Before explaining how one might overcome Romantic thinking, however, Coeckelbergh presents a historical and cultural foundation of romanticism and technology drawing on historians, philosophers, and literary critical theory.

Part one mainly focuses on the perceived dichotomy between Enlightenment rationalism and Romanticism regarding science and technology and provides a cultural and historical foundation. For example, as early as 1818, Mary Shelly warns her readers about the danger of technology going out of control. Similarly, Max Weber (1905) calls modern technology an “iron cage.” And Heidegger (1977) is seen as Romantic philosopher of technology due to his emphasis of the “enframing” and danger technology poses to the individual and his tendency toward German romantic poetry (13). However, the section ends with an argument that romanticism may not have been strictly opposed to technology. Writers such as Mary Shelly, Leo Marx, and Herman Melville (all romantically inspired) also shared a fascination with science and the section closes by suggesting that technology and romanticism might be compatible in some way.

In part two, Coeckelbergh questions the opposition between romanticism and technology, humans and machines, culture and materiality (13). The argument is that the romantic relationship to technology cannot be reduced to mere opposition (13). For example, “… in the early nineteenth century, romantics were not only fearful of but also fascinated by the new science and technology that delivered magic machines, wonderful scientific phenomena, and mysterious forces such as electricity” (13). Coeckelbergh claims that Kant was haunted by both rationalism and mysticism (13). In addition, Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein can be interpreted through a gothic-romantic lens which captures both the horror and fascination romantics have with technology—the merging of life with the machine. Romanticism may be more complex than usually perceived and not easily reducible to escapism or antimachine thinking (14). With this foundation, contemporary culture is essentially romantic—beginning with Freud who developed a kind of romantic science of the self and continuing through the romantic hippie computing era of the 1960s and 1970s which provided the technology for individual freedom, revolution, and love. In this sense, we can understand that in today’s technological culture romanticism has merged with technology.

In part three, Coeckelbergh provides arguments that are critical of the union of romanticism and technology and examines the views of antiromantics such as Babbitt, Berlin, and Popper. He believes that many critiques of romanticism are unfair and romanticism never really did reject reason or rationality as such. Coeckelbergh indicates that the romantics simply wanted to redress a crucial error of the Enlightenment, namely the imbalance between individualism, sentiment, imagination on one hand and reason, science, and empiricism on the other. (219). While Coeckelbergh holds that the union between romanticism and reason does not finally succeed he turns to scholars such as Marcuse and Coyne to build an argument that would get beyond romanticism, and have a less dualistic world view. To get beyond the romantic framework, it is important to Coeckelbergh that we change our thinking. Cyberspace, for example, is extremely Platonic (Coeckelbergh sees a Platonic impulse in romanticism) and the figure of the cyborg in its postmodern form is still completely romantic (17). To really move away from romanticism, we would have to move beyond modern and Platonic thinking (17). Coeckelbergh explains how this might be done in a couple of ways. First, the Enlightenment-Romanitic binary could be overcome through skilled engagement which would decrease the modern romantic “distance” between science and the individual, and second, he explores modes of what he calls “nonmodern” thinking. Using Latour, and Szerszynski, he questions the disenchantment myth of romanticism and argues that if we really want to change our thinking into less modern directions, we cannot avoid a discussion about religion and spirituality, broadly understood (18). While it is admirable that Coeckelbergh seeks a more holistic view of nature and technology, including a nonmaterial aspect to reality, he seems to be very dismissive of Aristotle, the philosopher whose ideas would most likely help him in this goal. If it is true that romanticism seeks the union of essence with material reality, then philosophy of technology should become more Aristotelian, not less. One does not need to be a monist to achieve a holistic view of reality.

One of the strengths of this book is that it provides a critical process of inquiry and helpful analysis of inherited philosophical orientations regarding the relationship between technology and society. Critical self-reflection is always a good starting point when trying to understand and overcome previous biases and presuppositions. Due to the amazing advances of science and technology in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it is easy to overlook the influence of romanticism on society and, in this sense, New Romantic Cyborgs presents a solid counterbalance. It is not clear, however, that humans are essentially the same as machines, or that we are all cyborgs.

David Seng, University of Arizona

Metaphysics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Epilogue: A Twenty-First Century Meditation on First-Philosophy

by Dave Seng

[Note: As July quickly approaches, I will not be making many posts on this blog. I will have my two beautiful daughters with me for the month and much of my time will be spent with my family. These are the times I rediscover that love is the primary matter which holds our family together.]

At any rate, here are some initial and unfinished thoughts regarding physics and metaphysics. The more I delve into the concept of Being, the further I seem to go into the philosophy of science and the existential import of what it means to be and become in this temporal world. I remain impressed by how the classical categories of Western thought (specifically, act and potency, accepted by both neo-Platonists and Aristotelians) hold up and have stood the test of time.

Part two of my essay on Heisenberg’s appeal to Aristotelian metaphysics can be found here.

I probably won’t be able to explicate these further until August, but here are a few rough and undeveloped reflections that came to me when thinking about the intersection of science and the philosophical first principles of reality. Post below if you have anything to add or something which you think needs further discussion.

1. The Copenhagen School interpretation of quantum mechanics seems to indicate that we can say nothing about the properties of an atom or sub-atomic particles. All scientists can do is provide the results of experiments on them. Would it be better to say that the strange behavior of quantum mechanics demonstrates the classical nature of potential waiting to be put into act? Perhaps that is the nature or essence of quantum physics?

2. The mystery of causality. Predictability in the quantum realm may not hold in particular cases. That does not mean, however, that there is no efficient cause or sufficient reason for its action. An efficient cause may be unpredictable but that does not mean it does not exist.

3. The actual world we live in is alive with potentialities from the smallest elements of matter to human individuals. This is what we mean when we speak of “human potential.” Our world is charged with real potentialities, relationships, and interactions between real beings.

4. Many of the early scientists and mathematicians working on quantum phenomena such as Planck, Heisenberg, and Bohr were not strict materialists. Neither were other influential thinkers of the time such as Bergson, Einstein, Whitehead, and Hardy. They all understood that something more is going on in our world than matter, energy, and motion. In other words, they would have rejected the undue and uncritical acceptance of the scientific method as it is applied to every other field of inquiry such as philosophy, history, or the humanities.

5. Perhaps Einstein’s formula regarding the convertibility of matter and energy (Energy = the mass x the speed of light squared), points to Aristotle’s “primary matter”? (It may of itself have no form but must always be structured by some form or essence?)

6. The classic question of the one and many. Heraclitus was only half correct when he stated that all reality is in flux. Our world is not in total or complete flow or chaos. Even Heisenberg’s Indeterminacy Principle is not infinite. There must be something that perdures or there would be no sense of continuity. In this regard, quantum physics point to the classical question of the one and many (which also speaks to the nature of relationships).

7. The great conversation regarding act and potency which was started by Aristotle, accepted by Plotinus, elaborated by Aquinas, and rediscovered by Heisenberg needs to be explored, developed, and integrated for our time. Metaphysics is about recovering the first principles of Being.

Metaphysics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Between Possibility and Reality: Heisenberg’s Appeal to Aristotelian Metaphysics, Part Two

by Dave Seng

So what do Aristotelian-Thomist notions of act/potency and form/matter have to do with quantum dynamics? In 1975 Werner Heisenberg gave a lecture to German physicists and said, “good science is being unconsciously discarded because of bad philosophy” and sought to correct the situation with his book, Physics and Philosophy. The bad philosophy that Heisenberg wanted to redress was the materialistic, mechanistic, and deterministic view of nature assumed by Enlightenment physicists and philosophers. He specifically appealed to the metaphysics of Aristotle to correct the deterministic view of Newtonian physics. It is important to note at this point that much of Aristotle’s ideas were either thrown out or misinterpreted by early modern philosophers and scientists due to their materialist assumptions. Heisenberg’s appeal to Aristotle’s metaphysics was a bold new move for his day but he realized it made the most sense out the facts as they were presented to him.

So what was Heisenberg getting at when he explained the function of sub-atomic particles in the Aristotelian category of ‘potential’? In his book Physics and Philosophy, he tells us:

“In throwing dice we do not know the fine details of the motion of our hands which determine the fall of the dice and therefore we say that the probability for throwing a special number is just one in six. The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater, however, meant more that; it meant a tendency for something. It was a quantitative version of the old concept of “potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality” (396).

According to Heisenberg, the probability inherent in quantum behavior is potential – a tendency for something. (This might also imply a ‘telos,’ or purpose, but we will not develop that here.) Heisenberg is clearly stating that the many abilities, capacities, possibilities, or dispositional properties a sub-atomic particle has is its potential.

When explaining the unity of matter as energy or universal matter (similar to Aristotle’s ‘prime matter”) Heisenberg says this, “If we compare this situation with the Aristotelian concepts of matter and form, we can say that the matter of Aristotle, which is mere “potentia,” should be compared to our concept of energy, which gets into “actuality” by means of the form, when the elementary particle is created” (440). Here Heisenberg is intuitively correct. Matter is always in potential. Contrary to early modern philosophers such as Descartes and others, matter and form are not so easily thrown out. Matter and form, or as Heisenberg might say, energy as a form of matter are necessary conceptual tools which physicists use to describe the world. Here, it is important to note two things, the first is that potential is not empirical, the second is that potency is not pure chaos.

First, potential is inaccessible to the strict empiricist. No empiricist who believes that all human knowledge is restricted to what can be observed by some sense experience can allow for potency. Why? Because although potency can be observed through act as an effect (in hindsight, so to speak), it can not be directly observed by itself through sense perception. This is why no real scientist is a strict empiricist because they are always appealing to properties, capacities, probabilities, or capabilities of matter, even though potential is never known by itself apart from that which is in act. The second thing to keep in mind is that at the quantum level, the range of probabilities (potential) is not absolutely indeterminable or chaotic. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that the quantum mechanical behavior of sub-atomic particles is not absolutely indeterminate because it can only oscillate between a range of probabilistic values (Silva 638). This is why things correspond to their nature or essence. Potency can only have an effect on a range of possibilities to that which is in act.

Finally, Heisenberg claimed that many of his fellow physicists were coming to the same Aristotelian conclusions, “One might perhaps call it an objective tendency or possibility, a ‘potentia’ in the sense of Aristotelian philosophy. In fact, I believe that the language actually used by physicists when they speak about atomic events produces in their minds similar notions as the concept ‘potentia.’ So the physicists have gradually become accustomed to considering the electronic orbits, etc., not as reality but rather as a kind of ‘potentia’” (447). Heisenberg came to realize that many of his colleagues were beginning to understand the philosophical implications of quantum dynamics in Aristotelian terms. This should not be surprising since reality is the determinate of order and will always reveal its own intractable way of being.

Max Planck, who is considered the father of quantum theory, also held that scientific discoveries ultimately point to a metaphysical reality. Although he did not explicitly use the category of potential, he was very aware of the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics. “As there is a material object behind every sensation, so there is a metaphysical reality behind everything that human experience shows to be real” (97). Potency seems to be the best metaphysical category that explains the mysterious behavior of quantum particles. It certainly cannot explain the entire mystery, for there are still many remaining questions for science to explore but act and potency are viable options that the physicist and metaphysician can use to describe reality. These metaphysical co-principles have stood the test of time and point us to the nature of ultimate reality. In many ways, reality itself points to a metaphysical reality. Plank went on to explain that, “Metaphysical reality does not stand spatially behind what is given in experience, but lies fully within it. … The essential point is that the world of sensation is not the only world which may conceivably exist, but that there is still another world. To be sure, this other world is not directly accessible to us, but its existence is indicated time and time again” (98). The metaphysical co-principles of act/potency and form/matter help us understand what is happening in the physical realm.

From these remarks by Planck and Heisenberg, and through an investigation of the Aristotelian categories of act and potency, we see that reality by its very nature is oriented toward self-expressive action. In classical philosophy, the physical world is seen as “one and many” or “being and becoming” (both are needed to make sense of the world). Potentiality, however, is the category used for explaining the dynamic aspect of life. Nothing in the human, animal, or plant kingdoms can grow, develop, or meet its potential by being static. To stand out of nothing—the very meaning of existence—is to be oriented toward action and is the reason there is a metaphysical basis for reality, even at the atomic level. The Aristotelian categories of act and potency account for the dynamic and changing realities we experience in the world around us. Potency itself is not a strictly empirical phenomenon but is indispensable for accounting for and maintaining the integrity of the empirical data. There are all sorts of non-empirical realities that nature itself points us to—from the smallest sub-atomic particle to human nature itself.

[Special thanks and gratitude go to my friend Dr. Derek Gardner at the University of Arizona for keeping me pointed in the right direction regarding the issues around quantum physics. Without his guidance my ontology would have certainly failed.]

Works Cited

Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 56. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Planck, Max. Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 56. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Silva, Ignacio. “Werner Heisenberg and Thomas Aquinas on Natural Indeterminism.” New Blackfriars, 2013, 635 – 653.

For further reading:

Clarke, Norris. The One and The Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. University of Notre Dame, 2001.

Goetz, Stewart and Charles Taliaferro. Naturalism. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2008.

Trigg, Roger. Beyond Matter: Why Science Needs Metaphysics. Templeton Press, 2015.

Moreland, J.P. Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology. Crossway, 2018.