Being, Intellectual History, Philosophy

Excursus: Pascal And The Inescapable Nature of Being

Have you ever come across children arguing about something on playground? One says “is so” and the other “is not”? Each is emphatically stating that something is or is not the case. Each is attempting to persuade the other about reality. Perhaps unknowingly, each is making a metaphysical statement and assuming an ultimate truth belonging to reality. Each is tacitly assuming there is a reality to argue about. Reality is assumed. To say something is the case is to already assume “what is,” to assume reality. No one can deny that Being is. The question arises, however, because Being is so fundamental to our human experience, how does one go about presenting a definition of Being?

The inquiry into Being is the most foundational question of all. It is the basic starting point of ontology, or the study of Being and existing things. It is the study of reality. This fundamental and most basic feature of reality, that Being is, perplexed the great mathematician and philosopher, Blaise Pascal. He thought that any attempt to define what is, or Being, amounts to a tautology. In On Geometrical Demonstration, Pascal writes:

There are even those who go to the absurdity of explaining a word by the word itself. I know of some who have defined light in this way: “Light is a luminary motion of luminous bodies,” as if we could understand the words luminary and luminous without understanding the word light [lumière].

We cannot undertake to define being without falling into this absurdity, for we cannot define any word without beginning with these words it is, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore to define being we would have to say it is, and thus use the word defined in the definition.

It is sufficiently clear from this that there are words incapable of definition. And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused; whereas we make use of them with the same assurance and the same certainty we should have if they had been explained in a perfectly unambiguous way, because nature itself has given us, without words, a clearer understanding of them than we gain through art with all our explanations.1

The perplexity Pascal is pointing to is that Being, or “what is” is defined as that which is and seems to be circular because the words “it is” belong to the definition of Being. In a very strict sense, Pascal is correct. It is difficult to precisely define Being without using the terms “what is.” The reason, logically, is that Being is the most fundamental aspect of reality. It is the most basic point of departure for the metaphysician. No one can deny that Being, or something, is. Long ago, Aristotle pointed out that philosophy must have some very basic starting points and it is the mark of ignorance to not recognize this fact. We must have these first foundational starting points in order to avoid an endless regression of explanations. So, when the metaphysician starts from the basic assumption of what it is, and then explicates what is, he is not engaging in circular reasoning. Being is the fundamental principle of reality and why Pascal points out that it is difficult to define. The most fundamental aspects of reality are difficult to define ontologically. Pascal correctly points out that Being is so basic that it is intuitively correct—And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused. Being is both the logical and intuitive starting point for the metaphysician.

Being, is not as much a tautological worry as Pascal feared. And he partially answered his concern. I do believe that Being can be correctly defined even if it is a little imprecise. As Aristotle pointed out, Being can be said in many ways. Different kinds of being exist in different ways. Fictional characters such as Hamlet exist in a different way than my writing desk. But the philosopher is not alone regarding the difficult nature of ontology, or being. The physicist can give a definition of energy (a capacity for change) but can not explain its ontology (being). Definitions are elusive indeed. No one, however, denies that things that things like fictional characters exist in one way, while things like energy, or tables exist in another. The nature of Being forces us to re-examine the claims of children who passionately question what is or what is not.

Next time, we’ll begin our study of Hegelian idealism and the nature of Being. Hopefully, this excursus helped to clarify the foundational nature of Being.

1 Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters; Pensées; Scientific Treatises, ed. Mortimer J. Adler and Robert McHenry, trans. W. F. Trotter, Second Edition., vol. 30, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1990), 432.

Being, Metaphysics

Classical Metaphysics and Hegelian Idealism: Prefatory Remarks

Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know the nature of Being.

—Plato, The Republic

I will soon post a short series on the metaphysical idealism of Georg Hegel. What follows is a prolegomena which seeks to lay the foundation of what will come and provide some helpful interpretation of the concepts discussed. I am critical of idealism—the notion that the mind determines reality or that all reality is ultimately reducible to mind. Dr. Mortimer Adler once called idealism “the greatest of all modern philosophical mistakes.”1 So we will begin this introduction by discussing the concepts of “idea” and “reality” in order to see why idealism is such a significant error, and more specifically for this series, Hegelian idealism. Finally, we will discover that reality is not monistic (reducible to only one thing) but pluralistic due to the three modes of existence (real being, mental being, and intentional being). Monistic Hegelian idealism is an over simplification of reality.

To begin, we will start with Being or reality. In philosophy, the term ‘being’ most simply refers to the fact that something exists. It can be further analyzed into abstract being (such as ideas, mathematical entities, fictional characters, etc. that exist mentally) and concrete being (people, furniture, and things that can be experienced with the senses). Aristotle taught that the study of being as being is the primary concern for the metaphysician. In the realist tradition, the fact of being and theories about it are two distinctly separate ontological and epistemological questions (because one’s epistemological theories about reality might turn out to be wrong). Being, therefore, is another term for reality or that which is or exists in some way.2 Philosopher John Macquarrie provides this helpful etymology,

“To ‘exist’ or ‘ex-sist’ (Latin: ex-sistere) meant originally to ‘stand out’ or ‘emerge’. Thus the verb probably had a more active feel about it than it does now. To exist was to emerge or stand out from the background as something really there. Putting it more philosophically, to exist is to stand out from nothing”. 3

To exist, or to stand out from nothing applies to individual things and the universe as whole. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Being is not the study of one thing among the already existing things which exist; it is the study of why and how the universe is the way it is and explores the fundamental principles of its existence. When looking at the universe as whole, Being is not a genus. This will be helpful when it comes to understanding Hegel’s metaphysical understanding of the world. For Hegel, the fundamental principle of the universe is what he calls “world-spirit” or mind.

The series will explore the three modes of being—real being, mental being, and intentional being. These modes of being help us to understand that ideas are always about something. Ideas themselves do not create reality or have productive power. Aristotle is a helpful guide here. In his Metaphysics, he states, “It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth.”4 Aristotle is saying three important things. First, the being of the mind is different from being in complete reality.5 Second, just because we ‘think’ something is the case, does not make it so. Mental being, although real being (because the individual mind exists in reality), is not the same thing as external or actual real being (complete reality in Aristotelian terms). Third, there is a primacy in Aristotelian metaphysics of that which is in ‘act’ or physical existence. There is a primacy to external reality in classical metaphysics. The reason for this emphasis is that it is impossible to deny that being is. Mental being is different in kind, from physical reality. As we will see, intentional being, demonstrates that ideas are always of something else, and are grounded in both external reality and mental being.

What will be developed in future posts are what classical philosophers call the three modes of being—real being, mental being and intentional being. Real being, is physical reality—that which exists apart from the mind and independent of it. Real being exists exist whether or not the mind perceives it and is completely independent of the mind. Mental being includes subjective and objective acts of the mind. Mental being includes the subjective feelings that would not exist apart from the individual and the objective acts of memory and fictional characters. Antigone is a mental character but objective, a real character of literary fiction. The same is true regarding historical figures. Joseph Stalin once lived in reality but now is an objective figure of memory and history. Not all mental being is strictly subjective. Intentional being can only exist when there are two or more minds that can communicate about an object. The object could be an act of the mind or something in physical reality. In a sense, intentional being, is a via media, or middle way, between real being and mental being. Intentional being points to the ability of the individual mind to be “about,” bent towards, stretched out to, or focused on something. It is an act of cognition and includes the immaterial or universal nature of being because the mind is immaterial. The mind itself understands through a mode of immaterial existence. Through perception, the intellect receives the universal or essence of the object. This is possible, because the human mind can make abstractions about physical reality. What must be remembered, however, is that intentional being completely relies on both real and mental being. As we will see, all of this is collapsed in Hegelian idealism. To be an idealist one must deny real being.

Intentional being points us to at least two important concepts. The first is classical realism and how universals are to be understood and, secondly, that ideas are always of something (the primacy of real being). Daniel Sullivan provides a very helpful understanding of classical or moderate realism:

The view of philosophers in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas is that what is known exists as universal in the intellect, but as individual outside the mind. This position is called Moderate Realism. It is called realism because the universals really do exist in the intellect; moderate, because their existence stops there. Since the form universalized in the intellect is identical with the form individuated in the thing, we can say, following the traditional formula, that our ideas are universal in the intellect only, but have a foundation in things. Implied in this view of the nature of the idea is the spirituality of the intellect (otherwise the universal could not exist there) and the matter and form composition of all corporeal substances, including man.6

When it comes to understand Hegel, is important to realize that he was correct about the immateriality of the mind. What Hegel failed to understand is that Being is composed of both the material and immaterial. Mathematicians know that this is intuitively correct. Even Max Planck, the father of quantum physics, understood this, “As there is a material object behind every sensation, so there is a metaphysical reality behind everything that human experience shows to be real.”7 Part of real being is that it demonstrates mathematical and immaterial qualities. But Hegel mistakenly makes all reality part of an immaterial world-spirit. In this sense, Hegelian idealism (and idealism in general) is Gnostic—the theological error which denies or denigrates the existence of real being.

The second point, that ideas refer to something else is best illustrated by Dr. Mortimer Adler:

In view of the fact that ideas are natural signs which signify, refer to, or intend objects as their natural referents or significates, it would seem appropriate to speak of the mode of existence possed by objects as intentional existence… ideas are intentions of the mind. Their intentionality consists in their having significates or objects. Objects, as intended or signified, have intententional existence.8

In other words, ideas are the signs which signify reality. They are descriptive of the world around us, but not the world itself. Before Kant and Hegel, no philosopher in the Western intellectual tradition confused or conflated the concept of idea with reality.

After Aristotle, Augustine was among the first to point to intentional existence and the ability of the human mind to discern it. Regarding immaterial principles of reality such as mathematics and the laws of logic (noncontradiction, identity, excluded middle), Augustine explains, “I have heard the sounds of the words by which their meaning is expressed when they are discussed, but the words are one thing and the principles another. The words may sometimes be spoken in Latin and at other times in Greek, but the principles are neither Greek nor Latin.”9 Intentional being is possible because the mind can hold the principle as an object of thought and discuss it regardless of the language used. The idea points to the thing signified (object of mental being or object of real being). Intentional being is not the thought itself. Augustine further explicates this idea in his book On Christian Doctrine. The mind holds a middle way between the immaterial (the mind, mathematics, logic, moral truths, aesthetics, questions of value and meaning, etc.) and the empirical material worlds. Human existence lives between these two worlds. Regarding the mind, Augustine reminds us, “… it holds a middle place between the unchangeable truth above it and the changeable things beneath it…”10 In classical terms, the mind holds a middle place between real being and mental being. Intentional being brings these worlds together and helps us to make sense out of reality.

The next few posts will explore the nature of being, reality and idea as they are to be correctly understood. We’ll discover why Hegelian idealism is not a helpful view of reality. Why should we put this emphasis on reality and defend the classical view of moderate realism? The reason is that we want to be rightly and correctly related to reality as it actually is. When one is correctly aligned with reality, intellectual integrity and wholeness is brought about. An integrated philosophical perspective will help us to understand and live in reality as it is.

Works Cited

Adler, Mortimer. Adler’s Philosophical Dictionary: 125 Key Terms for the Philosopher’s Lexicon. New York, NY: Scribner, 1995.

———. The Four Dimensions of Philosophy: Metaphysical, Moral, Objective, Categorical. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Vol. 7. Great Books of The Western World. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Augustine. On Christian Doctrine. Vol. 16. Great Books of The Western World. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., n.d.

———. The Confessions. Vol. 16. Great Books of the Western World. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1993.

Macquarrie, John. Existentialism: An Introduction, Guide, and Assessment. New York: Penguin Books, 1973.

Planck, Max. Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers. Translated by Frank Gaynor. Vol. 56. Great Books of The Western World. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993.

Sullivan, Daniel. An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition. Charlotte, North Carolina: TAN Books, 2009.

1Mortimer Adler, Adler’s Philosophical Dictionary: 125 Key Terms for the Philosopher’s Lexicon (New York, NY: Scribner, 1995).

2As we will discover, things can be said to exist in different ways, depending on their mode of being.

3John Macquarrie, Existentialism: An Introduction, Guide, and Assessment (New York: Penguin Books, 1973)., 62.

4Aristotle, Metaphysics, vol. 7, Great Books of The Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996), 577.

5In book IX, chapter 3 of his Metaphysics, Aristotle connects ‘act’ with ‘complete reality’.

6Daniel Sullivan, An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition (Charlotte, North Carolina: TAN Books, 2009), 72.

7Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. Frank Gaynor, vol. 56, Great Books of The Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993), 97.

8Mortimer Adler, The Four Dimensions of Philosophy: Metaphysical, Moral, Objective, Categorical (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 113.

9Augustine, The Confessions, vol. 16, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996), 95.

10Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, vol. 16, Great Books of The Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996), 736.

Being, Natural Theology, Philosophical Theology

SPINOZA’S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AND AUGUSTINE’S NATURAL THEOLOGY: PART Three of three

Part one can be found here.

Part two can be found here.

It is true that natural theology reasons to a transcendent God based on the properties of being and the natural world, but the God that natural theology reasons to is far from an afterthought, or built on fictions. Many of the great Western philosophers such as Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas employ natural reasoning, appeal to being and becoming, logic, and the principle of causality to conclude that an eternal and necessary God exists. This is a very different approach than that of Spinoza’s and is worth investigating. From the standpoint of natural theology, it is illogical to presuppose that God exists in a sound deductive argument. Furthermore, according to natural theology, self-creation is a self-contradiction, and pantheism is impossible due to the laws of logic, contingency, and the principle of causation. Using this foundation, Augustine provides a helpful analysis from the perspective of natural theology.

Classical philosophers have found that natural theology is a powerful and thoughtful way to think about the existence of God. In fact, many thinkers of Western antiquity have used some form of argumentation based on the nature of Being, or reality, to reach their theological or cosmological conclusions. Natural theology is the approach many classical theologians and philosophers use to conclude the existence of a transcendent God. It is not a uniquely Christian way of argumentation either, because Plato, Aristotle, Jewish, and Muslim thinkers have used or adopted various versions of natural theology. Natural theologians and philosophers tend to focus on forms of the cosmological argument which reasons that God must exist as the ultimate cause of the contingent, physical universe.

There are many forms of the cosmological argument. In general, the argument follows from the contingency of the universe and usually adopts this line of thought: contingent, or caused, being depends for its existence on some uncaused being.1 The universe is a contingent being, therefore, the universe depends for its existence on some uncaused being. Another way of the putting the argument is this: Something exists (myself, Being, etc.). Nothing cannot produce something. Therefore, something exists eternally and necessarily. It must exist eternally because if there was absolutely nothing, nothing would exist now because nothing cannot produce something. Non-being cannot produce being. Further, it must exist necessarily because not everything can be contingent. All contingent beings require a cause due to the principle of causality—whatever comes to be (contingent being) has a cause. In general, most Western philosophical theologians argue from some aspect of Being whether it is contingency, motion, apparent design, or causality and conclude that because nothing cannot produce something, something transcendent must exist.2 The following analysis from Augustine provides additional insight into the nature and characteristics of Spinoza’s God and philosophical theology. In addition, Augustine appeals to logic and the natural order to make his case for the existence of God.

Interestingly, Augustine applies the law of noncontradiction when it comes to the nature and existence of the universe. The law of noncontradiction says that nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same relationship. As a property of being, the law of noncontradiction is fundamental to all thought, science, language, and is necessary to avoid definitional equivocation in correct reasoning. In addition, as a property of being, the laws of logic cannot be denied.3 The law of noncontradiction cannot be rejected in correct reasoning because it is self-evident and based on the idea that being and non-being are opposites and points to the nature of what is (reality). For something to exist, it cannot both exist and not exist at the same time or same relationship.4 To exist means to stand out of non-being or nothing. Being and non-being are opposites. Further, it is impossible to deny the law of noncontradiction without using the law in the denial. To say that the law of noncontradiction is false, assumes that the opposite of the claim is true. Opposites cannot both be true, which is the reason that the law of noncontradiction is foundational to all correct reasoning. This is important to keep in mind as Augustine draws on the law of noncontradiction and appeals to reality when he argues for the existence of God.

Augustine believes that the universe did not create itself and provides this natural theological argument based on the law of noncontradiction,

Earth and the heavens also proclaim that they did not create themselves. “We exist,” they tell us, “because we were made. And this is proof that we did not make ourselves. For to make ourselves, we should have had to exist before existence began.” And the fact that they plainly do exist is the voice which proclaims this truth. (Augustine, Vol. 16, 114)

Augustine is simply making the point that something cannot exist before it exists. If something did exist before it existed, it would have to be, and not be at the same time and same way, which is impossible according to the law of noncontradiction. In order for the universe to create itself, it must be before it is. Something cannot exist before it exists. Augustine thinks that self-creation violates the law of noncontradiction. According to the law of noncontradiction, the concept of self-causation is a contradiction. It is like saying there is an “uncaused effect” which is logically incoherent. Therefore, philosophers who hold to the natural theology methodology reject Spinoza’s concept of self-causation.

A natural theological approach rejects Spinoza’s rational presuppositionalism. The reason why, is that Spinoza’s methodology is circular in its reasoning. The presuppositional approach asks one to assume or presuppose that God exists in order to prove that God exists. According to Spinoza, God “is in itself and is conceived through itself” and “cannot be conceived unless existing.” In other words, “God is” (presupposition, one cannot think of God unless existing), therefore “God exists” (because a Perfect Being must exist). This is the heart of Spinoza’s methodology and presents an error in logic because the conclusion is present in the premises.5 It is the informal fallacy of begging the question. When the conclusion is present in one of the premises, the argument fails because it is circular and begs the question. It does little practical good when investigating the question of whether or not God exists, to assume that God exists in the first place. Finally, according to Augustinian natural theology, Spinoza’s pantheism is not correct because a transcendent cause of the universe is necessary. If the universe is contingent there must be something that is uncaused to create anything that may or may not exist. Self-creation is a self-contradiction.

On the question of God’s existence, Spinoza tells the inquirer to study the divine nature first (611), but the very question is whether or not the divine nature exists at all. On the other hand, a good valid and sound deductive cosmological argument will not (or should not) be circular. The existence of God is not assumed in a valid cosmological argument.6 Of course, no conclusion in a deductive argument can be stronger than the premises, but that is exactly where the conversation should take place (and does take place between philosophers of religion). Throughout intellectual history, there have been many doubts, challenges, and questions applied to the premises of natural theology and the cosmological argument, and that is perfectly good and appropriate. The circular reasoning of Spinoza’s overall rational presuppositionalism, however, is not helpful.

1 A contingent being is that which may or may not be or exist, any being which can be or can be made to exist or not exist.

2This is the general line of reasoning found in Aquinas’s “Five Ways” on pgs. 12 – 13 in Aquinas I, Vol. 17.

3 The three primary laws of logic are noncontradiction, excluded middle, and identity. They were first explicated by Aristotle in his Physics and Metaphysics. Here we will only focus on the law of noncontradiction.

4Many things in the world exist in relationship to one another. I, however, cannot both be my father’s father and my son’s father. That is a different relationship. Similarly, I may be the biological father of my son, but if my son were to be adopted by someone else, that would entail a different legal relationship.

5Another example of circular reasoning is Descartes’s statement, “I think, therefore I am”. Descartes presupposes an “I” and then concludes that an “I” exists. The conclusion is the premise of the argument and therefore, circular and invalid. Thankfully, Descartes later changed his statement to be understood as a self-evident first principle.

6This is true for any sound and valid argument whatsoever. The conclusion should never be a premise.

Works cited

Augustine. The Confessions, The City of God, On Christian Doctrine. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 16. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Spinoza. Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 28. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Being, Metaphysics, Philosophical Theology

A Personal Reflection on Metaphysical Realism

We shall not cease from exploration

And the end of all our exploring

Will be to arrive where we started

And know the place for the first time.

– T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding

On a personal note, I have to say that epistemology was the single area of study that made me want to completely walk away from the field as an undergraduate philosophy student. I began to think that all philosophy was an attempt to explain how one knows what they know in a purely cognitive or psychological manner. When one starts with a theory of reality, and not reality itself, it is very easy to become internally circular in one’s thinking. One never gets to external objective reality. Without ever examining the nature or being of reality as it is in act, all one is left with is a subjective and somewhat skeptical view of the world. Metaphysics—the study of ultimate reality—becomes an impossibility. One never gets out of Plato’s cave.

I came to understand, however, how such circular thinking is possible and why epistemology seems to be the central focus for much of modern philosophy. There are many reasons why modern philosophy begins with theorizing about reality rather than accepting reality as it is, but I think I can briefly point to the influence of Rene Descartes, Idealism, and twentieth-century Existentialism.

Ever since Descartes, philosophy and the development of intellectual thought in the West has emphasized the primacy of the thinking individual apart from the world or concrete reality. External reality, of course, can be doubted or considered uncertain. For Descartes, the only certain thing that can be known is the fact that one is thinking. This is the famous doctrine of his “cogito,” I think therefore I am.” Modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes, finds its point of departure, not in the fact of being (reality)—as Aristotle did—but with doubt and skepticism. The movement of the mind, for Descartes, was to go from the autonomous thinking individual and one’s ideas to the real and external world. Of course, this makes epistemology, one’s theory of reality, the starting point of philosophy—not reality itself. Rather than making being the concrete touchstone of reality, Descartes places the independent thinking individual as the center point of existence. Descartes’ emphasis of doubt, uncertainty, and the autonomous thinking individual eventually gave birth to the “hermeneutics of suspicion” so popular among critical theorists today.

Of course, Descartes was not alone in this error. Plato and Plotinus laid the groundwork for the rationalism of Descartes, and later Spinoza. Such disembodied rationalism made the Idealism of Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel possible1. No wonder we now live in an age where the human spirit creates reality, no matter how chaotic, disordered, or disengaged from concrete being one’s conception of it might be.

Post World War Two Existentialism did not help things either. Just one example, among many, can be found in the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre, who never recovered from his inherent Cartesianism, had a powerful impact on Western philosophy, and laid the groundwork for much of postmodernism. Sartre’s famous line, “existence precedes essence” was meant to overturn classical Western thought. It nearly succeeded. In his understanding, the goal of philosophy is to reject abstraction in all its forms and focus on the freedom, autonomy, and self-determination of the individual, liberated from all universal or external values. The existentialism of Sartre is certain in its conviction that the human being is absolutely free to create his own values and embraces a firm denial that values or ethical absolutes are to be imposed externally or from outside the existing human individual. The will is all-determining and defining in Sartrean Existentialism. When it comes to human moral behavior we are left with a hardened societal clash of wills2.

Of course, it is true that existence and essence are different things3, the existentialist error, however, completely separates them. When it comes to the human person, the essence, or rational soul, is completely bound to the existence of the individual. In Christian Aristotelian terms, everything in the natural world is bound together by form and matter. Among contingent things, there is no form without matter and no matter without form. This is true for human existence as well. A body without essence or soul is just a body, not a person. To exist means to be in act through the composition of form and essence. From this perspective, Sartre completely misses the point of human existence and what it means to be human.

At some point, I will write about the philosophy of the person and how to genuinely preserve the significance of the individual in today’s cultural climate. For now, what keeps me sane, is the re-discovery of classical metaphysics, the inquiry and study of being as being, the acceptance of being as a gift that is complete in its “giveness.” Being itself is what keeps one grounded because it can not be denied. It is the first point of contact anyone has and is of special interest to the metaphysician. Being is prior to philosophical reflection. St. Thomas Aquinas puts it this way:

Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being, because everything is knowable only in so far as it is in act as it says in [Aristotle’s] Metaphysics. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is that which is primarily intelligible, as sound is that which is primarily audible. (1, q. 5, art., 2)

Being grounds the individual because it the first thing one experiences in reality. Being is the giveness of order. One should walk away from circular philosophies that start with a predetermined theory of reality. But one should never reject the fullness and significance of being. I came to understand what T.S. Eliot was trying to explain in Little Gidding—actually, what he was emphasizing in all of his Four Quartets—that reality is the determinate of order. All reality has an order to it. Including the order of knowing, or how we understand the world around us. When the order of metaphysical reality is properly understood, we come back to the extra-mental order of place and time and receive it with renewed meaning, purpose, and significance.

Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica Volume 1. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996.

Notes

1Prior to Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, no philosopher was an Idealist, meaning no philosopher believed that the mind was ultimate in determining reality.

2Sartre would most likely disagree with this sentence. He would suggest that most people would work together for the common good, though, ironically, without a shared objective standard of good. Interestingly, he admits to the clash of wills in his essay entitled The Humanism of Existentialism.

3To learn more about this, read St. Thomas Aquinas’ wonderful text, “On Being and Essence.”