Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Ontology

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence: Part One

by Dave Seng

The prologue to this series can be found here.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is a fascinating figure in the history of philosophy. Hegel provides a grand metaphysical system that encompasses all elements of reality and perennial questions. For example, Hegel believes that the role of philosophy is to explicate the development of “reason,” or “idea” as it unfolds in world history, political life, and every aspect of culture and society. According to Hegel, when exploring the philosophy of history (how one is to understand the meaning and significance of history), it is important to understand that human events are the ordered development and process of the Idea or world-mind, “The concrete Ideas, the minds of the nations, have their truth and their destiny in the concrete Idea which is absolute universality, i.e. in the world-mind” (116). Whether Hegel is discussing the philosophy of right (systems of right actions, ethics, and contractual law) or the grand purpose of human affairs in history, it is “reason,” “idea,” and world-mind that fundamentally guides reality and leads to all truth, and in fact, knows all things (165-166). Hegel explains further, “This vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the world-spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it” (171). Hegel’s far-reaching metaphysics touches on all reality. To further grasp Hegel’s metaphysical system, however, it is important to more closely examine his concept of the “world-mind” and its implications for understanding the world.

In both his Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of History, Hegel uses the terms “world-mind” or “world-idea” and “reason” as a kind of immaterial guiding force for all reality and Being. Sometimes, he even uses the theological German term “geist” to capture this notion (88, 147, among others). For Hegel, world-mind is the one ultimate substance that binds and guides all things in the universe (163). The one essential nature or character of Being is mind. One of the great questions Hegel explores is the nature and character of reality (or what is known as “Being”). Being is the formal object of study for the metaphysician and it involves exploring reality, itself, along with how and why things exist as they do. In metaphysics, the study of being seeks to explore the ultimate foundations and causes of all that exists. The study of Being is a far-reaching inquiry which explores what it means for a thing to exist, the various ways in which a thing can exist, and the metaphysical principles which make possible a thing to exist in the first place. Being, then is not the study of one thing among the already existing things which exist; it is the study of why and how the universe is the way it is and explores the fundamental principles of its existence. In the classical Aristotelian sense, the study of reality (being) takes being as it is and attempts to carefully demonstrate the first principles of reality and describe what it means for a thing to exist.1 Through a careful understanding of ontology (what it means for a specific thing to exist), philosophers find clues for what it means for the universe to exist.

Hegel, however, does not take the classical approach of examining the properties of reality such as the logical laws of noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle, or the various modes of existence (rational, mental, and intentional being and the relationships among being), and develop a metaphysical system from there, rather, he begins with the “world-spirit” and its organic processes and development in the universe. Hegel reduces all being to mind, idea, or world-spirit and this is why his conceptual scheme for reality is known as “idealism.” In metaphysics, idealism is any theory which reduces all reality to mind and its ideas. Idealism makes the mind or “world-mind” (in Hegel’s case) the ultimate character, or substance of reality and makes all reality mind-dependent.

As pointed out, Hegel believes that all reality is driven by a world-spirit or world-mind. This world-spirit, is not the transcendent Christian God, but a nonphysical spiritual force that is immanent, indwelt, and part of the universe itself—what is known as metaphysical monism. Since Hegel reduces all reality to only one thing, mind or spirit, his position can also be identified with theological pantheism or panentheism (the idea that all is in God). The universe is in continual change and development due to the careful guidance of the world-spirit. Hegel’s position is known as idealism because he believes that all reality is based on, or consists of spirit, idea, or mind. Hegel connects this notion to his overall understanding of idealism, “Now it is the interest of spirit that external conditions should become internal ones; that the natural and the spiritual world should be recognized in the subjective aspect belonging to intelligence; by which process the unity of subjectivity and being generally—or the idealism of existence—is established” (231). Hegel argues that idealism is established if one can reduce all reality to the subjective aspect of intelligence or mind. He believes that the subjective intelligent individual serves as a kind of microcosm of the universal world-spirit or intelligence (162-163). If the universe is reasonable, there must be an ultimate intelligence or “reason” that is at work, infused into, and guiding the universe. Humans have the intellectual capacity of discovering reason at work in reality. Hegel applies this notion of “reason” to all aspects of life and the world, including this unfolding of idealism to history and human events.

In part two we will explore how Hegel applies the notion of the world-spirit to history itself.

1 Aristotle takes the primacy of being, or the fact of existence, as his philosophical point of departure. This is the point of his famous phrase “being as being” in book IV of his Metaphysics (522).

Works Cited

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Being, Intellectual History, Philosophy

Excursus: Pascal And The Inescapable Nature of Being

by Dave Seng

Have you ever come across children arguing about something on playground? One says “is so” and the other “is not”? Each is emphatically stating that something is or is not the case. Each is attempting to persuade the other about reality. Perhaps unknowingly, each is making a metaphysical statement and assuming an ultimate truth belonging to reality. Each is tacitly assuming there is a reality to argue about. Reality is assumed. To say something is the case is to already assume “what is,” to assume reality. No one can deny that Being is. The question arises, however, because Being is so fundamental to our human experience, how does one go about presenting a definition of Being?

The inquiry into Being is the most foundational question of all. It is the basic starting point of ontology, or the study of Being and existing things. It is the study of reality. This fundamental and most basic feature of reality, that Being is, perplexed the great mathematician and philosopher, Blaise Pascal. He thought that any attempt to define what is, or Being, amounts to a tautology. In On Geometrical Demonstration, Pascal writes:

There are even those who go to the absurdity of explaining a word by the word itself. I know of some who have defined light in this way: “Light is a luminary motion of luminous bodies,” as if we could understand the words luminary and luminous without understanding the word light [lumière].

We cannot undertake to define being without falling into this absurdity, for we cannot define any word without beginning with these words it is, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore to define being we would have to say it is, and thus use the word defined in the definition.

It is sufficiently clear from this that there are words incapable of definition. And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused; whereas we make use of them with the same assurance and the same certainty we should have if they had been explained in a perfectly unambiguous way, because nature itself has given us, without words, a clearer understanding of them than we gain through art with all our explanations.1

The perplexity Pascal is pointing to is that Being, or “what is” is defined as that which is and seems to be circular because the words “it is” belong to the definition of Being. In a very strict sense, Pascal is correct. It is difficult to precisely define Being without using the terms “what is.” The reason, logically, is that Being is the most fundamental aspect of reality. It is the most basic point of departure for the metaphysician. No one can deny that Being, or something, is. Long ago, Aristotle pointed out that philosophy must have some very basic starting points and it is the mark of ignorance to not recognize this fact. We must have these first foundational starting points in order to avoid an endless regression of explanations. So, when the metaphysician starts from the basic assumption of what it is, and then explicates what is, he is not engaging in circular reasoning. Being is the fundamental principle of reality and why Pascal points out that it is difficult to define. The most fundamental aspects of reality are difficult to define ontologically. Pascal correctly points out that Being is so basic that it is intuitively correct—And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused. Being is both the logical and intuitive starting point for the metaphysician.

Being, is not as much a tautological worry as Pascal feared. And he partially answered his concern. I do believe that Being can be correctly defined even if it is a little imprecise. As Aristotle pointed out, Being can be said in many ways. Different kinds of being exist in different ways. Fictional characters such as Hamlet exist in a different way than my writing desk. But the philosopher is not alone regarding the difficult nature of ontology, or being. The physicist can give a definition of energy (a capacity for change) but can not explain its ontology (being). Definitions are elusive indeed. No one, however, denies that things that things like fictional characters exist in one way, while things like energy, or tables exist in another. The nature of Being forces us to re-examine the claims of children who passionately question what is or what is not.

Next time, we’ll begin our study of Hegelian idealism and the nature of Being. Hopefully, this excursus helped to clarify the foundational nature of Being.

1 Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters; Pensées; Scientific Treatises, ed. Mortimer J. Adler and Robert McHenry, trans. W. F. Trotter, Second Edition., vol. 30, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1990), 432.

Book Reviews, Intellectual History

Review: Hegel: A Very Short Introduction

by Dave Seng

I am a fan of the Very Short Introduction series published by Oxford University Press. The series covers topics of history, literature, philosophy, and the sciences among others. Almost any academic subject is treated and the books are easily digestible and comprehended. I often recommend the series to those who ask me for an introduction to a philosopher or topic but do not want to immediately dive into a dense textbook. These books are great for anyone who wants a basic understanding of a topic, looking for a source that will aide their reading in the subject, or is beginning to read in a particular field and looking for a solid point of departure for further study. I have read several of these short introductions and gained valuable insight from them. I use one chapter from Floridi’s Information: A Very Short Introduction as required reading in one of my classes.

As I am currently reading through the works of Georg W. F. Hegel (primarily his Philosophy of Right, and Philosophy of History), I took a small detour and picked up Peter Singer’s Hegel: A Very Short Introduction. Hegel is an important thinker, but he not easily discernable. I found Singer’s short introduction to by helpful and what I needed to get back on track with my Hegel reading. So if you are interested in finding a “quick-start” guide to understanding Hegel, at least at the basic level, I recommend Singer’s Hegel: A Very Short Introduction. For me, Singer provides all the necessary explication of Hegel’s main ideas that I needed to make my reading of Philosophy of Right much more meaningful.

Singer divides this introduction into six chapters: Hegel’s Life and Times, History With a Purpose, Freedom and Community, The Odyssey of Mind, Logic and Dialectics, Aftermath. It would be beyond the scope of this review to break down each chapter. However, I will try to demonstrate why this introduction is worth reading, especially if you are interested in understanding the thought of Hegel. The two most important concepts to understand in Hegel’s philosophy is his idea of Geist and his conceptual theme of dialectic.

After situating Hegel in his historical context, Singer highlights and explains the most important aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. This is really helpful because Hegel was one of the last great system builders of the Western intellectual tradition. In other words, Hegel was among the last to attempt to make sense out of such perennial questions as (What is reality? What is the ultimate good? What is the total meaning of things?) and answer these questions in a complete and systematic way which makes sense out of reality and experience as a whole. Today, due to postmodernism, grand narratives of reality have fallen out of fashion. Hegel’s great interpretive scheme of the world is a cosmic one—a spiritual one really—grounded in mind or what he calls Geist (the German word for mind or spirit) it is where the English word for ghost comes from and also, interestingly, the word geyser. Hegel’s conception of Geist, then, is something like an immaterial life force or purposeful spiritual ‘world-mind’ that encompasses all reality (some translations of Hegel’s works use the term ‘world-mind’ for Geist). For Hegel, Geist, is the complete totality of all reality, including being and becoming, the mental and external, finite and infinite—everything is grounded in Geist. (As we sill see below, much of Hegel’s philosophy seeks to bring unity out of conflicting paradigms or opposing forces, for now it is enough to know that everything is grounded in Geist and the dialectic is the process that Geist uses to bring about unity from opposites). Singer explains that Geist is both a spiritual or mental force in the world and it is central to Hegel’s philosophical system. Singer puts it this way, “So crucial is this idea that Hegel actually says that the whole object of the Philosophy of History is to become acquainted with Geist in its guiding role in history” (60). So when reading Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, or his Philosophy of History, it is helpful to understand that Hegel is trying to explain how the world-mind, or Geist is driving society, nations, ethics, law and history.

The concept of dialectic is also important to Hegel. In Philosophy of Right, Hegel is careful to distinguish his method of dialectic from that of Socrates and Plato. Dialectic, means ‘conversation’ and in philosophy, in the classical sense, dialectic means the rational and analytical investigation of truth through conversation and dialogue. According to Hegel, however, Plato’s dialectical method does not go far enough. Hegel thought that coming to greater clarity about something through conversation did not serve a greater historical purpose. For Hegel, dialectic is the process which Geist reconciles conflicting ideological forces in history. Singer explains that there is nothing mysterious about Hegel’s line of thought. He further points out that Hegel developed this formula in his work on logic. The dialectic starts with an assertion or proposition, the thesis, moves to a second stage which is the opposite of the thesis, the antithesis, and is unified in what Hegel calls the synthesis. Hegel applies this line of thinking to various movements in history from classical Greece, the Reformation, and the French revolution to name a few. A really quick example might help. In political economics a Hegelian dialectic could look like this—Thesis: Capitalism (private property is allowed) Antithesis: Communism (private property is not allowed), Synthesis: Fascism (private property and enterprise is allowed as long as the producers obey the dictates of the totalitarian State) this is oversimplified, of course, but Hegel’s dialectic is an attempt to show the unification of opposing ideas in a new idea. The thesis would be the first stage in history, the antithesis would be the second state in history, the historical working out of the opposite idea, and the synthesis would be the final stage of some kind of new intellectual or historical unity. For Hegel, however, the dialectic does not stop at the synthesis. The synthesis becomes the foundation of a new thesis and the dialectic moves on to greater and grander abstraction.

Some scholars have doubted the importance and significance of Hegel’s dialectic. To Hegel, it was very significant. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with it in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. It was also an influence on Marx, who modified the formula to what he called dialectical materialism. Marx made the dialectic a purely material phenomenon. Singer’s introduction does a great job explaining these ideas and he clearly demonstrates the influence of Hegelian philosophy on other thinkers such as Marx and how those ideas have influenced the world around us. Singer’s short book Hegel: A Very Short Introduction is very helpful for those who want to gain a better understanding of Hegel and his importance in intellectual history.

Works Cited

Singer, Peter. Hegel: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2001.

Great Books, Intellectual History, Natural Theology

Spinoza’s Philosophical Method and Augustine’s Natural Theology: Part Two

by Dave Seng

Part one can be found here.

The presuppositional method of Spinoza’s philosophy is an important part of the structure of his metaphysical system and generally follows Descartes’s reasoning. Spinoza does not argue for the existence of God discursively, deductively, or dialectically in the way Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, or Aquinas frames a cosmological argument, reasoning from an effect (the universe) to a cause (God).1 Spinoza believes that God necessarily exists because the notion of perfection proves that he exists. Spinoza puts it this way,

Perfection consequently does not prevent the existence of a thing, but establishes it; imperfection, on the other hand, prevents existence, and so of no existence can we be more sure than the existence of the Being absolutely infinite or perfect, that is to say God. For since His essence shuts out all imperfection and involves absolute perfection, for this very reason all cause of doubt concerning His existence is taken away, and the highest certainty concerning it is given,—a truth which I trust will be evident to any one who bestows only moderate attention. (593)

Spinoza reasons that both perfection and existence are properties of being and since God is the Perfect Being, God’s existence follows because existence is a necessary part of being. For Spinoza, God is the Perfect Being and substance of the universe. In fact, Spinoza thinks that those who reason from the natural order (what is) to the conclusion of God, “have not observed the proper order of philosophic study” (610). He explains,

For although the divine nature ought to be studied first, because it is first in order of knowledge and in the order of things, they think it last; while, on the other hand, those things which are called objects of the senses are believed to stand before everything else. Hence it has come to pass that there was nothing of which men thought less than the divine nature while they afterwards applied themselves to think about God, there was nothing of which they could think less than those prior fictions upon which they had built their knowledge of natural things, for these could in no way help to the knowledge of the divine nature. (611)

As a rationalist, Spinoza believes it is wrong to start with the “objects of the senses” because he thinks all knowledge comes by reason alone. After all, as Descartes famously insists, the senses can be wrong. Natural things, according to Spinoza do not provide knowledge of the divine. Arguments from natural reasoning, are based upon “fictions.” Instead, Spinoza thinks it is best to start with the existence of God, assumed or presupposed, and rationally describe the divine nature from there. “The divine nature ought to be studied first” according to Spinoza and he reasons that any natural argument from existence to an eternal and necessary Being is philosophically backwards. He thinks natural theology makes God an afterthought. In addition, Spinoza believes that God must be presupposed, or assumed, when it comes to the existence of the natural order, “Every one must admit that without God nothing can be nor be conceived; for every one admits that God is the sole cause both of the essence and of the existence of all things” (610). In other words, according to Spinoza, when considering the question of whether or not God exists, it must be assumed there is a God because “nothing can be nor be conceived” without God. A genuine inquiry into the existence or non-existence of God is not a viable option for Spinoza because God must be assumed and all reasoning must start from there. Spinoza repeats this assertion on page 611 of his Ethics, “individual things cannot be nor be conceived without God.” One reason why Spinoza takes this position is that he believes that all things and people are really a part of God. If all things are a part of God, it is unreasonable to discount the existence of God.

Spinoza, goes further than Descartes, however, and equates God with the universe which is pantheism. This is an important difference between Descartes and Spinoza. Like Descartes, Spinoza is a rationalist in his epistemology, unlike Descartes, Spinoza, is a pantheist in his theological perspective. Pantheism is the philosophical and theological position that equates God with the universe. With pantheism, the universe and God are one entity. In other words, the natural world and God are the same thing. According to Spinoza, “whatever is, is in God” (594) and “…in nature … only one substance exists, namely God” (600). Spinoza further claims that, “Hence it follows with the greatest clearness, firstly that God is one, that is to say … in nature there is but one substance, and it is absolutely infinite” (594). Finally, Spinoza concludes “All things which are, are in God and must be conceived through Him.” (597). Spinoza thinks that God is in all and all is in God. Spinoza’s metaphysical commitments ultimately lead him to conclude that all reality can be reduced to one thing, natural substance, which is God. The individual, particular things of this world are simply modes or attributes of the universal substance of God.

Spinoza, assumes or presupposes the nature of God’s existence because he is a rationalist, meaning that he believes all philosophic knowledge can be acquired through reason alone, apart from sense experience, or any appeal to external reality. God must exist because God is the perfect Being. God is in all and all are in Him. Spinoza’s rationalism also leads him to conclude that there can only be one substance in the universe and that substance is God. Further, Spinoza thinks that God, or the universe, created itself. He believes that the universe is the cause of itself (590). One of his earliest axioms in the Ethics is “that which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself” (589). Later, he concludes, “for the thing whose nature (considered, that is to say, in itself) involves existence, is the the cause of itself and exists from the necessity of its own nature alone” (emphasis added, 599). For Spinoza, the reason why the universe exists is because the universe, which is God, made itself. Spinoza’s philosophical method for arguing to the existence of God is very different from Augustine’s.

Next time, we will examine how Augustine’s natural theology is different from Spinoza’s and why self-creation is a logical contradiction.

1Plato argued for a Demiurge or God-like artisan of the universe based on the reality of Being. Aristotle argued for a “Prime Mover” reasoning that an actual uncreated being is necessary to actualize the potency of the universe. Augustine and Aquinas also argued from the reality of Being to the creator Christian God. All thinkers agree that non-being cannot create being.

Works Cited

Spinoza. Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 28. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.