Classical Apologetics, Natural Theology, Philosophical Theology

Is Belief in God Properly Basic? Part Two

Philosophy is the knowledge of all things in their first principles or causes as seen by the natural light of reason — Daniel J. Sullivan

In part one, I indicated some questions and concerns I developed when I was a Reformed epistemologist. (Reformed epistemology being an anti-evidentialist and somewhat Calvinist view which holds that belief in God is a properly basic belief requiring no rational justification.) I must be honest, again, and say that I’ve moved away from epistemology as the starting point of philosophy, in general, and have moved on to metaphysics and the study of being. So even though metaphysics will always have an epistemic side to it, I am not an epistemologist, although I have given some thought to it. Nonetheless, as we discussed last time, Reformed epistemology (RE) is very broad and vague. I want to unpack and clarify some of these concerns a little more here.

One reason I say that RE is vague is that even though Alvin Plantinga claims to be a Reidian foundationalist, so too, did the Old Princetonians who were Reformed as well. And yet, the positions of the old Princetonian common sense realists are very different from Plantinga’s conceptual scheme. As indicated in the last post, the Reformed scholastics and Old Princeton theologians had a very strong sense of natural theology and espoused a high regard for the use of evidence and reason in presenting Christian truth. Having become Lutheran, I will admit to becoming a little rusty on the Reformed tradition. Nonetheless, the Lutheran scholastics, on the issues of faith and reason, are not that far apart from the classical Reformed in their use of natural theology, logical reasoning, and use of evidence (here I am thinking only in terms of philosophical theology or natural theology, not theology proper). I do not want to be too repetitive but I would encourage everyone to read Luther (as far as he approved the cosmological argument), Melanchthon, and the Lutheran scholastic theologians J. Musaeus, and Milton Valentine who were realists, foundationalists, and, unlike Plantinga, held to a robust and thoroughgoing natural theology. But why would we see such a philosophical similarity here between such different traditions as the Reformed and Lutheran? The answer is that many of the Lutheran and Reformed scholastics were Aristotelian in their approach to philosophical questions. And what was first seen by Aristotle to be the way things are, is still the way things are, for the structure of reality does not change from generation to generation (Sullivan, 278). Our understanding, of course, deepens as we can make greater metaphysical insights but the order of reality does not change.

What does this have to do with Plantinga and RE? First, I think, Plantinga is coming from a different strain of Reformed thought, one that disregards natural philosophy or at least downplays its significance (many on the Calvinist side will claim there is no such thing as natural theology). I merely want to point out that the “reformers” he appeals to, and the Protestant scholastic tradition generally, may not have really understood his concept of properly basic belief. Further, Plantinga’s system of thought is a departure from classical Protestant scholasticism and orthodoxy.

Another way RE is vague is its theory of knowledge. Some representatives of RE hold to foundationalism (the belief that all knowledge rests ultimately on fundamental truths which are themselves not subject to any proof and are the foundations of other truths, ironically a very Aristotelian idea.) A quick survey of a few practitioners of RE demonstrates this. Kelly James Clark is a personalist and subjectivist following the trajectory of Kierkegaard and Pascal (although Clark does seem to espouse a kind of broad foundationalism in his book Return to Reason). William Alston is a reliabilist and holds to the correspondence theory of truth. And Nicholas Woltersdorff is a coherentist, while Randal Rauser is a moderate foundationalist. Alvin Plantinga is a functionalist (although he would most likely hold to a broad foundationalism). To understand RE, as a school of thought is very difficult. The best way to understand this method is to understand that it is very broad and some thinkers will probably disagree with others on certain points (not very surprising as anyone knows who has investigated any school of philosophy). But as an epistemology, which the methodology claims to be, it is problematic and confusing due to its lack of clarity. Apparently, a variety of epistemologies can be included in the term “Reformed epistemology”. The only common theme is that it is a kind of foundationalism and a type (unique perhaps) of evidentialism. 

I do not want to do much more criticism at this point. From a classical perspective, RE contains elements of truth and error. It might be more helpful to illustrate how RE actually lead me to the classical apologetic method. In part three, I’ll discuss some problems with intuitionism and the error of making epistemology drive one’s philosophy (in short, one’s theory of knowledge is a separate issue from the question of reality itself). 

Back when I was reading everything I could about RE, I realized it suffered from the same criticisms as other methodologies. How does the concept of God, as a properly basic belief which requires no other evidence, account for the Christian God? Could not my Hindu friend’s conception of Shiva be just as properly basic? In other words, the best that RE could do is attain to a kind of generic theism. But how exactly are two different and contradictory properly basic beliefs to be adjudicated? Many practitioners of RE claim one needs to appeal to external evidence, a properly functioning cognitive structure, and human reason. The truth is, at some point, we have to deal with external reality and utilize some method of verification and many representatives of Reformed epistemology acknowledge this. It does not seem to be helpful to provide reasons and evidence why no reasons or evidence are needed to be rational or justified in one’s belief in God.  

What I learned from Reformed epistemology is that enlightenment empiricism and narrow foundationalism is a difficult position to defend. The worry, for those who hold to RE, is that after the enlightenment, we are all now narrow empiricists. Plantinga and others are correct to point out this epistemological error. I think Reformed epistemologists are correct to argue for a broad foundationalism. The interesting thing I discovered is that the perennial and classical method of Aristotle and Aquinas never held to such a narrow epistemology. It is a mistake for Reformed epistemologists to charge the classical theist with an epistemology he or she does not hold to. 

In order to avoid fideism, and I think they narrowly escape the charge, Reformed epistemologists have to give reasons and evidence for their position. They do embrace a form of foundationalism, in order to make sense out of their methodology. This is what lead me back to the classical method. Because Reformed epistemologists hold to a type of epistemic evidential foundationalism, it just made the most sense to be intellectually honest and adopt the stronger position developed from natural theology known as classical apologetics. Protestant and Lutheran scholasticism supports this move. Although it is possible that I have missed something, I have never encountered a representative of classical apologetics who held to an enlightenment epistemology, at least the way Clark or Plantinga claims. At least from the Lutheran side, classical apologetics is in full agreement with the subjective and objective aspects of knowing and understands the significant distinction of the ministerial and magisterial use of reason. I have not seen Reformed epistemologists address these issues. I also believe that the Aristotelian and Thomist categories of human capacities and potentialities in the reasoning process and the thinking individual composed of both form and matter (hylomorphism) avoid the narrow evidential charge by a long-shot! 

Finally, I understand that some Thomists have adopted Reformed epistemology as an epistemology. One does not have to be Reformed to adopt Reformed epistemology. I once attended a lecture given by the Catholic philosopher Francis Beckwith who used Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology to argue for the existence of God. This makes sense because it is an epistemology (theory of knowledge) that makes use of reason and evidence. But Reformed epistemology is just that, an epistemology. It is important to go on to develop reasons and use evidence for one’s position. Reformed epistemology is not the entire story. In part three I will discuss other concerns I have about RE such as why we do not want to start with epistemology, and why metaphysics is the strongest and most concrete point of departure.

Works cited.

Sullivan, Daniel. An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition. TAN Books, 2009.

For further reading:  Norman Kretzmann, “Evidence Against Anti-Evidentialism,” in the book Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology, ed. Kelly James Clark.

Classical Apologetics, Culture, Intellectual History, Natural Theology, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Stephen Meyer: God and the Origin of the Universe

Socrates once said that the unexamined life is not worth living. Perhaps as Christian theists, Socrates’s famous phrase could be revised to say that the unexamined faith is not worth having. Stephen Meyer helps us to understand this point.

Thomas Aquinas believed there is design, meaning, and significance to the created order of all the diverse things in the universe. Diverse things do not come together unless they are designed and ordered to come together. Since the universe demonstrates order, design, and purpose there must be one Orderer and Designer of the universe. (If this reminds you of the ancient metaphysical question of the one and the many, you are correct.) Stephen Meyer’s presentation fits nicely into this classical Christian understanding.

Book Reviews, Natural Theology, Philosophical Theology, Theology, Uncategorized

Review: Five Views on Apologetics

[Note: This essay was published about 17 years ago in Tabletalk when I worked at Ligonier Ministries. It is an older piece but perhaps it will be of some help.]

Book Review

Five Views on Apologetics Ed. By Steven B. Cowen

Zondervan Publishing House, 2000.

Assessing Apologetic Methodologies

Editor Steven B. Cowen presents the aspiring apologist with a highly valuable resource with the volume Five Views on Apologetics, (FVOA) published by Zondervan. The work is generally very readable and any informed layperson would find this book clear and concise. All Christians who seek to think rationally and critically about the truth of Christianity will find the book very helpful. The strength of the volume rests in its presentation and defense of various schools of apologetic methodology. The reader is introduced to all five major schools—classical, evidential, cumulative case, presuppositional, and reformed epistemology.

William Lane Craig presents the Classical method, which he states is based on natural theology and Christian evidence such as the deity of Christ, the reliability of the Scripture, and the resurrection (28). Craig holds a two-step approach to apologetics in which he argues for the truth of theism based on Thomas Aquinas’ “Five Ways” to establish that we live in a theistic universe and then argues for Christianity based upon various kinds of evidence. Craig’s argumentation is strong but his most interesting contribution lies with his discussion of faith and reason drawn principally from Martin Luther. Craig uses Luther’s categories of the magisterial use of reason and the ministerial use of reason (36). Luther called the magisterial use of reason that which adjudicates the truthfulness of the gospel based upon shear reason alone. In the magisterial use of reason, human reasoning becomes the basis and foundation for faith. The ministerial use of reason is how the Holy Spirit guides the Christian in deciding Christian truth claims, “reason submits to and serves the gospel” (36). Most theologians reject the former and accept the latter as the appropriate use of reason. Craig claims, “Reason under the sovereign guidance of God’s Spirit and Word is a useful tool in helping us to understand and defend our faith” (37). Many of the 17th century Protestant and Lutheran Scholastics, found the ministerial use of reason helpful in discerning the place and purpose of philosophy and establishing sound principles derived from Scripture.

Evidential apologetics focuses largely on the historical evidence for Christianity. While Classical apologetics argues deductively (reasoning in which the conclusion follows with logical necessity from the premises), Evidential apologetics is largely inductive in its approach. Inductive reasoning is a form of argumentation that draws its conclusion based upon probability. (Inductive reasoning is used most often by historians and scientists and is empirical in nature.) The evidentialist, then, will draw the best possible conclusions based upon his or her premises. Evidential apologetics is termed a “one-step” approach (as opposed to Craig’s two-step method) because it seeks to argue from the very essence of what Christians believe.

Gary Habermas contributes arguments from the historical nature of Christian events based upon what he calls a “minimal facts” approach. Minimal facts, according to Habermas, are facts that are either accepted by critics or facts that would be absurd for critics to deny. The strength of the evidential method is in asserting the historical character of the Christian faith. Evidentialists will argue for theism and, more specifically, Christian theism but do not stress an elaborate use of natural theology the way classical apologists will. Nevertheless, Habermas claims that “historical evidence can serve as a species of argument for God” (92).

Paul Feinberg, the cumulative case contributor, presents a case for Christianity that is rationally compelling. Feinberg does not build his case for Christianity based on formal logical proof (i.e. inductive or deductive reasoning) but claims the best case for Christianity will be somewhat similar to how a lawyer presents a brief in a law court, or how a historian explains facts and events, or how a literary critic presents an interpretation of literature (151). The cumulative case method is sometimes called the “inference to the best explanation approach” (152). Feinberg draws from a wide variety of evidence that is common to our human experience. Cumulative case apologetics views Christian theism, other theistic religions, and atheism as systems of belief (151). The cumulative case apologist will then marshal all available evidence from the fields of history, literature, law, and philosophical theology to discern which system of belief makes more sense out the facts of our human condition.

John Frame represents the presuppositional school of apologetics. The main thrust of Frame’s argumentation is that the Bible is the only certain source of truth, ethics, and epistemology. Presuppositionalists claim that the noetic effects of sin have affected human reason in such a way that there is little or no common ground between the Christian and non-believer. The apologist, therefore, must presuppose the truth of Christianity and then argue “transcendentally” that is, the presuppositionalist would claim that every fact and argument presupposes the God of the Scriptures.

Finally, Kelly James Clark rounds out the discussion of apologetic methodology with his version of Reformed epistemology. In contrast to the classical, evidential, and cumulative case schools, Reformed epistemology claims that one’s belief in God is rational apart from evidence. The Reformed epistemologist does not deny that evidence is available or important, but claims that evidence is not necessary for rational theistic belief. Reformed epistemology argues that we know many things intuitively without empirical evidence, such as 2 + 2 = 4, moral truths such as kindness is always a virtue and killing people for fun is always wrong, and memory facts such as “I had breakfast this morning.” Clark also suggests that belief in God is more like the belief that other people exist (272). Belief in God is not arbitrary, however, and Clark points to Calvin’s doctrine that every human person has been imbued with a sense of the divine. Nonbelievers simply suppress this knowledge due to their sinfulness (Romans 1).

The apologetic task has long been a part of the Christian intellectual tradition. Christians from the earliest days of the faith can be seen contending for the faith that was delivered to the saints (Jude 3). This is easily seen in Justin Martyr’s Disputations with Trypho the Jew, Athenagoras’ Supplication to The Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, Augustine’s City of God, and various works by Anselm, Aquinas, Pascal, and Alvin Plantinga in the Twenty-First century (among others). The task of defending the faith will, to some degree, be rooted in the historical and cultural climate the apologist finds himself or herself in. Many of the contributors to FVOA conclude that the Bible does not teach one specific methodology to the exclusion of other approaches. We see an evidential and empirical emphasis on the use of the senses in Luke 24:39-40, Matthew 28:6 and I John 1:1-2. The use of the mind and rationality is affirmed in I Corinthians 10:15, 2 Corinthians 10:5 and 1 John 4:1. And Romans 1:18 – 23 teaches that the truth of God is clearly perceived by unbelievers. Whatever apologetic method one holds to then, a powerful and coherent case for Christianity will show that Christian theism alone illuminates human experience (is existentially meaningful), objectively true, and more rationally compelling than any other world religion. Finally, it would be a wonderful day indeed to see a time when Christians stop debating apologetic methodology (as important as it is) and start engaging an unbelieving world with the truth of their faith.

Classical Apologetics, Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Theology

A Critique of Presuppositionalism With Dr. Nathan Greeley.

I would like to thank my good friend Steve Hoover for telling me about this video.

Here is one of the best discussions and critiques of the presuppositional apologetic method I have seen in a long time. Dr. Jordan Cooper and Dr. Nathan Greeley are Lutheran scholars who seek to revive the Lutheran scholastic method and corresponding classical approach to apologetics.

For about twenty years I have made the point, much to the disappointment of my presuppositional friends, that the presuppositional method is nothing more than Kantian idealism. This video does a very good job of explaining why that is the case. (Note: Dr. Greeley uses the term anti-realism for Kantian idealism, both anti-realism and idealism hold the position that the mind is ultimate in determining reality. So when they speak of anti-realism, they are essentially talking about idealism.)

Idealism is an error because we do not determine reality. Therefore, philosophy and Christian apologetics must start with metaphysics, the nature of reality as it is, and not with theories of knowledge (epistemology). Our knowledge of reality, does not objectively determine reality. Our theories of reality can be wrong.

A couple of terms to know before going into the discussion.

Presuppositionalism (which I have found a few Lutherans to be adherents of) is the idea that mankind is so fallen (due to the noetic effects of sin) that there is no possible intellectual commonality between the Christian apologist and the non-Christian. There is no place for the ministerial use of reason. The apologist must first assume the truth of the existence of God and the reliability of the Bible as the proper starting point for doing apologetics. In other words, the apologist must presuppose the very things his non-theistic friend rejects in the first place.

One thing Dr. Cooper and Dr. Greeley could have pointed out is the circularity of the presuppositional approach. This is a logical fallacy which is formally called the petitio principii (begging of the question). This is an error that occurs when the conclusion of an argument is already present, usually disguised or vague, in the premises. It is seen as circular because the conclusion is present in the premises, and no real progress is made. (I am aware of Van Til’s and Frame’s response to this critique, but that should really be another post. It is enough to say, here, that when one reasons with correct premises and conclusions, a good and valid rational argument is a virtue and an expression of the ministerial use of reason. Rationality is not an intellectual or moral failing.)

Another term that comes up in the discussion is realism. In metaphysics, realism is the doctrine that Forms, or essences, possess objective reality. In modern philosophy, realism is the concept (contrasted with idealism) that physical objects exist independently of perception, the mind, or theory of reality. For realists, theories of reality, theories of knowledge, and perceptions are logically separate from objective reality itself.

Regarding realism, the name was given to a certain philosophic way of thought first inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle, developed and refined in the Middle Ages, and still living at the present time. This view includes three basic theses: 1. The world is made up of substantial beings really related to one another, which exist independently of any human opinions or desires. Reality is objective. 2. These substances and relations which make up the world can be known by the human mind as they are in themselves. 3. Such knowledge can offer sound and immutable guidance (the law of nature) for individual and social action.

Christian theology, philosophy, and apologetics should always start with a firm understanding of realism. As Dr. Cooper and Dr. Greeley point out, the Lutheran Scholastics understood this point very well.

I could say more but this discussion is too important and just fantastic. Enjoy.