Being, Metaphysics, Philosophy

Mere Metaphysics: An Introduction

by Dave Seng

‘Being’ and ‘Unity’ are among the number of attributes that follow everything.—Aristotle.

This post is simply presented as an introduction or prolegomenon to a series of posts I will call “Mere Metaphysics” which will explicate the most fundamental concepts in metaphysics.

What I would like to call “mere metaphysics” is along the lines of C. S. Lewis’s work entitled Mere Christianity. Lewis, of course, wanted to explain the basic themes and ideas that were common to all of the Christian family, regardless of denomination. He was eager to show the truth of Christianity itself. Once one has entered the house of faith, one is then free to explore the particular rooms and denominations. The next series of posts will explicate and define the most basic and foundational metaphysical principles—concepts which everyone takes for granted and, upon reflection, are impossible to deny. These basic and foundational principles are called “first principles” by classical philosophers and are still accepted and used by philosophers today. They are the first principles needed for making sense out of the world.

Dr. Mortimer Adler defined philosophy as the rational discussion of basic ideas. Metaphysics, then, is simply the branch of philosophy which rationally discusses the most basic ideas and fundamental nature of being or reality. Some of the mere metaphysical principles we will explore in future posts are the laws of logic—noncontradiction, excluded middle, and identity, along with other principles like being and nonbeing, act and potency, the principle of existence, principle of causality, principle of analogy, and principle of predictive uniformity among others. These, and others, are properties of being. Metaphysicians understand being to be the totality of the universe or reality. It includes everything within temporal reality, including the past, present, and future. (As we will discover, all things composed of form and matter have an immaterial aspect to them along with a material component. And because of the form or essential element to being, there may well be a timeless element to reality as well.) Put a little more simply, for now, all we need to know is that which has being is the individual and the external world.

A few other prefatory remarks need to be made. The opposite of being is nonbeing or that which does not exist, nothing. Being and nonbeing are essential components to classical metaphysics. In addition, classical philosophy uses the term “becoming” for that which is in a state of change. That which is becoming is an admixture of being and nonbeing. The artist who carves a block of marble takes away part of the stone in order to form it into a beautiful sculpture. Some of the block’s being is removed. There is an element of nothingness, or certainly absence, involved in the removal of the stone. In one way or another, we live in a world of change, becoming, and mutable being.

The hope is that by examining these mere metaphysical principles, we will be reminded of the basic structure of the universe that ultimately finds its foundation in God. However, in order to approach the question of God, one must first understand the basic metaphysical structure of reality. One can only engage in a project of natural theology when a proper metaphysics is in place.

One of the oldest and most perennial questions of human existence is, why is there something rather than nothing? Or, put a bit more philosophically, how did being come to be? This is not a strictly scientific question or one that can be analyzed by repeated observation (how does one apply the scientific method to past events?) In order for science to succeed, it must assume prior metaphysical principles such as the ones mentioned above. The question of being, then, is a more fundamental and philosophical question concerning reality. Science can be a helpful tool, to be sure, but the question of reality evades a strictly scientific approach. Part of the question of being, or reality, is the exploration of what makes science possible in the first place. Being and its properties are prior to everything else.

For centuries philosophers have puzzled over one of the most all-embracing metaphysical questions of human existence—what is the cause of being? From the time of the Pre-Socratics (those philosophers who lived before Socrates) to the current day, important thinkers have rationally and carefully thought about the nature of existence and how it might have come about. In different ways, Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Cicero, Augustine, Plotinus, Anselm, Aquinas, Spinoza, Locke, Descartes, Leibniz, and those in the modern and contemporary scene such as Joseph Owens, Mortimer Adler, John Knasas, Brian Davies, Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig, Stephen Davis, and Edward Feser (among others) have engaged in a rich dialogue about the cause of reality. Much of the discussion centers around what is known as cosmological reasoning, or reasoning from the fact of existence (being) to a creator God.

Sometimes this form of reasoning is called the cosmological argument. However, over the centuries many different versions of the cosmological argument have been put forward. Aquinas, himself, gave several different ways to argue for God’s existence based on the cosmos or world. I made a distinction between two different and popular forms the cosmological argument in a recent post.

The general line of thought for cosmological reasoning goes like this (premises that are common to most forms of the cosmological argument):

1. The world exists. Space and time exist. I exist. Something exists. Being is.

2. Being can not be the cause of itself.

3. Being can not come from nonbeing (nothing).

4. Being could not be an effect in an infinite series of causes and effects.

5. Therefore, it must be caused by something outside space and time, something uncaused and ultimate.1

Or put more concisely in the form of a categorical syllagism:

1. All contingent (or caused) being depends for its existence on some uncaused being.

2. The cosmos is a contingent being.

3. Therefore, the cosmos depends for its existence on some uncaused being. (Aquinas would say, “to which everyone gives the name of God”.)

This form of the cosmological argument is called the argument from contingency because it focuses on the caused and contingent (dependent) nature of existence.

Another form of the argument goes like this:

1. Every part of the universe is dependent.

2. If every part is dependent, then the whole universe must also be dependent.

4. Therefore, the whole universe is dependent right now on some independent Being beyond it for its present existence.2

This argument is focused on what philosophers call ontological dependence. It is less concerned with arguing that the universe has a beginning in time, and more focused on the ontological dependence that things demonstrate here and now in reality. An interesting part of this argument is that even if reality is somehow infinite, it is no less ontologically dependent here and now than a finite one.

These are just a few examples of philosophical cosmological reasoning. In future posts we will explore a little more carefully how these premises can be presented and defended. Because there are many different versions of the cosmological argument, the one we will be using moving forward will be the one used by Norman Geisler in his book, God: A Philosophical Argument From Being. Here is the shortened version of what Geisler calls an argument from being:

1. Something exists (e.g., I do)

2. Nothing cannot produce something.

3. Therefore, something exists eternally and necessarily.

A. It exists eternally because if ever there was absolutely nothing, then there would always be absolutely nothing because nothing cannot produce something.

B. It exists necessarily because everything cannot be a contingent being because all contingent beings need a cause of their existence.

4. I am not a necessary and eternal being (since I change).

5. Therefore, both God (a Necessary Being) and I (a contingent being) exist. (= theism)

Of course, no conclusion in a deductive argument can be stronger than its premises. Many have posed doubts, critiques, challenges, and questions regarding this argument and its premises. Indeed, many have asked, why cannot something be the cause of itself? Why cannot something come from nothing? And why cannot something be the product of an infinite series? These are questions that have been discussed and debated throughout the centuries of human civilization. The answers have profound and far reaching effects. In our next series of posts, we will consider the mere metaphysical concepts that show the validity of the argument from being.

1Ed L. Miller and Jon Jensen, Questions That Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy, 5th ed (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 272.

2 Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Books, 1999), S.V. Cosmological Argument.

Being, Metaphysics, Ontology

A Philosophical Reflection on Sir Roger Penrose and Jordan Peterson

by Dave Seng

[Note: For the conversation between Sir Roger Penrose and Dr. Jordan Peterson, click here. What follows is my reflection on the conversation.]

The deepest of all philosophic problems: Is the Kosmos an expression of intelligence rational in its inward nature, or a brute external fact pure and simple? – William James, Principles of Psychology

I recently viewed this discussion between Sir Roger Penrose and Dr. Jordan Peterson on the nature of consciousness which ultimately expands to philosophical reflections on some interesting qualities and characteristics of time and the origin of the cosmos. I am not a trained physicist and I understand that Penrose may not reflect the consensus of his field. Nonetheless, Peterson and Penrose present a rational discussion of the most perennial and foundational ideas surrounding the nature of the consciousness and the universe. I also think that Penrose presents some thought provoking ideas about the world we inhabit and should be given rational and careful consideration.

Penrose and Peterson are an interesting pairing and it reflects some foundational issues regarding the relationship between science and philosophy. One thing I noticed in the discussion is that Peterson is a very much a global thinker or a speculative philosopher in the manner of Whitehead or many earlier classical philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, among others). These philosophers seek a unifying whole to all of reality and want to connect all the sciences and human experience into a consistent world view. This kind of philosopher, according to Plato “is the spectator of all time and all existence” … and will intellectually “move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.”1 As C. D. Broad explains about the nature of speculative philosophy, “The hope is that, by this means, we may be able to reach some general conclusions as to the nature of the universe, and as to our position and prospects in it.”2 In this conversation, however, we see Peterson pursuing deeper unifying metaphysical themes that focus on the nature of reality, while Penrose simply stops at the theoretical physical level. I think the reason for this is that Penrose understands that physical inductive science can only go so far. He stops at the end of his field and what it can do. On the other hand, philosophical inquiry resists empirical solutions because philosophers are seeking the meaning, truth, and logical connections of reality as a whole. Philosophers want to know what the foundation of empirical truth is and what makes it possible in the first place. These are not empirical questions. I believe this is the source of the slight frustration that Peterson demonstrates. (For what it’s worth, I thought the conversation turned much more friendly after it moved to art, which both have a love for.)

Regarding induction and observational science, Alfred North Whitehead put it this way,

Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations.3

Science itself is based on metaphysical and theological principles. (I’ve written about this in the context of Lucretius, here. And professor Ken Samples has made important insights here.) Peterson was simply asking questions that physics can not answer.

A really interesting point made in the discussion, is the fact that consciousness is not computational. If consciousness is not computational, hard AI (computational self-consciousness) will ultimately fail. Researchers are still not sure how to define consciousness, or really understand what it is at all. Nonetheless, Peterson and Penrose seem think that Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems support the non-computational nature of consciousness. Briefly, Gödel’s first theorem states that there will always be statements about natural numbers that are true, but are unprovable within the system. Gödel’s second theorem states that the system itself cannot show its own consistency. What this means is that there must be an axiom outside the system that makes sense of the system in the first place. For a more practical illustration, Gödel uses the “liars paradox” to support his theorems. The paradox in its simplest form arises from considering the sentence “This sentence is false.” If the sentence is true, then it is false, and if it is false, then it is true. A computer can be programmed to write the sentence but it has no resources within its own system to make sense out of it. It takes a human outside the system to understand the sentence is logically self-contradictory. The earliest pioneers of programmable logic—Alfred Tarski, Alonzo Church, and Turing’s Halting Problem—all deal with aspects of this important problem. The human will never be replaced. Further, there must be something outside the system which makes sense out of the system itself. In other words, the system is ontologically dependent on an axiom outside itself that gives it meaning and significance. It appears that Peterson is acutely aware of this situation.

So what does this have to do with the discussion of cosmology at the end of the dialogue? First, I’m not really sure about Sir Roger Penrose’s conception of time and his cosmological model. I need to look into it a bit more. If he is right, however, it might pose a problem for the Kalam cosmological model. The Kalām cosmological argument runs this way:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence.

Proponents of the Kalām cosmological argument (Craig, Koontz, Pruss and others) rely on space and time as having a definite starting point and draw heavily on scientific evidence (such as the Big Bang). If Penrose is correct, however, then the universe is an infinite, which might undermine the Kalām argument. Of course, Craig and others will point to the impossibility of traversing an infinite and perhaps the second law of thermodynamics to make their case for the beginning of the universe. These are fine points points, indeed, and along with the principle of causality, do hold some significance. In the end, however, the Kalām cosmological depends on a very specific model of the universe for its validity.

There are other ways to formulate a cosmological argument that does not rely so much on one particular interpretation of the science. The Thomistic way of arguing is valid whether or not the universe is finite. This cosmological argument is sometimes called the argument from Being. It looks like this (taken from Norman Geisler’s book, God: A Philosophical Argument from Being):

1. Something exists (e.g., I do)

2. Nothing cannot produce something.

3. Therefore, something exists eternally necessarily.

A. It exists eternally because if ever there was absolutely nothing, then there would always be absolutely nothing because nothing cannot produce something.

B. It exists necessarily because everything cannot be a contingent being because all contingent beings need a cause of their existence.

4. I am not a necessary and eternal being (since I change).

5. Therefore, both God (a Necessary Being) and I (a contingent being) exist. (= theism)

It is not necessary to go into the principle of existence, or the principle of identity and the rest of the first laws of metaphysics here. What is important to note are two things—the ontological dependence of reality on God as Necessary Being and the absence of temporality as a starting point.4 The ontological dependence is necessary regardless whether or not time is infinite. On the substance of Thomistic argumentation, one philosopher puts it this way,

We know from experience that the world is contingent, that is, it depends on something outside itself for its existence. And this would be true even if the world has always been here, for an infinite collection of contingent things is no less contingent than a finite one. But there must be some unconditional, ultimate being upon which the world depends, otherwise it would have no final basis for existence.5

Aquinas argues against an infinite series, but the series he thinks is impossible is a per se series, or one that extends infinitely upwards in being. The argument from being focuses on contingency and ontological dependence and does not rely on one particular model of the universe. So if the science changes, an explanation for being is still necessary. This might be one advantage that this argument has over the Kalām cosmological argument. If Penrose is correct, time may not be the most fundamental element of reality and it seems to do some pretty strange things both at the quantum level and the macro or cosmic levels. But no one can deny that being is and it stands in front of us as a mystery which is truly one of the most enduring questions of human existence.

In the final analysis, Penrose may or may not be right in his arithmetic regarding the infinity of the universe, but he still misses the ontological weight of the issue.

I’d like to thank my friend Dr. Derek Gardner for pointing me to this video and providing inspiration for this post.

1 The Dialogues of Plato. Translated by J. Harward. Vol. 6. Great Books of the Western World. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990. 374 – 375.

2Scientific Thought. New Yourk: Harcourt, Brace, 1923. 20.

3 Science and the Modern World, vol. 55, Great Books of The Western World Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993. 156.

4 I am always reminded of Exodus 3:14 – one translation of the Hebrew reads of God’s self-description “I am who causes to be” or “He who causes to be”.

5 Miller, Ed L., and Jon Jensen. Questions That Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy. 5th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 276.

Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence: Conclusion

by Dave Seng

Part three of three.

Part one can be found here.

Part two can be found here.

Other philosophers, such as Aristotle, disagree with Hegel and think that is important to maintain the being of the mind and the being of concrete physical reality. The distinction between the being of the mind and the being of physical reality aids in understanding what ideas are and how they help one in understanding reality and the various modes or “acts” of existence. It is important to understand what an “act” is according to classical metaphysics. Aristotle uses the notion of “act” to describe things that exist in reality. Things of the mind, such as ideas, memories, fictional characters in narrative or verse, concepts, perceptions, and things of the imagination like unicorns, are objects or “acts” of the mind. Things that exist external to one’s mind exist as an “act” of physical reality. Both mental and physical objects are real acts of existence. That which is in act is simply that which exists. An act of the mind is real because the individual has real existence. In external existence, the act of a physical thing is its primary way of being or its objective existence. Aristotle points out that mental existence, or things of the mind, are different in kind from physical existence yet, both ways of being are real because they are in act (here, Aristotle is applying the term “movement” to that which physically undergoes change):

The word ‘actuality’, which we connect with ‘complete reality’, has, in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement. And so people do not assign movement to non-existent things, though they do assign some other predicates. e.g. they say that non-existent things are objects of thought and desire, but not that they are moved; and this because while ex hypothesi they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually if they were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but do not exist, because they do not exist in complete reality. (572)

Aristotle points out that the objects of the mind and objects of physical reality do not exist in the same way. That which exists in “complete reality” is different from the existence of the things of the mind. The being of mind and being of objective reality are a basic feature of reality, and should not be overlooked or confused, because the distinction points to the plurality of existence and, what will be developed, the foundation for intentional existence. Aquinas makes the point that the knower and the thing known are not the same, “…the eye knows the stone according to its being outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the thing known according to the being it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its being outside the knower, the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible being it has in the intellect …” (81). The knower and the thing known, then, are not the same. They have actuality in different ways. Hegel, however, rejects this distinction, “…philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas, without reference to actuality” (163). According to Hegel, then, there is no need to reference external reality because all of reality consists of mind and is mind-dependent. Nonetheless, because the being of reality and the being of the mind are real, and exist in different ways, there must be a better way of understanding the nature of idea. Ideas are that which signify something. Ideas point to something that is, or has being. They signify something that exists either in the mind or objective reality, and it is conceptually incoherent to confuse the two aspects of being, or make them one. Idealism is ultimately circular in nature because it assumes the ultimate nature of mind before concluding that mind is ultimate in reality. In such a system, one could never grasp the nature of physical reality. If all is mind and there is no reference to actuality, one is forever locked inside Plato’s cave.

Two points need to be clarified. The first is the fact of being. The preceding, of course, assumes the existence of an external reality. It is unnecessary to prove the existence of external reality. The starting point that classical metaphysicians use is—being is. It is impossible to deny reality or the fact that something exists. Even the solipsist has to admit that, “I exist.” Further, there are several modes of being at work should the solipsist write a sentence. Both the solipsist and the sentence, itself, would have different kinds of being. Something exists. The second point is that mental existence does not necessarily mean subjective existence. It is a mistake to confuse mental existence with that which is subjective because not all things of the mind are subjective or person-relative. Subjective experiences are those that belong to the individual alone, things like memories, personal and bodily feelings, and personal experience. Mental existence such as characters like Hamlet or Tom Sawyer are not subjective but objective through imagination and the written word. (If this were not so, there would be no point in having literature classes in universities. Many wonderful works of literature can be discussed objectively.) Similarly, historical figures that live on in memory like Benito Mussolini or Abraham Lincoln are not subjective, but objective. They once existed in reality but now live in the mental reality of memory. They have left objective effects of their lives for historians to discover and explicate. Furthermore, one can make a subjective experience objective as when a husband explains to his wife that she hurt his feelings, making the subjective experience objective through intentional existence (more on that below). Subjective existence belongs to the individual alone, but has mental existence because the individual is real. To be clear, subjective existence has real being, but is different in kind from other types of mental existence like historical figures and characters of fiction. The overall point, however, is that reality has a structure to it. There is a composition to Being that involves both the mind and physical reality. An object of being can be said to exist in many ways, and to reduce reality to one thing, as Hegelian idealism does, does nothing to help one understand the essential structure and nature of reality. Monism cannot account for the plurality of existing things or the way they exist (modes of existence).

Reality has three modes of being or existing. To quickly summarize the first two modes of being, there is objective existence and rational or mental existence. Objective existence is real existence. It is the physical world of mountains, animals, trees, and buildings. It is the world outside one’s head—independent of the mind and unaffected by it. It would exist even if there were no humans on the planet. The second mode of being is mental existence or that which exists in the mind. Since individual minds are real, mental existence is a type of real existence. The being of the mind and the being of reality are two different modes of being. The third modality of being is intentional existence. Intentional existence brings both the mental and physical ways of being together. Intentional existence points to the fact that the mind can be “about” something, it can describe something, or communicate something to another mind. Intentional being depends on a plurality of minds, but not on any one in particular. An intentional object can be real existence or mental existence. Intentional being can be anything discussed or communicated based on shared experience and existence. Intentional being shares both real and mental properties, but depends on a plurality of minds for existence. Intentional being is an act of existence that is dependent on minds in general. It is different in kind from strictly real or mental existence. If there are no minds in existence, there is no intentional existence, only real existence. If there was only one mind on the planet, there would be mental and real existence, but no intentional existence. For example, three scientists are discussing an atom. The three scientists are discussing the same atom existing in real existence. Their communication with one another indicates that they are discussing the same atom based on their shared perceptual experience. There are three individual and particular mental existences of the same atom, yet the atom is one intentional existence among the three scientists. Intentional being makes possible the fact that three different individual mental experiences can communicate about one object. The multiplicity of shared experience makes this possible. Long ago, Plato was among the first philosophers to point this aspect of reality out, “…if every man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to another” (270). Intentional existence has its foundation in things and is communicable through a plurality of minds based on objectively shared real existence. Hegelian idealism, on the other hand, reduces all reality to mind and ideas, and therefore collapses the structure of reality. Hegel reduces being and becoming, the subjective and the objective, real and mental existence to one construct of the mind.

The scope and breadth of Hegel’s philosophy is admirable. The attempt to organize all reality into a systematic whole that makes sense of all experience is a project which many philosophers in the speculative tradition engage in, from Plato and Aristotle to Aquinas and Whitehead. Hegel certainly has a high regard for philosophy and believes in mankind’s innate rationality to discover the ultimate truths of reality. He believes that metaphysics can unlock the deepest and most perennial questions and was correct in pointing out that there is a mental or nonmaterial aspect to reality. Hegel’s mistake, however, is making all reality into an immaterial mind. Immaterial monism fails to make sense out of the plurality of existence and the modes of being. A true speculative philosophy, one that seeks to make sense out of reality as a whole, needs to correctly explicate all the ways something can exist. Hegelian idealism and monism are too simplistic and does not properly make sense out of reality.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 7. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Aquinas. The Suma Theologica. Translated by Father Laurence Shapcote. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 21. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Plato. Georgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 6. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence, Part Two

by Dave Seng

Part one of this series can be found here.

When it comes to understanding history, according to Hegel, the goal of the philosopher of history is to discover the progress and development of reason as an immaterial and spiritual force which simply uses human events to achieve its goals and purposes (116). For example, Hegel explains how mind is revealed in world history, “The history of the world begins with its general aim, the realization of the idea of spirit, only in an implicit form, that is, as nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of history (as already observed) is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one” (171). According to Hegel, the role of the philosopher is to show how mind or reason is at work in the world. Hegel continues:

The only thought which philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of history, is the simple conception of reason; that reason is the sovereign of the world; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process. This conviction and intuition is a hypothesis in the domain of history as such. In that of philosophy it is no hypothesis. It is there proved by speculative cognition, that reason—and this term may here suffice us, without investigating the relation sustained by the universe to the divine being—is substance, as well as infinite power; its own infinite material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the infinite form—that which sets this material in motion. (163)

Hegel believes that reason (or the world-mind) is an infinite power and material form, a type of first principle of reality, not a hypothesis. Additionally, he explains that reason is the substance and infinite energy, “that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence … That this “idea” or “reason” is the true, the eternal, the absolutely powerful essence; that it reveals itself in the world, and that in that world nothing else is revealed but this and its honour and glory—is the thesis which as we have said, has been proved in philosophy, and is here regarded as demonstrated” (163).

In sum, reason is “the infinite complex of things, their entire essence and truth (163). For Hegel, the universe is one organic whole, an all-powerful and continuous substance of mind or spirit.

Overall, Hegel makes a compelling case for presenting reality and the universe as a complete whole. Each person, object, and event has a position and role in the grand narrative and unfolding of the world-mind. People and events have value because they belong to a greater cosmic plan and through reflection and their innate ability to reason, can discover the grand narrative and design of the world-spirit at work in the universe (116). People and events are the outworking of the world-spirit. In terms of Hegelian idealism, the human race is imbued with meaning and purpose and not a product of chance or blind impersonal mechanistic forces, because the universe is an entire logical system working itself out to greater perfection, significance, and importance due to the all benevolent world-mind or Idea. Individuals can find comfort, solace, and be “at home” in the universe because the self is not isolated or insignificant but a genuine part of the world process. In many ways, Hegel’s idealism is deeply existentially meaningful. In this system, values, ethical principles, and determinations of right or wrong are not transcendent, obscure, or impossible to reach, but are inherently discoverable because all knowledge and value lies within the universe and within every single individual. There is no transcendent reality to concern oneself with. The self is not adrift alone in the cosmos, but anchored firmly within the comfort and purpose of the world-spirit.

While Hegel’s grand quest for the meaning of reality is a noble one (and worth pursuing), it remains to be seen whether or not his foundational notion of reality is correct. If it turns out that his first principles of reality are incorrect, his overall system fails. As Thomas Hobbes reminds us, “Where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin” (132). It is important, therefore, to evaluate Hegel’s philosophical system in light of his basic premises and conclusions. If the premises are faulty, the conclusion will be too. Therefore, Hegel’s metaphysical system should be evaluated in the context of other great thinkers of the Western intellectual tradition in order to discover whether or not his foundation is firm. Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas can help bring further clarification to the nature of existence, the plurality of existence, and the role of “mind” in understanding the world.

One interesting point about Hegel’s idealism is that he conflates the existence of mental realities such as ideas and objectively physical ways of knowing reality (123). The external conditions of reality should become internal ones (231). According the Hegel, in order to have complete self-consciousness one must collapse the distinctions between what one knows objectively with what one knows by way of the mind, “Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly what I know. In self-conscious these are merged in one; for spirit knows itself” (167). The world-mind, which, according to Hegel incorporates everyone and everything must be merged into one ultimate entity. That which I know (ideas of things) gets merged into that by which I know (sense experience and objective reality).

This is the basis of the Hegel’s metaphysical monism. Next time, we will look at how Aristotle and other great thinkers would respond to Hegelian idealism.

Works cited in this series

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 7. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Aquinas. The Suma Theologica. Translated by Father Laurence Shapcote. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 21. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Plato. Georgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 6. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.