Book Reviews, Culture, Philosophy, Philosophy of Technology

Review: New Romantic Cyborgs: Romanticism, Information Technology, and the End of the Machine.

by Dave Seng

Mark Coeckelbergh. New Romantic Cyborgs: Romanticism, Information Technology, and the End of the Machine. MIT Press 2017. 320 pp. $00.00 USD (Hardcover ISBN 0262035464 ); $00.00 USD (Paperback ISBN ).

The question is often asked in humanities classes or philosophy courses that examine the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, “which movement has had the most profound impact on our culture today – the Enlightenment or Romanticism”? It is often fun to hear students argue for either the Enlightenment or Romanticism because it is not hard to find evidence for either position in today’s contemporary intellectual climate. Mark Coeckelbergh, (Professor of Philosophy of Media and Technology in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna) addresses this question as it relates to technology and its effects on culture and society. Coeckelbergh clearly falls into the romantic camp with his book New Romantic Cyborgs: Romanticism, Information Technology, and the End of the Machine. Interestingly, a history of Romanticism and how it effects our relationship with technology has not been clearly discussed or defined in the field of philosophy of technology.

Much of the early philosophy of technology has examined the existential implications of technology on the individual and society—Marcuse One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, Barrett, The Illusion of Technique—or it has focused on the ways that human making is a way of understanding the world and therefore our being and becoming in it. Our contemporary technological mindset, not just the technology itself, has become a metaphysics all its own and has become the driving ontology of our age—Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, Grant, Technology and Justice. While it is certainly worthwhile to understand what technology is (ontologically or metaphysically) and its effects on the person and society, Coeckelbergh points out the interesting ramifications of romanticism on contemporary culture and technology.

Romanticism is a very difficult term to define precisely because writers such as Rousseau, Keats, Shelly, Wordsworth, and Coleridge often relied on concepts and elements that were not uniquely romantic and even changed their views as they developed and progressed. Nonetheless, in general terms, Coeckelbergh uses a standard understanding of romanticism which begins with Rousseau and includes many nineteenth-century poets and writers who emphasize the imaginative, intuitive, mysterious, exotic, and uncivilized aspects of the human condition against the perceived rational, balanced, logical, ordered, and perhaps totalizing views of the generation that came before them—those of the Enlightenment and Neo-classical period. The idea is, at least from the romantic view, that these Enlightenment ideas of formal rules, logic, and strict empiricism were inhuman and oppressive to genuine human authenticity, creativity, and emotion. In addition, Coeckelbergh takes an additional step to demonstrate that romanticism and the Enlightenment were never really that far apart when it came to science and technology.

Essentially, New Romantic Cyborgs presents and defends the idea that romanticism has ultimately won the day in today’s technological society. At the same time, however, he provides a critique of the more extreme forms of Romanticism which he believes are not helpful in understanding technology and its role in culture. In Coeckelbergh’s view, it is important to find a kind of romanticism that goes beyond a Platonic dualistic understanding of reality and technology and at the same time, argues that it is impossible, or at least difficult, to completely escape the romantic world-view. He explains, “This book explores how people today, albeit unintentionally, try to realize their romantic craving for freedom, self-expression, spirituality, utopia, and authenticity by electronic means and how companies unscrupulously respond to these romantic desires with electronic gadgets that become … romantic technologies” (4). Furthermore, Coeckelbergh phenomenologically examines how people use their devices in ordinary ways, and from that vantage point provides a discussion of the effects of technology on society. For example, when exploring the romantic impulses of the twentieth century, he states, “As children of twentieth-century romantic counterculture, we seamlessly fuse technology and romanticism. Engaging with our many screens and smart gadgets and shielded from the inner, machine-like workings of our devices (developed by science), we try to satisfy our romantic desires and are more like Rousseau, Novalis, or Wordsworth than we think” (4). To support this argument, Coeckelbergh divides New Romantic Cyborgs into three parts: 1. Romanticism against the Machine, 2. Romanticism with the Machine, and 3. Beyond Romanticism? Beyond the Machine? Before explaining how one might overcome Romantic thinking, however, Coeckelbergh presents a historical and cultural foundation of romanticism and technology drawing on historians, philosophers, and literary critical theory.

Part one mainly focuses on the perceived dichotomy between Enlightenment rationalism and Romanticism regarding science and technology and provides a cultural and historical foundation. For example, as early as 1818, Mary Shelly warns her readers about the danger of technology going out of control. Similarly, Max Weber (1905) calls modern technology an “iron cage.” And Heidegger (1977) is seen as Romantic philosopher of technology due to his emphasis of the “enframing” and danger technology poses to the individual and his tendency toward German romantic poetry (13). However, the section ends with an argument that romanticism may not have been strictly opposed to technology. Writers such as Mary Shelly, Leo Marx, and Herman Melville (all romantically inspired) also shared a fascination with science and the section closes by suggesting that technology and romanticism might be compatible in some way.

In part two, Coeckelbergh questions the opposition between romanticism and technology, humans and machines, culture and materiality (13). The argument is that the romantic relationship to technology cannot be reduced to mere opposition (13). For example, “… in the early nineteenth century, romantics were not only fearful of but also fascinated by the new science and technology that delivered magic machines, wonderful scientific phenomena, and mysterious forces such as electricity” (13). Coeckelbergh claims that Kant was haunted by both rationalism and mysticism (13). In addition, Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein can be interpreted through a gothic-romantic lens which captures both the horror and fascination romantics have with technology—the merging of life with the machine. Romanticism may be more complex than usually perceived and not easily reducible to escapism or antimachine thinking (14). With this foundation, contemporary culture is essentially romantic—beginning with Freud who developed a kind of romantic science of the self and continuing through the romantic hippie computing era of the 1960s and 1970s which provided the technology for individual freedom, revolution, and love. In this sense, we can understand that in today’s technological culture romanticism has merged with technology.

In part three, Coeckelbergh provides arguments that are critical of the union of romanticism and technology and examines the views of antiromantics such as Babbitt, Berlin, and Popper. He believes that many critiques of romanticism are unfair and romanticism never really did reject reason or rationality as such. Coeckelbergh indicates that the romantics simply wanted to redress a crucial error of the Enlightenment, namely the imbalance between individualism, sentiment, imagination on one hand and reason, science, and empiricism on the other. (219). While Coeckelbergh holds that the union between romanticism and reason does not finally succeed he turns to scholars such as Marcuse and Coyne to build an argument that would get beyond romanticism, and have a less dualistic world view. To get beyond the romantic framework, it is important to Coeckelbergh that we change our thinking. Cyberspace, for example, is extremely Platonic (Coeckelbergh sees a Platonic impulse in romanticism) and the figure of the cyborg in its postmodern form is still completely romantic (17). To really move away from romanticism, we would have to move beyond modern and Platonic thinking (17). Coeckelbergh explains how this might be done in a couple of ways. First, the Enlightenment-Romanitic binary could be overcome through skilled engagement which would decrease the modern romantic “distance” between science and the individual, and second, he explores modes of what he calls “nonmodern” thinking. Using Latour, and Szerszynski, he questions the disenchantment myth of romanticism and argues that if we really want to change our thinking into less modern directions, we cannot avoid a discussion about religion and spirituality, broadly understood (18). While it is admirable that Coeckelbergh seeks a more holistic view of nature and technology, including a nonmaterial aspect to reality, he seems to be very dismissive of Aristotle, the philosopher whose ideas would most likely help him in this goal. If it is true that romanticism seeks the union of essence with material reality, then philosophy of technology should become more Aristotelian, not less. One does not need to be a monist to achieve a holistic view of reality.

One of the strengths of this book is that it provides a critical process of inquiry and helpful analysis of inherited philosophical orientations regarding the relationship between technology and society. Critical self-reflection is always a good starting point when trying to understand and overcome previous biases and presuppositions. Due to the amazing advances of science and technology in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it is easy to overlook the influence of romanticism on society and, in this sense, New Romantic Cyborgs presents a solid counterbalance. It is not clear, however, that humans are essentially the same as machines, or that we are all cyborgs.

David Seng, University of Arizona

Book Reviews, Philosophy of Technology

Review: The Metaphysics of Techonology

by Dave Seng

David Skrbina

The Metaphysics of Technology.

New York: Routledge 2015

311 pages

The philosophy of technology is generally conceived as the philosophical investigation of the effects of technology on society and David Skrbina’s book, The Metaphysics of Technology (MT), is an important contribution to this field. MT is divided into two sections, the first which provides a rational and critical investigation into general metaphysics and why it is important to understand that technology has a metaphysical grounding. Using this foundation, Skrbina spends some time providing a contextual metaphysical foundation for technology and explores the metaphysical outlooks from the pre-Socratic thinkers to twentieth-century metaphysicians such as Martin Heidegger and others. The second part of the book focuses on what Skrbina calls “Praxis”. This section addresses what technology does, how it functions in the actual world, and how humanity can or should respond to it’ (113–14). This section is largely focused on thinkers such as Ellul, Borgmann,Feenberg, among others who have either failed to understand the metaphysical underpinnings of technology, or who have simply missed the philosophical weight of an all-enveloping technological society.

Throughout the book, Skrbina covers the literature and history of the philosophy of technology very well. He correctly notes that most thinkers who have provided thoughtful criticism of technology have not done so from a metaphysical viewpoint and few (with the possible exception of Martin Heidegger) have provided a metaphysical foundation for understanding technology. MT is possibly the first book-length treatise that seeks to provide a metaphysical grounding for technology.

The central metaphysical claim of MT is that technology is all-encompassing, shapes humans and their society, is deterministic, and possesses intrinsic intentionality at the core of its being. Skrbina calls this phenomenon the “pantechnikon”. Our present technological situation is guided by the pantechnikon which ‘ishere identified as the universal process of creation, as the realization (techne) of a universal order (logos)’ (119). Furthermore, the pantechnikon has suprahuman power, ability to alter and even determine social conditions, has a psychological impact on people, is fixated on energy and power, and is unstoppable (119). Skrbina makes no distinction between natural and man-made creation because all being is a product of Techne-Logos.

To build his case for the pantecknikon, Skrbina unpacks the Greek concepts of techne and logos, starting with Heraclitus who believed along with the early Stoics that logos was a divine ordering principle of the cosmos. The logos embodies both material and psychic dimensions (21). For Plato and Aristotle, the connections between techne and logos are more nuanced. Techneroughly means all human activities. For Aristotle,techne refers to human creation and he makes a distinction between natural and human creative activities. On the other hand, Aristotle does connect techne with logos in both his “Nicomachean Ethics” and his “Poetics” but are still conceived as human activities. Skrbina believes that the nature of the pantecknikon was not clearly discovered by Plato or Aristotle because they did not live in a highly technological society and techne was a low-class activity of manual craftsmen, unworthy of philosophical examination(26). Nonetheless, Skrbina builds on the notions of the Stoics and Heraclitus and explains that the Heraclitean/Stoic worldview – the cosmos as a Pantechnikon – can serve as the basis for a relevant metaphysics of technology (27). In the realm of Being all creation is techne. As Skrbina points out, ‘From our biased vantage point, we see our own creations as of a different order, but they are not. All coming-to-be is creation, and all creation is techne’ (30). Technology is thus seen as a panpsychic, and pantheistic, logos that guides all reality.

With this basic understanding, Skrbina then argues for technological determinism. The argument is, that as physical beings in a physical world, we are subject to a wide range of forces and pressures. Technology is one of the forces of the world. On the pantechnical thesis the universal process of Techne-Logos drives evolution forward, creating order, complexity, and intelligence along the way. Like gravity, thermodynamics, and quantum physics, it is a constant of the universe – a natural law that in no sense depends upon human agency. The striving for order – the realization of the Logos –is the dominant force in nature. In the long run, order prevails in the cosmos. The universe is a pantechnikon (201–2). However, the unfolding of this deterministic pantechnikon has a two part process, the anthropogenic and the autogenic. The first phase, the anthropogenic phase, of technological determinism began when humans learned how to control fire and make simple tools. This phase lasted until around 1200 or when the European Renaissance began in the West. The tools created in this phase served human purposes and allowed for social and cultural flourishing. The next phase of technological determinism is autogenic. This phase, which has not been fully realized yet, but will be soon, includes intelligent and self-aware computers, nanomachines, and biotech creations that will serve their own purposes, not humans. Technology will become autonomous,self-augmenting, and self-evolving. Humans will become the raw material for these machines and humanity will become the servants of technology (205 – 8).

Skrbina addresses some critics of technological determinism and examines the response of the position known as the social construction of technology (SCOT). Skrbina uses Joel Feenberg as are presentative example of SCOT. SCOT generally holds that people are the primary sources of change in both technology and society. This perspective focuses on how technologies arise from social processes because it is ultimately humans who make the devices. In addition, this position argues that technology does not determine human action, but instead, human action shapes technology. Skrbina would claim that this position misses the entire metaphysical structure of technology and that, within the Pantechnikon, humans are a type of technology.

One perspective Skrbina does address is the Social Shaping ofTechnology (SST). This perspective admits to a socio-technological symbiotic relationship. Technology and humans do in fact affect each other in both directions. Technology pushes individuals and society to behave and communicate in certain ways. However, the technological “affordances” are often used in new and unpredictable social ways. The SST thesis realizes and takes seriously the negative effects of technology on society. It also holds that humans can learn to mitigate and control their use of technology and learn to use them in wise ways.

 Both SCOT and SST find a place for the individual and social response to technology. Skrbina would reject these positions and respond,‘When we focus on the human role in technology, we miss the larger metaphysical context’ (209).

It is, however, the larger human context in which technology rests and needs to be understood. Historically, the twentieth century saw both the most incredible advances in technology and some of the greatest human destruction and violence ever recorded due to the use of technology. It is imperative that humans learn to use their technology wisely. On the other hand, society has also found amazingly positive uses of technology that connect families across continents, cure diseases, and foster communication and learning. These are deeply human traits and seem to reflect the human condition itself. In the words of one of the chief importers of European existentialism into America, William Barrett, ‘We seem to carry over into technology that deepest and most vexing trait of the human condition itself: that our efforts are always ineradicably a mixture of good and evil’ (The Illusion of Technique, 25). To ignore the human and social relationship between technology, society, and culture is a serious mistake.

Finally, Skrbina claims that Ellul, Heidegger, Borgmann and others fall into the trap of mysticism when trying to understand the effects of a technology on society. It is a little difficult to understand how a position that claims that a universal pantheistic Techne-Logos which drives all coming-to-be is not itself bound up in mysticism.

 One of the strengths of this book is that it raises important metaphysical claims that have been forgotten or deemed impossible to answer in today’s philosophical climate – from both theContinental and Analytical schools of thought. Although Skrbinaframes these issues around technology and its impact on society, he raises the important metaphysical questions of free will and determinism, the nature and teleogy of evolution, the question of being and becoming (the one and many), and rationality and mind, among others. For those working in the intersection of philosophy and technology this book is helpful in bringing to light the important philosophical questions that somehow will not go away. It will most likely provide interesting and important classroom discussion.

Dave Seng, University of Arizona