Part three of three.

Part one can be found here.

Part two can be found here.

Other philosophers, such as Aristotle, disagree with Hegel and think that is important to maintain the being of the mind and the being of concrete physical reality. The distinction between the being of the mind and the being of physical reality aids in understanding what ideas are and how they help one in understanding reality and the various modes or “acts” of existence. It is important to understand what an “act” is according to classical metaphysics. Aristotle uses the notion of “act” to describe things that exist in reality. Things of the mind, such as ideas, memories, fictional characters in narrative or verse, concepts, perceptions, and things of the imagination like unicorns, are objects or “acts” of the mind. Things that exist external to one’s mind exist as an “act” of physical reality. Both mental and physical objects are real acts of existence. That which is in act is simply that which exists. An act of the mind is real because the individual has real existence. In external existence, the act of a physical thing is its primary way of being or its objective existence. Aristotle points out that mental existence, or things of the mind, are different in kind from physical existence yet, both ways of being are real because they are in act (here, Aristotle is applying the term “movement” to that which physically undergoes change):

The word ‘actuality’, which we connect with ‘complete reality’, has, in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement. And so people do not assign movement to non-existent things, though they do assign some other predicates. e.g. they say that non-existent things are objects of thought and desire, but not that they are moved; and this because while ex hypothesi they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually if they were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but do not exist, because they do not exist in complete reality. (572)

Aristotle points out that the objects of the mind and objects of physical reality do not exist in the same way. That which exists in “complete reality” is different from the existence of the things of the mind. The being of mind and being of objective reality are a basic feature of reality, and should not be overlooked or confused, because the distinction points to the plurality of existence and, what will be developed, the foundation for intentional existence. Aquinas makes the point that the knower and the thing known are not the same, “…the eye knows the stone according to its being outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the thing known according to the being it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its being outside the knower, the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible being it has in the intellect …” (81). The knower and the thing known, then, are not the same. They have actuality in different ways. Hegel, however, rejects this distinction, “…philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas, without reference to actuality” (163). According to Hegel, then, there is no need to reference external reality because all of reality consists of mind and is mind-dependent. Nonetheless, because the being of reality and the being of the mind are real, and exist in different ways, there must be a better way of understanding the nature of idea. Ideas are that which signify something. Ideas point to something that is, or has being. They signify something that exists either in the mind or objective reality, and it is conceptually incoherent to confuse the two aspects of being, or make them one. Idealism is ultimately circular in nature because it assumes the ultimate nature of mind before concluding that mind is ultimate in reality. In such a system, one could never grasp the nature of physical reality. If all is mind and there is no reference to actuality, one is forever locked inside Plato’s cave.

Two points need to be clarified. The first is the fact of being. The preceding, of course, assumes the existence of an external reality. It is unnecessary to prove the existence of external reality. The starting point that classical metaphysicians use is—being is. It is impossible to deny reality or the fact that something exists. Even the solipsist has to admit that, “I exist.” Further, there are several modes of being at work should the solipsist write a sentence. Both the solipsist and the sentence, itself, would have different kinds of being. Something exists. The second point is that mental existence does not necessarily mean subjective existence. It is a mistake to confuse mental existence with that which is subjective because not all things of the mind are subjective or person-relative. Subjective experiences are those that belong to the individual alone, things like memories, personal and bodily feelings, and personal experience. Mental existence such as characters like Hamlet or Tom Sawyer are not subjective but objective through imagination and the written word. (If this were not so, there would be no point in having literature classes in universities. Many wonderful works of literature can be discussed objectively.) Similarly, historical figures that live on in memory like Benito Mussolini or Abraham Lincoln are not subjective, but objective. They once existed in reality but now live in the mental reality of memory. They have left objective effects of their lives for historians to discover and explicate. Furthermore, one can make a subjective experience objective as when a husband explains to his wife that she hurt his feelings, making the subjective experience objective through intentional existence (more on that below). Subjective existence belongs to the individual alone, but has mental existence because the individual is real. To be clear, subjective existence has real being, but is different in kind from other types of mental existence like historical figures and characters of fiction. The overall point, however, is that reality has a structure to it. There is a composition to Being that involves both the mind and physical reality. An object of being can be said to exist in many ways, and to reduce reality to one thing, as Hegelian idealism does, does nothing to help one understand the essential structure and nature of reality. Monism cannot account for the plurality of existing things or the way they exist (modes of existence).

Reality has three modes of being or existing. To quickly summarize the first two modes of being, there is objective existence and rational or mental existence. Objective existence is real existence. It is the physical world of mountains, animals, trees, and buildings. It is the world outside one’s head—independent of the mind and unaffected by it. It would exist even if there were no humans on the planet. The second mode of being is mental existence or that which exists in the mind. Since individual minds are real, mental existence is a type of real existence. The being of the mind and the being of reality are two different modes of being. The third modality of being is intentional existence. Intentional existence brings both the mental and physical ways of being together. Intentional existence points to the fact that the mind can be “about” something, it can describe something, or communicate something to another mind. Intentional being depends on a plurality of minds, but not on any one in particular. An intentional object can be real existence or mental existence. Intentional being can be anything discussed or communicated based on shared experience and existence. Intentional being shares both real and mental properties, but depends on a plurality of minds for existence. Intentional being is an act of existence that is dependent on minds in general. It is different in kind from strictly real or mental existence. If there are no minds in existence, there is no intentional existence, only real existence. If there was only one mind on the planet, there would be mental and real existence, but no intentional existence. For example, three scientists are discussing an atom. The three scientists are discussing the same atom existing in real existence. Their communication with one another indicates that they are discussing the same atom based on their shared perceptual experience. There are three individual and particular mental existences of the same atom, yet the atom is one intentional existence among the three scientists. Intentional being makes possible the fact that three different individual mental experiences can communicate about one object. The multiplicity of shared experience makes this possible. Long ago, Plato was among the first philosophers to point this aspect of reality out, “…if every man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to another” (270). Intentional existence has its foundation in things and is communicable through a plurality of minds based on objectively shared real existence. Hegelian idealism, on the other hand, reduces all reality to mind and ideas, and therefore collapses the structure of reality. Hegel reduces being and becoming, the subjective and the objective, real and mental existence to one construct of the mind.

The scope and breadth of Hegel’s philosophy is admirable. The attempt to organize all reality into a systematic whole that makes sense of all experience is a project which many philosophers in the speculative tradition engage in, from Plato and Aristotle to Aquinas and Whitehead. Hegel certainly has a high regard for philosophy and believes in mankind’s innate rationality to discover the ultimate truths of reality. He believes that metaphysics can unlock the deepest and most perennial questions and was correct in pointing out that there is a mental or nonmaterial aspect to reality. Hegel’s mistake, however, is making all reality into an immaterial mind. Immaterial monism fails to make sense out of the plurality of existence and the modes of being. A true speculative philosophy, one that seeks to make sense out of reality as a whole, needs to correctly explicate all the ways something can exist. Hegelian idealism and monism are too simplistic and does not properly make sense out of reality.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 7. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Aquinas. The Suma Theologica. Translated by Father Laurence Shapcote. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 21. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Plato. Georgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 6. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.