Metaphysics, Philosophy

Between Possibility and Reality: Heisenberg’s Appeal to Aristotelian Metaphysics, Part One

by Dave Seng

“As there is a material object behind every sensation, so there is a metaphysical reality behind everything that human experience shows to be real.” – Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography

[Note: I would like to thank Dr. Derek Gardner for reading a draft of this essay and supplying helpful suggestions. His scholarship saved me from making errors when describing quantum mechanics and I deeply appreciate his insight.]

I recently heard a professional philosopher say that metaphysics is no longer a dirty word in the field of philosophy. This was good news to me, because for the last four hundred years or so metaphysics has been considered a lost cause in philosophy. Upon reflection, however, I think there has been a small resurgence in the interest of classical metaphysics but the philosophy of mind, language, science, politics, and ethics still seem to be the most popular areas of study in the field. I’m still told that professional positions for metaphysicians are hard to find. Nonetheless, it is fascinating that philosophy is rediscovering its primary role—to explicate the most universal principles of reality and discover the rules, axioms, and laws that make our universe, fields of learning, and human experience possible in the first place. I think the ultimate questions of reality and what it means to be human will never really go away. Thoughtful individuals will always try to offer systematic attempts to illumine our human experience in depth and set it in a vision of the whole of reality. Why might there be an emerging interest in metaphysics and what would that tell us about the relationship between philosophy and science?

Aristotle explains in his Metaphysics that there is a science (for Aristotle ‘science’ is a body of knowledge) which is concerned with “being as being” and that the primary causes and principles of being are the object of study for the metaphysician. This is the formal study of ontology, the metaphysical exploration of all existing things as they exist, the properties of being, and whether certain things, whose existence can be questioned, do or do not exist. Aristotle also laid out the tactical possibilities for conducting what we now call the physical sciences – the study of the structure and behavior of the natural world through repeated observation and experiment. For Aristotle, however, and the many classical and medieval philosophers that came after him, the physical world and the ultimate principles of reality (what they would have called ‘physic’ and ‘metaphysic’) are not to be divorced or separated because both are needed to explain the ultimate nature and significance of reality. While the subdivision and classification of learning and science is helpful for sharpening one’s focus on their object of study, most areas of study ultimately fall back on basic first principles that attempt to explain or support their overall project, such as the principle of sufficient reason, the law of identity, the law of noncontradiction, correspondence, cause and effect, act and potency among others. Perhaps one reason metaphysics is being re-discovered is that all fields of inquiry, whether the social sciences or physical sciences, use foundational first principles which reflect their basic assumptions about the nature of the universe and how the world works. Note that nearly all our basic assumptions are not empirical in the sense used by Enlightenment philosophers and natural scientists and yet it would be foolish to discard them. There are many immaterial and material aspects of reality. The union of the immaterial with the material has often been discarded or forgotten in Western thought but recently have been rediscovered with interesting metaphysical corollaries. Every cosmology, mathematical formula, scientific hypothesis, and ethical theory has metaphysical implications.

Another reason I think metaphysics is being rediscovered is that a few physicists and mathematicians in the twentieth-century ventured into the discussion and pointed out that physics and metaphysics are indeed related and ought not to be detached. This was a profound change in Western thought at least since the Enlightenment. Due to the skeptical theories of Descartes, Hume, Hobbes, and Kant, metaphysics was considered dead or impossible to pursue. However, interesting scientific developments in the early part of the twentieth-century changed things. Einstein’s colleagues, Max Planck, Werner Heisenberg, G.H. Hardy, Niels Bohr, and Erwin Schrödinger, among others, argued for a new understanding of nature due to the quantum discoveries of their day that described the behavior of reality at the atomic scale, where standard Newtonian physics failed to do so. Here, a basic tenet of quantum mechanics, as opposed to classical mechanics, is that reality, at an atomic level is not causally linear or smooth in its behavior but probabilistically discontinuous and discrete. In Newtonian physics, for instance, and in the classical “every day” large-scale sense to which it applies, it is generally possible to determine the future states of a system by knowing its present state (e.g., we can predict where a baseball will land given some initial conditions). In the new atomic physics of the twentieth century, this was no longer the case. Classical mechanics has at its basis the contention that all states of a considered system can be measured and known. When we describe atomic physics with quantum mechanics, on the contrary, one must accept that it is impossible to know the exact value of a parameter without measuring it, and one can know it only for that measurement. Heisenberg’s discovery of quantum indeterminism suggests that in the moment of an atomic measurement, the system (e.g., a molecule) is necessarily disturbed (e.g., by a probing photon) thus “collapsing” the original potential possibility-space into one state of the many probable states, some with much higher probability, but otherwise without any reason to “collapse” into one or another particular possible state (Silva, 637). The most one can do to describe the state of any given system, before or after the measurement, is to provide a probability for the outcome of that measurement (Dirac, 73).

From the standpoint of Aristotelian philosophy, Werner Heisenberg is especially interesting due to his specific appeal to Aristotelian categories of act and potency when describing his theory of indeterminism. Before getting further into Heisenberg’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, however, it is important to understand the central Aristotelian categories of Act and Potential.

As a quick review, ‘act’ or ‘actuality’ simply refers to that which exists. It is the physical, concrete existence of something (philosophers call this the ‘positive mode of perfection’ but we will not go into that here). For now, think of act or actuality as that which really exists here and now—a physical object. Another way to think of act is that which is ‘informed matter’. (In classical philosophy, matter is not form and form is not matter. Form is the essence of a thing or that which makes something the kind of thing it is and without which it can not be. Ordinarily, essence is considered distinct from existence. This is one reason why all reality has an immaterial as well as material elements.) ‘Potential’ or ‘potency’ is simply all the capacities for change, transformation, or movement that which is in act has. For example, a student has the capacity to become a great mathematician if she uses her rational capacities well. A rubber ball has the capacity or ability to be melted down and formed into a figurine, balloon, or tire. Potential is another way of describing all the possible modes of being something has (it is always innate to that which is in act). Potency is never unlimited, however, and is governed by the essence, nature, or form a thing has—and this will be important when we get to Heisenberg’s understanding of probability and atomic potency. For example, a hamster will never become a helicopter pilot, and a cephalopod will never become an architect because potency only relates to the nature (or essence) of the thing itself. Act and potency are metaphysical co-principles that help us make sense of the world around us. The act/potency distinction is an absolute feature of reality and is accepted by all serious philosophers from the classical tradition through the early modern period, including neo-Platonists and Aristotelians. For example, the neo-Platonist philosopher, Plotinus, appropriated Aristotle’s categories of act and potency when describing change.

Part two will specifically focus on Werner Heisenberg’s book, Physics and Philosophy with some concluding remarks from Max Planck.

Works Cited:

Dirac, Paul. The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958.

Silva, Ignacio. “Werner Heisenberg and Thomas Aquinas on Natural Indeterminism.” New Blackfriars, 2013, 635 – 653.

Metaphysics, Philosophy

A Very Short Introduction To Aristotelian-Thomist Metaphysics: Act and Potency, Part. 2

by Dave Seng

Although Aquinas applies the concepts of act and potency to almost every facet of existence, from natural science to the features of the intellect, and even to the characteristics of the soul and angels, the best starting point to understand the important categories of act and potency is the relationship these ideas have with Being. A large part of Aquinas’s philosophical methodology is to distinguish and apply the categories of act and potency to all of reality. (Sometimes Aquinas uses the word “powers” to mean innate potencies or abilities.) Aquinas himself tells us that all reality, or Being, can be divided between act and potency. “Potency and act divide being and every kind of being” (400). At another point Aquinas explains, “Since Being properly signifies that something is, in act, and act is properly ordered to potentiality, a thing is, in consequence, called Being absolutely according as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potency; and this is each thing’s substantial Being” (23). Furthermore, Aquinas expands upon the nature of Being, “Being is the actuality of every form or nature; for goodness or humanity are spoken of as actual only because they are spoken of as being. Therefore, being must be compared to essence, if the latter is distinct from the former, as act to potency” (17). Something is “in act” or in the state of actuality when it is existing in physical reality or knowable through the intellect. Echoing Aristotle, Aquinas tells us “everything is knowable only in so far as it is in act” (24). The concept of Being which is the most general concept we have of reality, can nevertheless be delineated between act and potency.

Being, however, has two senses — one sense refers to physical objects of reality and, in the second, intellectual objects of the mind such as statements, ideas or concepts such as goodness or humanity, and mathematics. Again Aquinas explains, “’To be’ can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of being, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject” (17). In sum, all of reality exists in one way or another in act — either in acts of perception or acts of the intellect. It is important to keep in mind, also, that Aquinas does not hold to a separate realm of ideas as Plato does, or the idea that the mind itself determines reality. As will be explained later, Aquinas holds that form and matter are always united together. In his epistemology, however, Aquinas holds that the natural physical things of this world (things existing “in act”) have their own intractable reality and they are known by way of the five senses. It is through abstraction that one realizes essences and universals that exist in the intellect. For example, “redness” is realized by viewing several red objects. Aquinas, following Aristotle, is grounded in nature and believes that the physical objects of this world have their own inherent and intrinsic characteristics and that these characteristics can be known through abstraction. In other words, reality is the determinate of order. According to Aquinas, “Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, while our intellect… understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from universal matter is the universal” (461). Aquinas indicates that it is possible for the intellect to know the particular through reflecting on the universal. All Being, nonetheless, exists in the universals and particulars that make up the being and becoming of this world.

For Aquinas, Being includes act and potency, but how does change actually take place in the realm of becoming? More specifically, what is the cause of change? With the exception of universals, virtually all things of the physical world are subject to change or movement. As noted earlier, both living and non-living things experience change. Change is the actualization of a thing’s potential. Aquinas provides this definition of change, “A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potency to several things; for that which is in potency must be reduced to act by something actual, and to do this is to move” (658). Change, then, is potency reduced to act. However, an outside and additional element is necessary to bring about change. Potency is needed for change, but it is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition to bring about change. Aquinas explains, “Now it is impossible for a thing’s being to be caused by its essential principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own being, if its being is caused” (17). In other words, for an acorn to change into a beautiful oak tree, more than potential is needed. In order for an oak tree to develop from an acorn, the acorn must be nurtured by sunshine, rain, nutrients in the soil, and time. Something else, always itself in “act,” is needed to actualize a potential. “For whatever is in potency can be reduced to act only by some being in act” (14). Potency itself cannot bring about act — just as non-being cannot bring about being.

That which reduces a potential to act is called a cause and a quick overview of Aristotle’s famous four causes is, therefore, necessary. Aquinas is fully committed to the Aristotelian four causes. The first cause is the material cause — that out of which something is actualized. The second cause is the efficient cause — that by which something is actualized. The third cause is the formal cause — that into which something is actualized. The fourth cause is the final cause — that for the sake of which something is actualized. A biological example will help explain how these four causes work in the physical world. To understand the basics of the human heart, it is important to know what it is made of — its material cause. In this case, the material cause of a heart is muscle. The efficient cause rests in the DNA that structures and orders cells in such a way as to create a muscular heart and not a kidney or spleen. The formal cause is that which the heart muscle is fashioned into — ventricles, arteries, aorta, etc. The final cause serves the purpose of pumping blood. For both Aristotle and Aquinas, final causes are significant and found whenever cause and effect relationships are seen. The totality of the three previous causes all serve a goal or ultimate end, culminating in the final cause. Focusing on act and potency, the efficient cause is that which actualizes a potency. That is why Aquinas says, “Now everything which is in any way changed is in some way in potency” (38). In other words, there is always an external component to a change which reduces potency to act, and that external component is the efficient cause. The builder of a ship is the efficient cause of the ship, and the DNA in the acorn is the efficient cause of the oak tree.

All things in act, therefore, are the subject or cause of change. That which is in act is always a composition of act and potency. According to Aquinas, all things are made up of a composition. “Thus, in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition” (39). One of the metaphysical aspects of reality is that the normal everyday things of this world are composed of act and potency. For Aquinas, another significant aspect of all of reality is the composition of form and matter. Aquinas explains, “matter is that which is in potency” (15). And this relates to change as well, according to Aquinas, “For just as matter, as such, is in potency, an agent, as such, is in act” (21). The twofold composition of form and matter is simply a restatement of the Aristotelian understanding of formal and material cause. It is also important to understand that things which change according to a final cause must also be composed of form and matter. Without form there would not be an essence to something and an inherent or final nature could not be realized. Aquinas explains how this final end is related to act and form, “upon the form follows an inclination to the end… for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form” (27). For Aquinas then, the immaterial aspects of causation are always connected to act and potency, and form and matter.

In addition, that which is in act is combined with form and matter, “being is the actuality of every form or nature” (17). Just as everything is composed of act and potency, all things are composed of form and matter. “Hence, being itself is the actuality of all things, even of forms themselves” (21). As we have seen already, being is that which is in act. We can therefore understand, that which is in act is also combined of form and matter. Aquinas explains that universals and essences can be infinite, but form is bound and contracted to matter, “Just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite” (620). In other words, apart from universals, essences, or abstractions, forms are always in combination with matter and that which informs, or participates in the transformation of matter when it changes, and matter is that which participates in the potential of receiving the form. “Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter” (16). Echoing Aristotle, Aquinas holds that in physical objects, forms are inherent or immanent in the things themselves.

As it turns out, the concept of potency is powerful and helps to provide a foundation for understanding the metaphysical structure of things that undergo change in this world. Therefore, wider implications of the act/potency distinction warrants exploration. From physical nature to human beings, everything that is in act is also in potency. Potency, therefore, precedes and supersedes actuality and provides continuity when things change because that which is in act will change according to its nature, or essence, through potency. Potency is not something that can be measured by the tools of the physicist, but its effects can be. Science, after all, is not interested in matter in and of itself, but rather in the properties, capacities, and possibilities that the matter contains by virtue of its potency. Whenever a drug manufacturer gives a list of possible side effects (such as bleeding, restlessness, bloating, blindness, etc.) it is explaining the potentialities that might occur if certain conditions are met. In information science, we know that computers only perform as they do because electrons have certain properties and not others. Finally, we do not yet know the capacity and limitations of the human mind and intellect. The capacity for the mind to grow, develop, and learn speaks to the potential of what it means to be human. Human beings are amazing and have the ability to adapt, appropriate knowledge, and develop greater and greater abstraction. Pure potentiality can never be measured empirically, but to deny its reality would be intuitively and conceptually absurd. Aquinas’ act/potency and his correlative form/matter distinctions make the most sense out of reality and provide a significant foundation for understanding the metaphysical structure of change and the world we live in.

Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica, Volume 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 17. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Metaphysics, Philosophy

A Very Short Introduction To Aristotelian-Thomist Metaphysics: Act and Potency, Part. 1

by Dave Seng

Although Aristotle and Aquinas define the term “metaphysics” in various ways, one common rendering both use is “first principles.” For these thinkers, metaphysics is the study of the first principles of reality and how one views the world. One of the guiding first principles for Aquinas, especially in his metaphysics or understanding of reality, is his distinction between “act” and “potency.” Act and potency are not unique to Aquinas; these categories are first developed by Aristotle who uses these categories to describe how causation and change work in the physical world. Nonetheless, Aquinas, following Aristotle, applies the categories of act and potency to virtually every aspect of reality. In addition to act and potency, Aquinas also uses the categories of form and matter to make sense out of reality as Being. With the categories of act and potency and form and matter, Aquinas describes the immaterial structure and nature of all of reality and explains how potency accounts for change. He uses the categories of act and potency to such a degree, and so broadly, that they are among the most important principles for understanding Aquinas’s metaphysics and have broad implications to how one understands nature, science, and human potential.

For Aquinas, and many philosophers in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, the proper object of study for metaphysicians is the concept of Being1. In the simplest terms, Being is the study of all that exists, including concrete physical phenomena such as humans, tables, quadrupeds, things that can be discerned from the senses, and abstract mental concepts such as mathematics, goodness, and other ideas. Being, therefore, is the study of the nature and framework of all reality. It is important to note that Being is not a particular genus or species, but rather that in which all genera and species participate. That which exists and all that which stands out of non-being, participates in Being, but Being itself is not a genus or species. “Being itself is considered as formal, and as something received, and not as that to which Being belongs” (21). As Aquinas reminds us in the most general terms, “Being is common to all” (22). It is important to note that for Aquinas, the physical and metaphysical are not separated. The physical things that exist in act or being also participate in the metaphysical notion of potency. Through act and potency, Aquinas provides an important conceptual scheme for things which participate in being and also undergo change.

Much of philosophical history is an attempt to understand the mystery of change. Although Aquinas uses Aristotle’s categories of act and potency to reveal important insights about reality and to explain how change is possible, the discussion begins with Plato. Plato, following Parmenides, insisted that true Being implies permanence. Parmenides teaches that Being and Non-Being are the only genuine realities of existence, and change, therefore, is impossible because Non-Being cannot be the cause of Being. Change, although obvious to the senses, is an illusion. Plato, influenced by Parmenides, holds that the changing and mutable things of this world are not real Being or existence in the highest sense — only the Forms existing in a transcendent realm, participate in true Being. Aristotle, however, being firmly grounded in nature and the physical world, knows that change and motion are real and must be accounted for. In Aristotelian and Thomist terms, motion means change in the broad sense and not just movement from one place to another. Drawing on Aristotle, Aquinas explains, “For because ‘motion from place to place is naturally the first of movements,’ as is proved in the Physics, we use terms belonging to local motion in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds” (351). For Aristotle and Aquinas, physical things, existing in reality actually change. Change is part of Becoming. Influenced by Aristotle, Aquinas knows that things change according to their nature and he uses the concept of potency to explain how change is possible. Things do not change at random or whimsically, but according to their nature. For example, an acorn has the natural potential or capacity (if nothing hinders it) to become a mighty oak tree. In the case of natural or biological generation (a type of change) Aquinas states, “It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed…” (367). Just as biological matter has inherent tendencies towards life, Aquinas also explains that human beings have intrinsic potencies. Relating human potential to the “intellectual soul” (395) as that property humans have to comprehend universals and to use their reason to understand and create things, Aquinas explains, “Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of the body only, but ‘the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially’; and that this potency does not reject the soul’ … In like manner, the soul is said to be ‘the act of the body,’ etc., because by the soul it is a body and is organic, and has life potentially” (394). In other words, a student has the potential to become a doctor if she studies and applies her intellectual abilities. Potency, then, contains the possibilities that something can change into according to its nature.

1 Many philosophers in the Aristotelian and Thomist traditions prefer the term “ontology” in describing their approach to the study of Being.

Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica, Volume 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 17. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Book Reviews, Education, Liberal Arts, Philosophy

Review: Mark Edmundson’s Self and Soul: A Defense of Ideals

by Dave Seng

Mark Edmundson. Self and Soul: A Defense of Ideals. Harvard University Press 2015. 283 pp. (Hardcover ISBN: 9780674088207).

Mark Edmundson has taken philosophic approaches in his writings on education, literature, and culture and in Self and Soul: A Defense of Ideals, Edmundson looks rationally and critically at the state of contemporary culture, and evaluates it in the context of ideas that have had a profound impact on the Western intellectual tradition. As Aristotle reminds us, philosophy begins with wonder. When one attempts to understand contemporary culture, one cannot help but wonder at what influenced the ideas, attitudes, and characteristics of our own age. Through this sense of wonder, Edmundson examines three essential values that he believes had an important impact on the development of modern liberal societies – courage, contemplation, and compassion and relates these central ideas to the modern understanding of “Self” and “Soul.” In Self and Soul, Edmundson blends literary criticism with intellectual history and philosophical reflection.

The central concern for Edmundson is that the West has become progressively more practical, materially oriented, and skeptical (1). Absent of real virtues such as courage, contemplation, and compassion, contemporary culture demonstrates a state of affairs where, “unfettered capitalism runs amok; Nature is ravaged; the rich gorge; prisons are full to bursting; the poor cry out in their misery and no one seems to hear. Lust of Self rules the day” (1). Using the categories of “Self” and “Soul” Edmundson presents a thoughtful dialogue between two different metaphysical world views.

The book’s central thesis is both simple and profound – “without ideals, life lacks significant meaning” (102). Edmundson admits that he could be wrong. Those who have embraced genuine ideals, or values, have often been persecuted, killed, or marginalized. Perhaps Freud, Nietzsche, and Derrida are right – values might actually be tools the powerful use to oppress others. And yet, Edmundson wonders, what if Freud and Nietzsche, geniuses though they were, were actually wrong about human nature and the role of ideals in society? What if Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were right about the place of ideals and intellectual virtue in one’s life? Self and Soul provides an intellectual history that seeks to provide a dialogue and exchange of ideas between these positions. Edmundson also has another reason for exploring these questions. Many young people are not even given the option to explore them. For that matter, many adults have given up on these questions altogether. “Every man and woman should have the chance to ponder the question of the ideal” (2). Edmundson argues that everyone today should be able to discover if these values are true or not and determine whether they want to implement them in their lives. The intellectual process of inquiry, free exchange of ideas, and discussion should be available to all. Yet, the concept of enduring, timeless, and essential values seems to be fading from our cultural heritage. The concern is, if we say there are no transcendent values, we cut ourselves off from the educational process of discovery and have no way of deciding whether or not we want to integrate ideals and values into our lives. Deciding whether or not ideals exist and how to implement them in life and society should at least be a living option. Edmundson is not simply concerned about describing a world or society in which values or ideals do not exist, he is well aware that false and counterfeit ideals do exist, and he believes that in various ways Freud and Nietzsche are the great intellectual proponents of anti-idealist ideals.

For Edmundson, the Self is a cultural condition of radical individualism, presentism, and greed. Society is increasingly driven and obsessed with consumer capitalism, mediated through technology and entertainment with no other significant purpose or end. “We live for our personal desires; we want food and sex, money and power and prestige” (14). For many, the mindless pursuit of appetite serves no greater purpose than providing inane distractions for their brief lives. The Soul, on the other hand, as Edmundson conceives it, is a unity of being that fully embodies the ideals of courage, compassion, and contemplation. The Soul is “unified, joy bringing, and fully present to experience” (1). Edmundson’s conception of the soul is similar to Aristotle’s “great souled man,” a soul centered on magnanimity and intellectual and moral virtue. The idealist hopes for joy and presence and unity, not only for himself but for others. Edmundson argues that a generous impulse lies behind the aspiration to the ideal and can be seen in the lives of Socrates, Jesus, the Buddha, and even Hector and Achilles (97). In contrast, however, “Lives without courage, contemplation, compassion, and imagination are lives sapped of significant meaning. In such lives, the Self cannot transcend itself. But the Self seems to hunger for such transcendence” (50).

The central values Edmundson seeks to explicate are courage, contemplation, and compassion. He uses Homer’s Iliad to develop the ideal of courage, although contemplation and compassion can also be found in the epic poem. Plato is examined for the role of contemplation and the quest for eternal Truth and Jesus, the Buddha, and the Hindu sacred texts are used to describe the life of compassion. Homer’s heroes (he focuses on Achilles and Hector) illustrate the unity of purpose between mind and heart as they experience a unity of being that centers them in this world. Edmundson explains, “The warrior senses himself to be an integral part of all he sees around him … The warrior is at home in the world, though there is little that is kindly, generous or sweet about the world in which he dwells” (27). Given a just and honorable cause, the true warrior takes appropriate action. He understands that one’s words and ideas must correspond to one’s actions. The Homeric hero experiences a metaphysical realism that centers him in this world. In contrast, contemporary man is not at home; he is restless and seeks the Self above everything else.

The idea of contemplation is found in Plato. Plato seeks a Truth that will be true for all time. He is not looking for truth that applies exclusively to Greeks, or to men and women who live in city-states, or to those who exist at the same point in time that he does. Plato seeks Truth that will apply to all men and women at all times. As Edmundson explains, “If Plato’s account cannot illuminate the human condition in America in 2020 as well as it did the human condition in Greece when he was teaching and writing, Plato fails” (5). If the true thinker, following Plato, succeeds he will understand the permanence of human nature and the Good that transcends time and space. He “can tell you not only what men and women are like now, and what the world is, but how those things will be for all time” (134). The thinker will understand human nature and understand what kinds of governments will succeed or fail and what kind of education is best. Edmundson then turns to the great ideal of compassion and focuses on the life of Jesus although similar teachings can be found in the Buddha or the wisdom of the Upanishads. “With compassion, every man is my neighbor. Every woman is my neighbor. … No longer is one a thrashing Self, fighting the war of each against all. Now one is part of everything and everyone: one merges with the spirit of all that lives” (8).

Is Edmundson right about our current social and intellectual climate? He is certainly not the first to point out the differences between contemporary culture and the classical worldview. Whether or not one holds to the declension model of Western civilization or one sees both continuities and discontinuities in previous or current societies, it can certainly be said that there is much in today’s culture that magnifies the Self above any and all ideals. Whether it be affective capitalism, ecotourism, or a simple online search (which is based on popularity and may or may not contain that which corresponds to reality), postmodern consumer capitalism exists to provide the ever new experience for the Self. Corporations invest large sums to give customers what they want and build their loyalty free from burdens of thinking too carefully or rationally about the most important concerns of life. The Self does seem to rule supreme. When it comes to education, having information does not mean one has understanding or wisdom. In a larger picture, Self and Soul speaks to the metaphysical tension of being and becoming. Are we now living entirely in a state of becoming? If so, how do we find the eternal moral and intellectual values of being – those that do not change according to time or one’s Self or political identities? Are there really no unchanging ideals? Perhaps it is due to the rationalism of Descartes, the idealism of Kant, or just disengaged global capitalism (simple self-centered greed), the culture of the Self does demonstrate a radical skepticism regarding knowledge of the external world or real values that might shape it for the better. In some ways, Edmundson echoes the philosopher F.H. Bradley as he explains that the Self is a consequence of the failure to seek and integrate the great ideals that were foundational to Western civilization. Many students do not get the opportunity to explore these questions. Edmundson’s Self and Soul argues that our students deserve such a chance.