Being, Epistemology, Logic, Ontology

On the Law of Noncontradiction

by Dave Seng

The law of noncontradiction states that nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same relationship. Put more formally, “A” can not be “B” at the same time and in the same relationship. The first part of the law is pretty straight forward. A fish can not be a cat or a frog can not be a table, at least at the same time. Being can not be nonbeing at the same time. Opposites can not be true at the same time and in the same relationship. It is contradictory to say that nonbeing is being at the same time. Contradictories can not both be true. One must be false, while the other is true.

Sometimes, however, the relationship part of the law is not understood. For example, I can be both a father and a son at the same time but not in the same relationship. I am my father’s son, and my son’s father but those are different relationships. Further, I can be my son’s biological father but not my son’s legal father if he were to be legally adopted. That, too, is a different relationship.

A basic feature of reality is that opposites can not exist in the same way and same relationship.

Because the law of noncontradiction is a basic property of being (reality), we learn that it is foundational to a proper understanding of metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology (theory of knowledge). Truth is clarified when the law on noncontradiction is properly understood.

The law of noncontradiction is a metaphysical first principle because it speaks to basic nature of reality. It helps us understand what is or is not so.

The law of noncontradiction is an ontological first principle because it points to the act or type of being a thing is–what can or can not be.

The law of noncontradiction is an empistemological first principle because it tells us what can or can not be known.

Finally, the law of noncontradiction helps us determine what is true and false, because opposites can not both be true. At the most fundamental level one statement or act of being can not be both true and false at the same time and same relationship.

Being, Metaphysics, Ontology

A Philosophical Reflection on Sir Roger Penrose and Jordan Peterson

by Dave Seng

[Note: For the conversation between Sir Roger Penrose and Dr. Jordan Peterson, click here. What follows is my reflection on the conversation.]

The deepest of all philosophic problems: Is the Kosmos an expression of intelligence rational in its inward nature, or a brute external fact pure and simple? – William James, Principles of Psychology

I recently viewed this discussion between Sir Roger Penrose and Dr. Jordan Peterson on the nature of consciousness which ultimately expands to philosophical reflections on some interesting qualities and characteristics of time and the origin of the cosmos. I am not a trained physicist and I understand that Penrose may not reflect the consensus of his field. Nonetheless, Peterson and Penrose present a rational discussion of the most perennial and foundational ideas surrounding the nature of the consciousness and the universe. I also think that Penrose presents some thought provoking ideas about the world we inhabit and should be given rational and careful consideration.

Penrose and Peterson are an interesting pairing and it reflects some foundational issues regarding the relationship between science and philosophy. One thing I noticed in the discussion is that Peterson is a very much a global thinker or a speculative philosopher in the manner of Whitehead or many earlier classical philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, among others). These philosophers seek a unifying whole to all of reality and want to connect all the sciences and human experience into a consistent world view. This kind of philosopher, according to Plato “is the spectator of all time and all existence” … and will intellectually “move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.”1 As C. D. Broad explains about the nature of speculative philosophy, “The hope is that, by this means, we may be able to reach some general conclusions as to the nature of the universe, and as to our position and prospects in it.”2 In this conversation, however, we see Peterson pursuing deeper unifying metaphysical themes that focus on the nature of reality, while Penrose simply stops at the theoretical physical level. I think the reason for this is that Penrose understands that physical inductive science can only go so far. He stops at the end of his field and what it can do. On the other hand, philosophical inquiry resists empirical solutions because philosophers are seeking the meaning, truth, and logical connections of reality as a whole. Philosophers want to know what the foundation of empirical truth is and what makes it possible in the first place. These are not empirical questions. I believe this is the source of the slight frustration that Peterson demonstrates. (For what it’s worth, I thought the conversation turned much more friendly after it moved to art, which both have a love for.)

Regarding induction and observational science, Alfred North Whitehead put it this way,

Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations.3

Science itself is based on metaphysical and theological principles. (I’ve written about this in the context of Lucretius, here. And professor Ken Samples has made important insights here.) Peterson was simply asking questions that physics can not answer.

A really interesting point made in the discussion, is the fact that consciousness is not computational. If consciousness is not computational, hard AI (computational self-consciousness) will ultimately fail. Researchers are still not sure how to define consciousness, or really understand what it is at all. Nonetheless, Peterson and Penrose seem think that Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems support the non-computational nature of consciousness. Briefly, Gödel’s first theorem states that there will always be statements about natural numbers that are true, but are unprovable within the system. Gödel’s second theorem states that the system itself cannot show its own consistency. What this means is that there must be an axiom outside the system that makes sense of the system in the first place. For a more practical illustration, Gödel uses the “liars paradox” to support his theorems. The paradox in its simplest form arises from considering the sentence “This sentence is false.” If the sentence is true, then it is false, and if it is false, then it is true. A computer can be programmed to write the sentence but it has no resources within its own system to make sense out of it. It takes a human outside the system to understand the sentence is logically self-contradictory. The earliest pioneers of programmable logic—Alfred Tarski, Alonzo Church, and Turing’s Halting Problem—all deal with aspects of this important problem. The human will never be replaced. Further, there must be something outside the system which makes sense out of the system itself. In other words, the system is ontologically dependent on an axiom outside itself that gives it meaning and significance. It appears that Peterson is acutely aware of this situation.

So what does this have to do with the discussion of cosmology at the end of the dialogue? First, I’m not really sure about Sir Roger Penrose’s conception of time and his cosmological model. I need to look into it a bit more. If he is right, however, it might pose a problem for the Kalam cosmological model. The Kalām cosmological argument runs this way:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence.

Proponents of the Kalām cosmological argument (Craig, Koontz, Pruss and others) rely on space and time as having a definite starting point and draw heavily on scientific evidence (such as the Big Bang). If Penrose is correct, however, then the universe is an infinite, which might undermine the Kalām argument. Of course, Craig and others will point to the impossibility of traversing an infinite and perhaps the second law of thermodynamics to make their case for the beginning of the universe. These are fine points points, indeed, and along with the principle of causality, do hold some significance. In the end, however, the Kalām cosmological depends on a very specific model of the universe for its validity.

There are other ways to formulate a cosmological argument that does not rely so much on one particular interpretation of the science. The Thomistic way of arguing is valid whether or not the universe is finite. This cosmological argument is sometimes called the argument from Being. It looks like this (taken from Norman Geisler’s book, God: A Philosophical Argument from Being):

1. Something exists (e.g., I do)

2. Nothing cannot produce something.

3. Therefore, something exists eternally necessarily.

A. It exists eternally because if ever there was absolutely nothing, then there would always be absolutely nothing because nothing cannot produce something.

B. It exists necessarily because everything cannot be a contingent being because all contingent beings need a cause of their existence.

4. I am not a necessary and eternal being (since I change).

5. Therefore, both God (a Necessary Being) and I (a contingent being) exist. (= theism)

It is not necessary to go into the principle of existence, or the principle of identity and the rest of the first laws of metaphysics here. What is important to note are two things—the ontological dependence of reality on God as Necessary Being and the absence of temporality as a starting point.4 The ontological dependence is necessary regardless whether or not time is infinite. On the substance of Thomistic argumentation, one philosopher puts it this way,

We know from experience that the world is contingent, that is, it depends on something outside itself for its existence. And this would be true even if the world has always been here, for an infinite collection of contingent things is no less contingent than a finite one. But there must be some unconditional, ultimate being upon which the world depends, otherwise it would have no final basis for existence.5

Aquinas argues against an infinite series, but the series he thinks is impossible is a per se series, or one that extends infinitely upwards in being. The argument from being focuses on contingency and ontological dependence and does not rely on one particular model of the universe. So if the science changes, an explanation for being is still necessary. This might be one advantage that this argument has over the Kalām cosmological argument. If Penrose is correct, time may not be the most fundamental element of reality and it seems to do some pretty strange things both at the quantum level and the macro or cosmic levels. But no one can deny that being is and it stands in front of us as a mystery which is truly one of the most enduring questions of human existence.

In the final analysis, Penrose may or may not be right in his arithmetic regarding the infinity of the universe, but he still misses the ontological weight of the issue.

I’d like to thank my friend Dr. Derek Gardner for pointing me to this video and providing inspiration for this post.

1 The Dialogues of Plato. Translated by J. Harward. Vol. 6. Great Books of the Western World. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990. 374 – 375.

2Scientific Thought. New Yourk: Harcourt, Brace, 1923. 20.

3 Science and the Modern World, vol. 55, Great Books of The Western World Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993. 156.

4 I am always reminded of Exodus 3:14 – one translation of the Hebrew reads of God’s self-description “I am who causes to be” or “He who causes to be”.

5 Miller, Ed L., and Jon Jensen. Questions That Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy. 5th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 276.

Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Ontology

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence: Part One

by Dave Seng

The prologue to this series can be found here.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is a fascinating figure in the history of philosophy. Hegel provides a grand metaphysical system that encompasses all elements of reality and perennial questions. For example, Hegel believes that the role of philosophy is to explicate the development of “reason,” or “idea” as it unfolds in world history, political life, and every aspect of culture and society. According to Hegel, when exploring the philosophy of history (how one is to understand the meaning and significance of history), it is important to understand that human events are the ordered development and process of the Idea or world-mind, “The concrete Ideas, the minds of the nations, have their truth and their destiny in the concrete Idea which is absolute universality, i.e. in the world-mind” (116). Whether Hegel is discussing the philosophy of right (systems of right actions, ethics, and contractual law) or the grand purpose of human affairs in history, it is “reason,” “idea,” and world-mind that fundamentally guides reality and leads to all truth, and in fact, knows all things (165-166). Hegel explains further, “This vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the world-spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it” (171). Hegel’s far-reaching metaphysics touches on all reality. To further grasp Hegel’s metaphysical system, however, it is important to more closely examine his concept of the “world-mind” and its implications for understanding the world.

In both his Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of History, Hegel uses the terms “world-mind” or “world-idea” and “reason” as a kind of immaterial guiding force for all reality and Being. Sometimes, he even uses the theological German term “geist” to capture this notion (88, 147, among others). For Hegel, world-mind is the one ultimate substance that binds and guides all things in the universe (163). The one essential nature or character of Being is mind. One of the great questions Hegel explores is the nature and character of reality (or what is known as “Being”). Being is the formal object of study for the metaphysician and it involves exploring reality, itself, along with how and why things exist as they do. In metaphysics, the study of being seeks to explore the ultimate foundations and causes of all that exists. The study of Being is a far-reaching inquiry which explores what it means for a thing to exist, the various ways in which a thing can exist, and the metaphysical principles which make possible a thing to exist in the first place. Being, then is not the study of one thing among the already existing things which exist; it is the study of why and how the universe is the way it is and explores the fundamental principles of its existence. In the classical Aristotelian sense, the study of reality (being) takes being as it is and attempts to carefully demonstrate the first principles of reality and describe what it means for a thing to exist.1 Through a careful understanding of ontology (what it means for a specific thing to exist), philosophers find clues for what it means for the universe to exist.

Hegel, however, does not take the classical approach of examining the properties of reality such as the logical laws of noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle, or the various modes of existence (rational, mental, and intentional being and the relationships among being), and develop a metaphysical system from there, rather, he begins with the “world-spirit” and its organic processes and development in the universe. Hegel reduces all being to mind, idea, or world-spirit and this is why his conceptual scheme for reality is known as “idealism.” In metaphysics, idealism is any theory which reduces all reality to mind and its ideas. Idealism makes the mind or “world-mind” (in Hegel’s case) the ultimate character, or substance of reality and makes all reality mind-dependent.

As pointed out, Hegel believes that all reality is driven by a world-spirit or world-mind. This world-spirit, is not the transcendent Christian God, but a nonphysical spiritual force that is immanent, indwelt, and part of the universe itself—what is known as metaphysical monism. Since Hegel reduces all reality to only one thing, mind or spirit, his position can also be identified with theological pantheism or panentheism (the idea that all is in God). The universe is in continual change and development due to the careful guidance of the world-spirit. Hegel’s position is known as idealism because he believes that all reality is based on, or consists of spirit, idea, or mind. Hegel connects this notion to his overall understanding of idealism, “Now it is the interest of spirit that external conditions should become internal ones; that the natural and the spiritual world should be recognized in the subjective aspect belonging to intelligence; by which process the unity of subjectivity and being generally—or the idealism of existence—is established” (231). Hegel argues that idealism is established if one can reduce all reality to the subjective aspect of intelligence or mind. He believes that the subjective intelligent individual serves as a kind of microcosm of the universal world-spirit or intelligence (162-163). If the universe is reasonable, there must be an ultimate intelligence or “reason” that is at work, infused into, and guiding the universe. Humans have the intellectual capacity of discovering reason at work in reality. Hegel applies this notion of “reason” to all aspects of life and the world, including this unfolding of idealism to history and human events.

In part two we will explore how Hegel applies the notion of the world-spirit to history itself.

1 Aristotle takes the primacy of being, or the fact of existence, as his philosophical point of departure. This is the point of his famous phrase “being as being” in book IV of his Metaphysics (522).

Works Cited

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Being, Intellectual History, Philosophy

Excursus: Pascal And The Inescapable Nature of Being

by Dave Seng

Have you ever come across children arguing about something on playground? One says “is so” and the other “is not”? Each is emphatically stating that something is or is not the case. Each is attempting to persuade the other about reality. Perhaps unknowingly, each is making a metaphysical statement and assuming an ultimate truth belonging to reality. Each is tacitly assuming there is a reality to argue about. Reality is assumed. To say something is the case is to already assume “what is,” to assume reality. No one can deny that Being is. The question arises, however, because Being is so fundamental to our human experience, how does one go about presenting a definition of Being?

The inquiry into Being is the most foundational question of all. It is the basic starting point of ontology, or the study of Being and existing things. It is the study of reality. This fundamental and most basic feature of reality, that Being is, perplexed the great mathematician and philosopher, Blaise Pascal. He thought that any attempt to define what is, or Being, amounts to a tautology. In On Geometrical Demonstration, Pascal writes:

There are even those who go to the absurdity of explaining a word by the word itself. I know of some who have defined light in this way: “Light is a luminary motion of luminous bodies,” as if we could understand the words luminary and luminous without understanding the word light [lumière].

We cannot undertake to define being without falling into this absurdity, for we cannot define any word without beginning with these words it is, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore to define being we would have to say it is, and thus use the word defined in the definition.

It is sufficiently clear from this that there are words incapable of definition. And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused; whereas we make use of them with the same assurance and the same certainty we should have if they had been explained in a perfectly unambiguous way, because nature itself has given us, without words, a clearer understanding of them than we gain through art with all our explanations.1

The perplexity Pascal is pointing to is that Being, or “what is” is defined as that which is and seems to be circular because the words “it is” belong to the definition of Being. In a very strict sense, Pascal is correct. It is difficult to precisely define Being without using the terms “what is.” The reason, logically, is that Being is the most fundamental aspect of reality. It is the most basic point of departure for the metaphysician. No one can deny that Being, or something, is. Long ago, Aristotle pointed out that philosophy must have some very basic starting points and it is the mark of ignorance to not recognize this fact. We must have these first foundational starting points in order to avoid an endless regression of explanations. So, when the metaphysician starts from the basic assumption of what it is, and then explicates what is, he is not engaging in circular reasoning. Being is the fundamental principle of reality and why Pascal points out that it is difficult to define. The most fundamental aspects of reality are difficult to define ontologically. Pascal correctly points out that Being is so basic that it is intuitively correct—And if nature had not made up for this defect by giving a like idea to all men, all our expressions would be confused. Being is both the logical and intuitive starting point for the metaphysician.

Being, is not as much a tautological worry as Pascal feared. And he partially answered his concern. I do believe that Being can be correctly defined even if it is a little imprecise. As Aristotle pointed out, Being can be said in many ways. Different kinds of being exist in different ways. Fictional characters such as Hamlet exist in a different way than my writing desk. But the philosopher is not alone regarding the difficult nature of ontology, or being. The physicist can give a definition of energy (a capacity for change) but can not explain its ontology (being). Definitions are elusive indeed. No one, however, denies that things that things like fictional characters exist in one way, while things like energy, or tables exist in another. The nature of Being forces us to re-examine the claims of children who passionately question what is or what is not.

Next time, we’ll begin our study of Hegelian idealism and the nature of Being. Hopefully, this excursus helped to clarify the foundational nature of Being.

1 Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters; Pensées; Scientific Treatises, ed. Mortimer J. Adler and Robert McHenry, trans. W. F. Trotter, Second Edition., vol. 30, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1990), 432.