Intellectual History, Liberal Arts, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Lucretius: A Conversation Between Science and Philosophy, Part One

by Dave Seng

This will be the first post of three regarding the Roman poet Lucretius (99 BC – 55 BC) and his philosophical poem, The Way Things Are. When one comes to Lucretius, his poem is often interpreted in terms of atomism, materialism, or strict philosophical naturalism. There is much truth to this interpretation. In this series, however, I want to make a larger metaphysical analysis and discuss the intersection of science and philosophy that was articulated by the poet. I thought it would be helpful to use Aristotle’s ideas to augment, clarify, and critique parts of Lucretius. Along the way we will bring Descartes and A. N. Whitehead for reflection. I hope you find the discussion helpful.

What we learn from the Roman Epicurean poet Lucretius is that when we explore questions about the nature of Being, including its properties, nature, and development, there is always a philosophical and scientific aspect to them. In The Way Things Are, Lucretius investigates the nature of reality poetically as he examines the physical world and draws philosophical implications about it. His approach is not necessarily new among the classical authors, but his insight that what we learn from physical reality has a philosophical dimension, is significant. Most ancient philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle held to this dual aspect of inquiry into the nature and development of the cosmos. Aristotle, more than Plato, took physical reality seriously and begins his philosophical and scientific investigations empirically and inductively drawing from the facts of the natural world around him. Aristotle was careful to articulate that his logical abstractions and conclusions corresponded to reality (much of his logical reasoning was drawn from external reality and conducted to show how nature works. After all, the laws of logic are simple properties of being). Lucretius, too, was very interested in the workings of the world around him and wrote The Way Things Are as an attempt to describe the properties and principles of natural science. Lucretius’s poem is a fascinating examination of a number of very important questions related to the intersection of philosophy and science. In other words, whenever the nature and character of Being is explored, philosophical and scientific questions are always involved.

Throughout his poem, Lucretius poetically describes the nature of Being (all of reality), the importance of induction, the scientific principles of uniformity and conservation, the law of causality, and the nature of explanation. Lucretius, is not the only important author who has articulated and explored these questions. The conversation Lucretius engaged in about science and philosophy is also augmented and developed by such thinkers as Aristotle, Descartes, A. N. Whitehead, among others.

In a broad interpretation, then, Lucretius’s poem can be read as a conversation between science and philosophy. Here, science is defined as the knowledge of our physical world which is discovered through testable and reproducible empirical experimentation, and is quantifiable and objective. Simply put, science is knowledge of the world obtained by the five senses and verified through repeatable inductive processes. Philosophy, or how one thinks rationally and critically about the natural world, is concerned—in this context—about how scientific knowledge corresponds, or is in agreement with metaphysical first principles, and how philosophical concepts relate to physical reality. Lucretius helps us to understand that a philosophy of science is important when examining both the philosophical and empirical implications of science. In this case, philosophy of science is not only interested in how empirical scientific results correspond to logical analysis, but is also interested in discovering the relationship and interaction between metaphysical first principles and scientific knowledge. Such philosophical concepts as being and becoming, the law of noncontradiction and other laws of logic which are the foundations for mathematics and critical reasoning, along with the principle of causality (which, we will see below is a logical extension of the law of noncontradiction), and the principle of the uniformity of nature are important philosophical aspects of reality that are assumed in the scientific process and must be held in order for science to function coherently. To summarize, science is descriptive, inductive, and empirical while philosophy, and particularly, metaphysics, seeks to understand the first principles of reality which are not empirical, and seeks to interpret scientific conclusions through the right use of reason and logic and to learn how both science and metaphysics provide insight into reality or Being. Lucretius wanted us to explore the philosophical and scientific foundations for Being, causation, and the nature of change.

First, however, it is important to examine Lucretius’s scientific postulations. Scientifically, Lucretius is an “atomist,” meaning he holds that all physical reality can be reduced to atoms and tiny indestructible material objects.1 Among other places, the poet tells us,

Seeds of things, firstlings, atoms, and in

them lies

The sum of all created things. (7)

Furthermore, Lucretius seeks to investigate the physical world “by insight into nature” and “systematic contemplation” (3). It is clear throughout his poem that his process is empirical and inductive. Interestingly, Lucretius had some sophisticated ideas about science and nature, itself, which still resonate with philosophers of science today. These ideas are centered around scientific concepts of the uniformity of nature and the conservation of energy. Lucretius’s inductive methodology laid the foundation for his scientific conceptual scheme. Induction is the logical process of coming to general conclusions drawn from particular instances. For example, one can correctly reason that since Socrates is mortal, Aristotle is mortal, and Ralph is mortal that all humans are mortal. (It is not necessary to examine every single individual to know that humans are mortal.) As a methodology, induction itself rests upon important metaphysical concepts. A. N. Whitehead, for example, explains this point,

Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history until your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations. (A. N. Whitehead, Vol. 55, 156)

Whitehead explains what Lucretius understands intuitively and poetically. Induction, the process of generating generalized conclusions from particular instances, rests upon the idea that there is an order and unity to events in the world, and that past events can be understood in light of the present and applied to the future based on the principle of uniformity. Induction is one of the basic properties of Being. Lucretius showed that order, unity, and induction rely on prior philosophical postulates. The scientific method, which is based on induction and repeatable events, rests on metaphysical assumptions. This is one reason why questions about the physical universe always involve both empirical and philosophical concepts.

Works cited:

Lucretius. The Way Things Are. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 11. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

1Lucretius was not the first to hold such a view. The pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus was also an atomist. Ancient atomists believed atoms were indestructible. It is now known, however, that atoms are destructible, but in general, Lucretius seems to have been on the right track. In addition, it is unclear how strict an atomist Lucretius was. For example, he referred to the goddess Venus as the “creatress” in the first page of the poem and referres to her throughout the work.

Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

The Deniable Darwin, David Berlinski

by Dave Seng

I’m not competent enough to dive into evolutionary biology and speak to it with any certainty. Nonetheless, as a metaphysician, I am very interested in the principles that set up the entire framework of existence and make reality possible in the first place. To that end, I believe David Berlinski, writer, philosopher, and mathematician has some interesting things to say about why traditional Darwinism can no longer account for the development of biological life on this planet.

Metaphysically, let us keep this in mind. The world is in fact made up of diverse things. Diverse things do not come together unless ordered. The world has an ordered unity and, therefore, there must be one Orderer of the world.

In Aristotelian and Thomist language, diversity is only an accident of unity. (Which is why earlier posts regarding the one and the many are important.) In this sense, an accident is that which exists not in itself but only in some substance as its property or attribute. In metaphysics, an accident is a feature or characteristic which does not belong necessarily to the nature of a thing. In the video, the puzzle that life moves significantly towards an end even in the face of the second law of thermodynamics (things move towards entropy) is brought up. I would offer that as diversity (the many) is an accident of the one (unity), entropy itself is an accident of the prior goodness and teleology of Being itself.

Interestingly enough, Berlinski, an agnostic, believes there are good reasons for Christian theism. Enjoy.

Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Theology

Lutheran Scholasticism and Aquinas

by Dave Seng

Scholasticism was the predominant system or method of theological and philosophical teaching during the middle ages, based largely on the Church Fathers and Aristotle. Classical and medieval writers using scholastic methodology wrote in a question and answer catechetical style. Although it has sometimes been forgotten, confessional Lutheranism has maintained a strong form of scholastic reasoning and apologetic methodology especially surrounding the doctrine of God and the classical arguments for His existence. For example, Luther approved of the cosmological argument. In fact, Luther, Melanchton, and Chemnitz reasserted the classical arguments for the existence of God as did the scholastic Lutheran thinkers Jakob Andreae, David Hollatz, Johann Gerhard, and Abraham Calovius among others. In the nineteenth century the confessional Lutheran, Ernst Hengstenberg promoted the classical approach to apologetics and so did Otto Zöckler who corresponded with Charles Darwin and defended classical Christian theism. In the early twentieth century, some of the leading proponents of classical Lutheran Scholasticism were theologians Leander Keyser, and Christoph Luthardt. As noted in Geisler’s essay (see below), the contemporary philosopher David Johnson is considered a Lutheran Thomist.

Lutheranism has a long history, of course, and has embraced other approaches to apologetics as well. I will not go into various methodologies here. I believe, along with Luther and the Lutheran Scholastics, that since reason is a minister to the Christian faith, it should be employed and used well, including the utilization of theistic reasoning and argumentation. The ministerial use of reason (Luther’s distinction) means that reason is a minister and support to Christian faith (which is also Aquinas’s position as well).

Further, Lutherans embrace the three ecumenical creeds (Apostle’s, Nicene, and Athanasian) which all begin with an affirmation of the existence of God. This makes sense, because, without a conception of God, miracles, the Bible, Christ’s atoning death, the Trinity, and virtually every other teaching of historic Christianity does not make sense. What good is it to argue from miracle that Jesus is the Son of God without the prior conviction that God is? Every major doctrine of the faith ultimately rests on our understanding of Almighty God.

The misunderstanding that many Lutherans have today—due largely to the errors of pietism and fideism—falsely teaches that Luther was opposed in all ways to the Christian development of the mind and natural reason. After all, he famously called reason “the devil’s whore.” Nonetheless, it should be remembered that Luther did promote the ministerial use of reason (philosophy) and his relationship to philosophy and apologetics needs to be carefully understood. It is true that Luther had both praise and disdain for Aristotle at times, and that he preferred Cicero in some cases (although not a Christian, Cicero promoted a cosmological argument for a divine creator in his The Nature of the Gods). As Luther developed, he became a critic of Nominalism and, later, further embraced his Augustinianism. A great book that addresses this aspect of Luther’s thought is Grace and Reason: A Study in The Theology of Luther, by B. A. Gerrish. It is not the case that Luther threw out the use of philosophy or rejected the idea that reason is not a support or minister to faith.

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) is considered one of, if not the, greatest of scholastic theologians. I believe that Lutherans can learn much from St. Thomas. Among his intellectual accomplishments, Aquinas built upon the inductive and realist theories of Aristotle. Although Aquinas was a Christian Aristotelian, he successfully synthesized much of Augustine and gave us the great “classical” arguments for the existence of God such as a version of the cosmological argument (that the cosmos is a contingent being and depends on God for its existence), and the teleological argument (the cosmos exhibits design and was planned and designed by God), among others. Much of Aquinas’s arguments can be summarized this way: We know from experience that the world is contingent and it depends on something outside of itself for being or existence. Further, the order, harmony, and rationality of the cosmos must be the product of a mind or creator.

This is far too short of a summary of Aquinas and the Lutheran scholastics, but it must stand for now. In other ways, Aquinas comes very close to a Lutheran understanding of Sola Scripture (Scripture alone as authoritative for the Christian). After all, Aquinas was writing before the council of Trent. I do not want to make Aquinas into a kind of pre-Reformation Lutheran because that would not be fair to him. Lutherans do accept, however, that which is Scripturally true and accurate throughout Christian history. This is because truth endures across time and place. Lutherans have always wanted to keep, preserve, and care for the best of our Western Christian heritage.

At times, I have gone back and forth regarding my assessment of Aquinas. On occasion, I found his doctrine of God challenging and probably read too many critiques of Thomism, particularly from William Lane Craig. I keep coming back to Aquinas, however. One of the things that keep me coming back to Aquinas is his Aristotelian epistemology which is essentially correct. The mind has an innate, a priori capacity or potentiality to know, without which it would be impossible to know even first principles. It is a first principle that being is that which is, and that which is can be known. Regarding God as the foundation or ground of being, Dr. Mortimer Adler explains,

“Aquinas, for example, conceives “being taken simply as including all perfection of being”; and in the Judeo-Christian tradition, ‘being’ without qualification is taken as the most proper name for God. When Moses asked God His name, he received as answer: “I AM THAT I AM … Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.” Used in this sense, ‘being’ becomes the riches of terms—the one which has the greatest amplitude of meaning.” (Syntopicon, Vol. I, Great Books of the Western World, S.V. Being.)

Here are a couple of essays that explain how Aquinas has been received in general Protestantism. I wish I could find more from the Lutheran side. The first is from Norman Geisler, who argues that evangelicals can learn a lot from Aquinas, and Carl Russell Trueman who reviews the book, Aquinas Among the Protestants. If someone knows of a Lutheran source which speaks to this topic, please post in the comments below, I would really appreciate it. I am attempting to do my own research on Thomism and the Lutheran Scholastics.

I’d like to thank Lutheran scholars Dr. Adam Francisco and Dr. Joshua Pagan for their email correspondence which served as an inspiration for this post.

Does Thomism Lead to Catholicism, Norman Geisler

Thomas Aquinas, Not Just for Catholics Anymore, Carl Russell Trueman

Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Philosophy

Augustine’s Modified Platonism

by Dave Seng

There can be no change where there is no form.—St. Augustine

One thing that I have discovered in my reading of classical and contemporary philosophers is how those who consider themselves Platonists often have to modify their position to account for a more accurate understanding of concrete reality. For example, Plotinus had to adopt Aristotle’s categories of act and potency to account for change in the world, and Augustine, too, had to concede that form and matter must be united (in order to understand motion, change, and avoid some theological concerns). Contemporary Platonists are rarely strict Platonists. One way or another, everyone on the philosophical spectrum has to come to terms with physical reality. The question is, what is the correct approach? I believe Aristotle and Aquinas provide the best understanding of ontology (the nature of existing things) and metaphysics (the nature and properties of existence). I have already pointed out how Aristotle argues for the union of form and matter. Here, I want to explicate how and why Augustine, a Platonist, needs to modify his position in order to account for reality. Although it is rare to compare Augustine with Aristotle, in some ways he must adjust his overall approach and comes very close to Aristotle’s position.

In the physical and contingent world, matter and its forms must begin at their creation. Since matter and its forms can not exist separately, philosophers and theologians, of both Platonist and Aristotelian varieties, think that God could not have made them separately. It can not be thought, according to Augustine, “that God first created matter without form and then gave it form” (138). To explain this, he offers us an analogy of how music works. “Song is ordered sound, and although a thing may very well exist without order, order cannot be given to a thing which does not exist … We do not first emit formless sounds, which do not constitute song, and then adapt them and fashion them in the form of song (139). Thus, Augustine believes that God made form and matter at the same time. God “concreates” matter and form, puts them together at the same time and is the one who puts the form into matter. For Augustine, the form is not a separate entity, as Plato believed, but put into the matter by God. Augustine clearly modifies his Platonism at this point.

Struggling with the theological and philosophical implications of the created world, Augustine tells us “For the matter of heaven and earth is one thing, their form another. You [God] created the matter from absolutely nothing and the form of the world from the formless matter. But you created both in one act, so that the form followed upon the matter with no interval of delay” (italics added, 157).

The above passages are best read in light of Aquinas because Augustine provides the foundation for the Thomistic doctrine of concreation. Concreation simply means “created together.” In fact, it was Augustine’s teaching that form and matter had to be created at the same time, and that form must follow upon matter, that leads Aquinas to coin the term “concreation” meaning that God created Form and matter at the same time. Why do both Augustine (a Platonist) and Aquinas (an Aristotelian) believe that form and matter must have been created at the same time? Simply because it is impossible to have form without matter, and matter without form. Both Platonists and Aristotelians must face the concrete facts of reality.

Aquinas is helpful here. When examining Augustine’s position of concreation, Aquinas says “if formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration … To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without actuality, which is a contradiction in terms … Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless” (344). Neither, however can the form of a material thing be created without matter. Aquinas reminds us, “Forms and other non-subsisting things, which are said to co-exist rather than to exist, ought to be called concreated rather than created things. (245)” The old Aristotelian adage, “no form without matter, no matter without form” still holds true.

Even more fascinatingly, Augustine believes that the form must be in the material object itself in order to account for change. “There can be no change where there is no form” (129), according to Augustine. This parallels exactly what Aristotle and Aquinas hold to. Without the potentiality of form, something can not change. If the acorn does not have the form and potency of the oak tree, it will not grow into a majestic oak tree.

Aquinas was one of the first great thinkers to realize that Platonists must modify there position at times. He tells us in his Summa Theologica, “Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended” (446). Clearly, Augustine understood the metaphysical and theological problems which arise when form and matter are separated. For Christians, Christ shed real human pH typable blood on the cross—not some Platonic version where the real blood exists as an ideal in the transcendent realm. The union of form and matter has significant implications when it comes to Christ’s atoning death. For rightly believing Christians, Holy Communion makes no sense without the union of form and matter.

Christian Platonists such as Augustine, do need to modify their position in order to correspond to correct theology. They also need to modify their position to account for a correct understanding of ontology and metaphysics. When I read contemporary Christian Platonists, such as J. P. Moreland and Peter van Inwagen, they too make similar adjustments to their ontology and metaphysics. It is simply very difficult to account for a pure separation of form and matter in physical reality without going into one error or another. Reality has its own intractable way of being. Aristotle was on the right path by adopting a common-sense approach which accounts for reality as we know and experience it. As T. S. Eliot discovered after converting to Christianity, reality is the determinant of order.

Works Cited:

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica, Volume 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 17. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Augustine. Confessions. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 16. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.