Culture, Education, Philosophy

Postmodernism Today

by Dave Seng

metaphysical truth

More than one person has told me that postmodernism is dead. I do not share that position. Recently, I conducted a quick scan of books and journal articles that were published in the past several years (of course one can find postmodern theory going back to the 1960s or even earlier, but I wanted to keep the search current), and found a quick sampling of the following titles. For books, I found Pixar’s Boy Stories: Masculinity in a Postmodern Age, Postmodern Theory and Blade Runner, and Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern. For academic journal articles, I found these: Heidegger’s Wrong Turn (Heidegger is sometimes used as a stepping stone to postmodernism), Postmodern Truth?, and the oddest of all, Toward a Postmodern Pragmatic Discourse Semioethics for Brain Injury Care: Empirically Driven Group Inquiry as a Dialogical Practice in Pursuit of the Peircean Aesthetic Ideal of ‘Reasonableness.’ This is a small selection, of course, but the point is, postmodernism is far from dead. To augment this assertion, search for terms like “deconstruction,” “poststructralism,” and “critical theory” in any academic database and you will find more than enough articles speaking to postmodernism’s current state.

But what is postmodernism and why do I think it is alive and well, against the opinions of my respected friends and colleagues? According to philosopher Ed Miller, postmodernism is “a contemporary interdisciplinary movement stressing the pragmatic, historically relative, and theory-laden character of judgments and knowledge” (Questions That Matter, pg. 589). Bruce Thornton explains postmodernism as a cultural and intellectual mood that denies “a stable creative order that can substitute for the fragmented social world and provide an alternative foundation for human meaning and identity,” for the postmodernist, “there are no foundations, neither for human meaning, identity, art, nor morality. Everything is fragmented and free-floating, including artistic forms, which are now completely open to unbridled experimentation, and the individual, who is no longer psychologically integrated but rather a bundle of neuroses, complexes, and multiple identities battered by indifferent cosmic, historical, and social forces” (Humanities Handbook, pg. 101). Postmodernism, therefore, encompasses a whole host of critical theories such as poststructuralism, postcolonialism, Marxism, and various literary interpretive schools generally based on racial, class, gender, and social justice issues. The most popular postmodern theorists at least during the 1990s were Rorty, Lyotard, Derrida, and Foucault. Many others can be cited as well. One can go back further, of course, and discover that in various ways Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Dewey, William James, and Heidegger were forerunners of postmodernism and one of the reasons I believe postmodernism is alive is that most academics have been trained in schools of thought founded by one or more of these thinkers. (I think it is a legitimate line of inquiry to ask what genuine needs of contemporary society help to explain the prevalence and acceptance of these philosophical doctrines. But that will be a topic for another post.) The idea that there are no facts, just interpretations, and all interpretations are equally valid—is part of our current postmodern condition. These core convictions of the last 50 years have not changed. Going further back in time, it is easy to see how Kant’s idealism, Hegel’s historicism, Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and even Kierkegaard’s subjective epistemology all share a postmodern anti-realism, and frankly, a conceptually incoherent approach to truth and reality. In the larger cultural and intellectual sphere, however, I don’t really see individuals or society comprehending or assimilating the logical implications of the law of non-contradiction or accepting absolutes in their lives, even when everyone functions from the assumptions of absolutes in all aspects of reality and the world (even if, ironically, the only absolute that one can accept is that there are no absolutes). In our current postmodern (or should I say postphilosophical?) cultural climate it is often forgotten that the cars we drive, the building we work and live in, the technology we use and consume, and the very economic lives we lead are built on and created by very strict standards.

There are, however, some interesting cases to be explored regarding the failure of postmodernism in some fields, and this might explain why my friends think postmodernism as an academic fad is over. It is true that some fields have returned to a common sense understanding of reality. Take the field of literature, for example. After a period from about the 1970s to 2000, when experimentation with plot structure was all the rage, imaginative literature returned to narrative and largely looks like the structure Aristotle set out in his poetics. Admittedly, this was largely due to fact that people stopped buying novels without a plot or were in other ways inscrutable. But even fields such as anthropology and sociology have experienced some misgivings of postmodernism. When I was a graduate student completing my second master’s degree, I attended a lecture by a senior anthropologist who also taught in the Honors School of the institution I was attending. This instructor gave a decidedly structural view of social order (this was a younger professor, not an older one or of a conservative bent. He was simply well versed in postmodernism but rejected it). After the lecture, I told this professor that many poststructuralists would have been sorely disappointed with his lecture. He responded to me quickly that a poststructuralist is someone who has never recovered from a head injury. The point is not that it is necessary to be intellectually mean-spirited to postmodernists but rather poststructuralism is not the final court of appeal in some academic circles. When a literature professor tells me that postmodernism is dead, what she is really saying is that the whole experimentation with plot and confused narrative is over. On the other hand, however, the racial, class, and gender struggles which are so popular today and really have their foundations in late modernity (just read Hemingway, Faulkner, or Fitzgerald on these issues) are now the adopted children of postmodernism. As an academic appellation, postmodernism may not be as fashionable as it once was. Nonetheless, the idea that all reality is historically and culturally determined is far from absent—both in academics and popular culture.

Metaphysics, Philosophy

Aristotle and Descartes on Teleology, Part Two

by Dave Seng

This post serves as an attempt to outline the differences between a classical Aristotelian view of the world and that of the great early modern, philosopher, Rene Descartes. The purpose of these essays will help us understand how and why these differences in understanding the nature of reality matter, primarily with how we understand purpose, or teleology in the world. Cartesian philosophy is still very much present in our current intellectual climate and still has an impact on the way we view the nature of things and individuals in the world around us.  Here’s where we left off …

In this conversation, it is helpful to understand that Aristotle’s conception of act and potency are important corollaries to his notion of cause, and are necessary to understand Descartes’ position on final causation and the resulting Cartesian conception of the world. With Aristotle’s construct of act, potency, and causation in place, the discussion between Aristotle and Descartes regarding final cause becomes clear. Act is that which has actual existence in this world. Potency is all the possibilities something could undergo in the world of becoming (For sake of brevity, Aristotle’s conceptions of act and potency related to cause can be found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, pg. 538, 565-566, and 569-575, among other places. This discussion is a quick summary). These are central concepts for Aristotle as he explains change and the causes of change in the world. With the exception of universals, virtually all things of the physical world are subject to change or movement. Both living and non-living things experience change. Change is the actualization of a thing’s potential. According to Aristotle, change is potency reduced to act. However, an outside and additional element is necessary to bring about change. Something else, always itself in “act,” is needed to actualize a potential. Potency, itself, cannot bring about act—just as non-being cannot bring about being. For Aristotle, act and potency are as fundamental as Being and Becoming, but to explain change more clearly, he provides the famous four causes which help clarify why that which reduces potential to act is called a cause. The first cause is the material cause—that out of which something is actualized The second cause is the efficient cause—that by which something is actualized. The third cause is the formal cause—that into which something is actualized. The fourth cause is the final cause—that for the sake of which something is actualized. A biological example will help explain how these four causes work in the physical world. To understand the basics of the human heart, it is important to know what it is made of—its material cause. In this case, the material cause of a heart is muscle. The efficient cause rests in the DNA that structured and ordered cells in such a way as to create a muscular heart and not a kidney or spleen. The formal cause is that which the heart muscle is fashioned into—ventricles, arteries, aorta, etc. The final cause serves the purpose of pumping blood. Aristotle sees purpose or goal-directedness wherever cause and effect relationships take place in this world, and is a significant element of his philosophy. The totality of the three previous causes all serve a goal or ultimate end, culminating in the final cause. Focusing on act and potency, the efficient cause is that which actualizes a potency. The final cause is that which actualizes the purpose or the reason something is actualized. In human activity things are done with intentionality, and the possibilities we speak of regarding human beings are often referred to as human potential. As we shall see, Descartes, in the end, reduces much of Aristotle’s causes to the efficient cause.

Note: Interestingly, Aristotle does not seem to use the same order of his four causes. On page 128, this order is given: formal, material (in this particular case—“an antecedent which necessitates consequent”), efficient, and final. On pages 514-515, the order is: efficient, final, material, formal. And on page 271, we see this order: material, formal, efficient and final. However, on page 514, Aristotle points to the goal-directedness of changeable things and their causes, “For how can a principle of change or the nature of the good exist for unchangeable things, since everything that in itself and by its own nature is good is an end, and a cause in the sense that for its sake the other things both come to be and are, and since an end or purpose is the end of some action, and all action simply change” (514)? In general, Aristotle sees the final cause as an ultimate goal-directed end.

Descartes, on the other hand, is skeptical of Aristotle’s conclusions and is not certain whether or not final cause can be discerned in reality. He does not completely deny the existence of final causality, but he thinks such knowledge transcends his abilities, “I have no further difficulty in recognizing that there is an infinitude of matters in His power, the causes of which transcend my knowledge; and this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final, finds no useful employment in physical [or natural] things; for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the [inscrutable] ends of God” (316). As he explains to one of his objectors, Descartes elucidates further:


The arguments you adduce on behalf of final causality are to be referred to the efficient cause; thus it is open to us, from beholding the uses of the various parts in plants and animals to regard with admiration the God who brings these into existence, and from a survey of His works to learn to know and glorify the author of these works, but that does not imply that we can divine the purpose for which he made each thing. And although in Ethics, where it is often allowable to employ conjecture, it is at times pious to consider the end which we may conjecture God set before Himself in ruling the universe, certainly in Physics where everything should rest upon the securest arguments, it is futile to do so. We cannot pretend that certain of God’s purposes, while, as to those which you have brought forward in illustrating the difficulty in question, there is no one who does not think that he is acquainted with them (441).


As a devout Roman Catholic, it is clear that Descartes is skeptical of the notion of final causality because he does not want to be so arrogant as to claim to know the mind of God. On the other hand, Aristotle might ask, how is it arrogant or impious to say that the eye is for seeing, the heart is for pumping blood, and human beings always do something with some good in mind? And why is it necessary to completely rule out the idea of final cause in physics? At this point, it seems that Descartes and Aristotle are addressing separate questions. Descartes sees final causality in terms of God’s ultimate ends of the universe which he thinks is an impossible question to answer. On the other hand, Aristotle is not really interested in the theological implications of natural or human causation (at least in the same way Descartes is), and is more interested in making an observable ontological claim that changeable things are directed to serve a good end. Humans seem to act with some good in mind (even if their “good” is misplaced). These are two separate and independent positions for each of these philosophers. Descartes, due to his quest for indubitable certainty, reduces final cause to efficient cause. Again, because he says, “The arguments…on behalf of final causality are to be referred to the efficient cause; thus it is open to us, from beholding the uses of the various parts in plants and animals to regard with admiration the God who brings these into existence” (441).

For Descartes, all we can really know about change and causation in the physical world is the efficient cause—that which influences or brings physical matter into some discernable form, and in this case, God is the efficient cause of all being—the best we can do is admire God who creates things into existence. Descartes’ epistemological skepticism keeps him from making any claim about purpose or goal-directedness in the physical world. In general, Descartes restricts his philosophical speculations to what he knows for certain, and usually applies formal and essential causation to God and the things of this world. For example he explains, “…I have at all points compared the formal cause or reason derived from God’s essential nature, which explains why he Himself does not need any cause in order to exist, with the efficient cause, without which finite things cannot exist” (384). For Descartes, God is the efficient cause of all things and anything beyond that, he seems to indicate, is not possible to speak of with strict precision and certainty. Therefore, he is unable to express ideas of what it means to live deliberately, be ethical, and order society for good. Descartes may not even deny that human actions are ordered to a good, but he leaves these types of questions regarding action, purpose, and agency untouched. At best, Descartes leaves these types of practical questions to the efficient cause of God.

Works Cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1 and 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7, 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Descartes, Rene. Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza.Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 28. Encyclopedia Britannica,Inc., 1999.

Metaphysics, Philosophy

Aristotle and Descartes on Teleology, Part One

by Dave Seng


There is little doubt in intellectual history that Rene Descartes is a formidable and influential philosopher. In many standard philosophy textbooks, Descartes is often considered the father of modern philosophy. For example, Descartes is frequently cited for providing the groundwork for the modern impulse to base all truth and knowledge on mathematical certainty, giving philosophy the traditional mind/body problem, substance dualism, and individual subjectivity (based on his teaching of the “cogito”). An important ramification of Cartesian subjective individualism is that it leads to the metaphysically neutral or even anti-metaphysical perspective of democracy since modern liberal states tend to minimize metaphysics and base political truth on the subjective individual. In addition, Descartes’ philosophy can be seen as a forerunner of Kantian idealism and British empiricism. The influence of Descartes is vast and can be found in many areas of Western philosophy. These articles will explore some overlooked insights of Cartesian thought from the vantage point of the traditional realist tradition, primarily using Aristotle as a guide. Since the ideas of Descartes are complex, this will be the first in a series of articles focusing on Descartes’ ideas of teleology or final causality and his overall conception of metaphysics.

In classical philosophy, and primarily with Aristotle, the chief end of philosophy is to examine the first principles and causes of the world. Philosophy begins, as Aristotle explains in his Metaphysics, with wonder about the world that surrounds us, or more technically, wonder about the reality of Being. Getting at how causation and change work as the first principles in reality was thought to unlock the mystery of Being and the place of human being and becoming in this world. (Just as an aside, Teleology or what is sometimes called teleological realism is the idea that things in the realm of becoming can be accounted for in terms of some goal, end or purpose they help bring about. The term teleology was first used by the philosopher Christian Wolff in 1728 to describe the role of final causes in regards to change. In Western thought, the foundation of teleology was laid by Aristotle and then developed by Thomas Aquinas and others. In these articles, I refer to final causation or purpose as a“telos” or teleology, the science of describing purpose and goal-directedness in the world around us.) If there is a place for causes, effects, order, and even goal-directedness (final causes) in this world, it has important implications for how humans view each other and human purposes. The curious thing about human beings is that they seem to be defined by the commitments, purposes, goals, and projects to which they give themselves. Politicians, for example, serve the purpose of good social order, teachers serve the purpose of educating their students, and social cooperation in economics serves the purpose of monetary stability and economic growth in trade and industry. Human beings tend to be naturally oriented to things they hold to be good or important. This was so obvious to Aristotle that the claims purpose in human action was a “first principle” of all social order and individual action. When discussing happiness as a final end, Aristotle explains, “It seems to be so also from the fact that it is a first principle; for it is for the sake of that we all do all that we do, and the principle and cause of goods is, we claim, something prized and divine” (Aristotle II 347). Aristotle very clearly helps us to understand that human beings always act with some good, goal, end, or purpose in mind.

To unpack these ideas more explicitly, however, it is insightful to investigate what Descartes has to say about final causality. This inquiry might hold significant ramifications for developing a robust view of human nature and how that leads one to view human existence with meaning, purpose, and significance. In the history of Western thought, two very different traditions have developed regarding the place of final causation in understanding reality. The first tradition in the lineage of Aristotle, Aquinas, and other neo-Aristotelians holds that the world is significantly better understood with a firm grasp of final causality. On the other hand, a tradition in the trajectory developed by Hobbes, Bacon, and Descartes is more skeptical about the place of final causation and believes, instead, that the natural world is better explained in terms of simple matter, mechanics, and mathematics. These articles seek explores the conversation that takes place between these two positions and, specifically, between Aristotle and Descartes regarding final causality.

The conversation that takes place between Aristotle and Descartes has a preliminary point that needs to be understood. Descartes has some broad agreement with Aristotle. For example, Descartes agrees with Aristotle that humans are basically rational beings, that God is pure“act” (act and potency are central concepts to Aristotle’s metaphysics) and with Aristotle’s conception of efficient causes. It is very important to point out that Descartes does not exactly deny final causation—he is just skeptical that he or anyone else can discover it. What we shall see, however, is that Descartes very methodology leaves him at a loss to explain change in a robust way and only allows him to explain change in purely mechanical and mathematical terms. He thinks the matter of final causation is entirely theological and that no one can really know God’s ultimate purposes (441). However, it will be seen that his methodological skepticism runs the risk of being unable to account for a large portion of human action, cultural production, and social order.

Aristotle and Descartes really are two very different thinkers despite their broad agreements. Descartes (due to his doctrine of the “cogito” or the mind, and ultimately his starting point from the existence of God) tends to be a “top-down” philosopher in the rational tradition of Plato, while Aristotle takes a “bottom-up” approach and reasons from empiricism, or that which can be discerned from the sense experiences common to everyone and the cognitive capacities of the mind, and then reasons to greater and greater abstract principles about the world. These are very different methodologies. Essentially, Descartes begins with epistemology (how we know what we know) and Aristotle begins with ontology (the nature and character of being and that which is becoming). One question that will be explored here is whether or not epistemology should determine ontology or metaphysics. It is important to note that Descartes seeks epistemological certainty akin to mathematical certainty, “the Method which teaches us to follow the true order and enumerate exactly every term in the matter under investigation contains everything which gives certainty to the rules of Arithmetic”(272). Furthermore, he explains:

Considering also that of all those who have hitherto sought for the truth in the Sciences, it has been the mathematicians alone who have been able to succeed in making any demonstrations, that is to say producing reasons which are evident and certain…And for this purpose it was requisite that I should borrow all that is best in Geometrical Analysis and Algebra, and correct the errors of the one by the other (271).

This is the discussion that becomes evident when exploring each philosopher’s metaphysical contributions, and a careful analysis of these two different approaches high lights the issues involved when understanding and discussing change, the nature of existence, final causality, and human agency. Descartes seeks mathematical certainty and is skeptical about what is not absolutely certain while, on the other hand, Aristotle does not require mathematical precision—especially in the areas of metaphysics, moral, and practical reasoning. Aristotle reminds his readers, “And we must…not look for precision in all things a like, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry” (Aristotle II 434). Because Aristotle is not confined by mathematical precision, he is able to examine the notion that human beings have intrinsic intentionality and agency in a way that Descartes does not. Next, we will explore how the concepts of act and potency relate to teleology and purpose in human action.

In the meantime, here’s a scientist who is rediscovering purpose in biology (and who does not assume the mechanistic starting point of intelligent design theory). http://natureinstitute.org/txt/st/org/comm/news.htm#mar3117a

Works Cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Descartes, Rene. Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 28. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.