Intellectual History, Liberal Arts, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Lucretius: A Conversation Between Science and Philosophy, Part Three

by Dave Seng

This concludes our series on Lucretius’s poem, The Way Things Are in which we have explored the intimate connection between science and philosophy. In this post, we will make some important concluding comments and connections.

Find part one here.

Find Part two here.

When exploring issues regarding the world we live in, both science and philosophical reflection are necessary. The distinction between essence and substance is why reflection on nature always involves both science and philosophy. Things which are composed of essence and substance have an immaterial and material character to them. Perhaps another example regarding physical reality and metaphysics, drawn from mathematics will help. The concept of numbers can be derived and abstracted from one physical object, two physical objects, etc. One can easily understand that two tables plus two tables equals four tables. However, the principles, axioms, and rules of logic which make algebra, calculus, and geometry are not strictly empirical and require a metaphysical foundation1. In both, substantial objects and mathematical realities, science and philosophy are interacting.

What is to be said of the ideas of cause and substantial change given the principles of induction, uniformity, and the conservation of energy which Lucretius points out? The principles of uniformity and conservation (among others) are properties of Being. Another property of Being is causality or the notion of cause among things that change. The notion of cause or the principle of causality, has both philosophic and scientific implications. As demonstrated, Lucretius is interested in exploring the nature of causation in physical reality. He tells us that he is interested in the causes of events (3), the causes of things (3), and the causes of movement (16) and effects which derive from natural laws (85) which we can understand to be uniformity, conservation, and causation (among other natural laws). In the realm of becoming and physical existence, it is reasonable to think that things exist in a cause and effect relationship. Linguistically, logically, and analytically it does not make any sense to speak of a cause without an effect or an effect without a cause. By definition, an effect is that which has an antecedent cause. Lucretius understands this and holds to a general theory of causation which says that that which comes into being (contingent effects) must have a cause. Events, effects, and created or living things have a cause which explains the nature or reason for their existence. This is why the law of causality is considered an extension or application of the law of noncontradiction. The law of noncontradiction states that nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. Actions and events cannot precede themselves just as non-being can not create Being. For something to create itself, it would have to exist prior to its existence which violates the law of noncontradiction. As Lucretius reminds us “nothing comes from nothing” (3). Philosophically and analytically, nothing is not a thing. It is a little weird to try to describe nothing ontologically because it has no existence whatsoever and is completely outside our knowledge of things in this world. The best one can do is call it pure or absolute non-being. It is impossible to think of nothing because if one tries, one is thinking of something and to think of something is not thinking of nothing. In Aristotelian terms, nothing or non-being has no act or potency.

Aristotle describes metaphysics as the study of being and the first principles and highest causes of reality. “Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes” explains Aristotle (Aristotle, Vol. 7, 522). Today, we can count among the first causes of reality the laws of logic, the law of causality, essence or form, the law of uniformity, mathematical truths, and many others. Strictly speaking, metaphysics is the study of transcendent realities which cannot be grasped by means of the senses. But there is an overlap between metaphysics and the physical sciences. Metaphysics points people to the logical structure of the world and in this sense, metaphysics allows people to study the world in the most general way. Metaphysics, as the study of “being as being,” is a body of knowledge about the world. Further, metaphysics shows us how truth is made coherent in any human field (all fields of knowledge want to correctly apply the law of noncontradiction, for example). Lucretius understands that there are basic laws of nature worthy of reflection. He acknowledges many important and foundational principles of reality. Upon reflection, we see that scientific laws are not strictly empirical but rely on metaphysical foundations. In this way, we understand that questions about the nature of the universe always involve both science and philosophy. Both are needed to interpret reality correctly.

Works Cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Lucretius. The Way Things Are. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 11. Encyclopedia

Britannica, Inc., 1999.

1Mathematics is not always inductive or empirical. It also works deductively. Alan Turing, for example, built a calculating machine based on abstract laws of mathematics and logic (principles of metaphysics). His machine and the theory behind it laid the foundation for generalized modern computing. Metaphysics and logic can have a direct result in the physical world.

Intellectual History, Liberal Arts, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Lucretius: A Conversation Between Science and Philosophy, Part Two

by Dave Seng

In the first part of this series, we examined a few ideas regarding the intersection of philosophy and science that are raised by Lucretius’s poem The Way Things Are. In this part, we will explore the concept of Being. (Part one can be found here.)

Being can be understood as all there is, or the totality of reality. That which is, or Being, can not be denied. As Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) taught us, something must exist, because it is impossible to doubt one’s own existence (Descartes, Vol. 28, 275-276). If I exist, something exists with certainty. In addition, when our cognitive faculties are working correctly, perception is always the apprehension of something that has existence in reality. Being, or reality, cannot be denied and is a first principle for both metaphysics and science. It is a natural impulse, then, to explore the nature and foundational principles of Being. Early in his poem, Lucretius points us to one of his first principles of Being. Lucretius asserted that his philosophical starting point is “nothing comes from nothing” (3) and explains:

… As for us,

Once we have seen that Nothing comes from

nothing,

We shall perceive with great clarity

What we are looking for, whence each thing

comes,

How things are caused, and no “gods’ will”

about it. (Italics in original, Lucretius 3)

In this short passage, we see that Lucretius develops important questions about the first principles of reality. He wants to know the nature of existence in light of the fact that nothing comes from nothing, the causes of events or “how things are caused,” and whether or not a god is involved in the creation of the universe1. Nonetheless, it is important to examine a couple of other basic positions that Lucretius believes to be foundational and which speak to the ultimate principles of physical reality and Being. Throughout The Way Things Are, Lucretius makes the claim, nothing comes from nothing, which is his logical point of departure (3). He grounds this starting point in two basic ideas or assumptions. The first is what can be called the uniformity of nature. Lucretius explains:

Now, if things come from nothing, all things

could

Produce all kinds of things; nothing

would need

Seed of its own. (3)

Lucretius believed that there is a regular order to physical nature which accounts for the uniformity of events such as like producing like, and things coming from their own seed or source. If there is an order to physical nature, then it is reasonable to think that events will have the same degree of inter-connectivity and predictability in the future as they demonstrated in the past or in the present.2 The general idea is, if an acorn is planted into nourishing soil, and nothing prevents it from flourishing, it will grow into an oak tree. There seems to be a regular or general order to nature. According to Lucretius, if there is no order and uniformity to nature, things would be completely unpredictable and chaotic.

Lucretius asserts his second point:

Our second axiom is this, that nature

Resolves each object to its basic atoms

But does not ever utterly dissolve it. (4)

And also,

But matter,

As I have proved before, can never be

Reduced to nothing, so, nor things created

From nothing. (12)

Lucretius’s second axiom is extremely thoughtful and prescient for his day. It seems to correspond with the notion that energy can neither be created; nor destroyed in a closed system, what is often called the scientific principle of conservation. In other words, the total energy of a closed system is constant; energy can be transformed from one form to another, but can be neither created nor destroyed. It is fascinating that Lucretius understood this principle long before it was articulated by classical (Newtonian) physicists. Lucretius points out that change can be a mysterious thing. Being always involves becoming or change and yet even among change, there is that which abides. In philosophical terms, temporal things change in the realm of becoming (change is a synonym for Becoming, and is in antithesis to Being—that which is immutable or permanent). Change and the cause of change is still worthy of investigation in light of the fact that there is something which remains throughout the process of change.

This is what Lucretius means when he says,

But if throughout this history, there

have been

Renewals, and the sum of things can stay,

Beyond all doubt, there must be things possessed

Of an Immortal essence. Nothing can

Disintegrate entirely into nothing. (4)

Lucretius recognizes that changing things in the physical world perdure in one form or another but do not disintegrate into nothing. It is important to note that Lucretius draws philosophic insights from empirical induction. He looks at normal everyday objects found in this world and draws ontological conclusions based on their particular objective existence and secondary properties. Here, the Aristotelian philosophical distinction between substance and essence is helpful with understanding what Lucretius is getting at. When substance changes, or what is called substantial change, a thing changes in its manner of being (what is called a “mode of being”) such as when a cat dies and becomes a corpse. The mode of being changes for the animal, but it does not go into non-being due to the principle of conservation. Accidental change occurs when the cat is born, grows, moves around, and changes in shape, color, or breaks a leg due to a fall. Accidental change is dependent on the substantial reality of the cat. When Lucretius speaks of an “immortal essence” of a thing he is highlighting the idea that there is a basic nature or “whatness” to something (such as a cat) that makes it the kind of thing it is. A cat, has basic properties that make it essentially a cat and not a dog or something else, things shared by all cats such as a love for milk, a penchant for chasing mice, and meowing when they want attention. When a cat dies, the essence or “catness” is not destroyed. This is due to the fact that substance is not essence and essence is not substance. This is why Lucretius declares that, in philosophic terms, essence is immortal. When things change accidentally in quality, quantity, or space, they do not completely go away or into absolute non-being. If, however, all reality (Being) were to experience a change into non-being, it would be a negation of all that is, not a substantial change in the mode or manner of Being.

Works Cited:

Descartes, Rene. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 28. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Lucretius. The Way Things Are. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 11. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

1Sometimes philosophers in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas use Lucretius’s principle that “nothing comes from nothing” as ground for positing a first cause type of argument for the cosmos. As noted in the first part of this series, it is unclear how strict an atomist Lucretius was. For example, he referred to the goddess Venus as the “creatress” in the first page of the poem and continues to refer to her throughout the work.

2Some philosophers of science call this the principle of predictive uniformity.

Intellectual History, Liberal Arts, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Lucretius: A Conversation Between Science and Philosophy, Part One

by Dave Seng

This will be the first post of three regarding the Roman poet Lucretius (99 BC – 55 BC) and his philosophical poem, The Way Things Are. When one comes to Lucretius, his poem is often interpreted in terms of atomism, materialism, or strict philosophical naturalism. There is much truth to this interpretation. In this series, however, I want to make a larger metaphysical analysis and discuss the intersection of science and philosophy that was articulated by the poet. I thought it would be helpful to use Aristotle’s ideas to augment, clarify, and critique parts of Lucretius. Along the way we will bring Descartes and A. N. Whitehead for reflection. I hope you find the discussion helpful.

What we learn from the Roman Epicurean poet Lucretius is that when we explore questions about the nature of Being, including its properties, nature, and development, there is always a philosophical and scientific aspect to them. In The Way Things Are, Lucretius investigates the nature of reality poetically as he examines the physical world and draws philosophical implications about it. His approach is not necessarily new among the classical authors, but his insight that what we learn from physical reality has a philosophical dimension, is significant. Most ancient philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle held to this dual aspect of inquiry into the nature and development of the cosmos. Aristotle, more than Plato, took physical reality seriously and begins his philosophical and scientific investigations empirically and inductively drawing from the facts of the natural world around him. Aristotle was careful to articulate that his logical abstractions and conclusions corresponded to reality (much of his logical reasoning was drawn from external reality and conducted to show how nature works. After all, the laws of logic are simple properties of being). Lucretius, too, was very interested in the workings of the world around him and wrote The Way Things Are as an attempt to describe the properties and principles of natural science. Lucretius’s poem is a fascinating examination of a number of very important questions related to the intersection of philosophy and science. In other words, whenever the nature and character of Being is explored, philosophical and scientific questions are always involved.

Throughout his poem, Lucretius poetically describes the nature of Being (all of reality), the importance of induction, the scientific principles of uniformity and conservation, the law of causality, and the nature of explanation. Lucretius, is not the only important author who has articulated and explored these questions. The conversation Lucretius engaged in about science and philosophy is also augmented and developed by such thinkers as Aristotle, Descartes, A. N. Whitehead, among others.

In a broad interpretation, then, Lucretius’s poem can be read as a conversation between science and philosophy. Here, science is defined as the knowledge of our physical world which is discovered through testable and reproducible empirical experimentation, and is quantifiable and objective. Simply put, science is knowledge of the world obtained by the five senses and verified through repeatable inductive processes. Philosophy, or how one thinks rationally and critically about the natural world, is concerned—in this context—about how scientific knowledge corresponds, or is in agreement with metaphysical first principles, and how philosophical concepts relate to physical reality. Lucretius helps us to understand that a philosophy of science is important when examining both the philosophical and empirical implications of science. In this case, philosophy of science is not only interested in how empirical scientific results correspond to logical analysis, but is also interested in discovering the relationship and interaction between metaphysical first principles and scientific knowledge. Such philosophical concepts as being and becoming, the law of noncontradiction and other laws of logic which are the foundations for mathematics and critical reasoning, along with the principle of causality (which, we will see below is a logical extension of the law of noncontradiction), and the principle of the uniformity of nature are important philosophical aspects of reality that are assumed in the scientific process and must be held in order for science to function coherently. To summarize, science is descriptive, inductive, and empirical while philosophy, and particularly, metaphysics, seeks to understand the first principles of reality which are not empirical, and seeks to interpret scientific conclusions through the right use of reason and logic and to learn how both science and metaphysics provide insight into reality or Being. Lucretius wanted us to explore the philosophical and scientific foundations for Being, causation, and the nature of change.

First, however, it is important to examine Lucretius’s scientific postulations. Scientifically, Lucretius is an “atomist,” meaning he holds that all physical reality can be reduced to atoms and tiny indestructible material objects.1 Among other places, the poet tells us,

Seeds of things, firstlings, atoms, and in

them lies

The sum of all created things. (7)

Furthermore, Lucretius seeks to investigate the physical world “by insight into nature” and “systematic contemplation” (3). It is clear throughout his poem that his process is empirical and inductive. Interestingly, Lucretius had some sophisticated ideas about science and nature, itself, which still resonate with philosophers of science today. These ideas are centered around scientific concepts of the uniformity of nature and the conservation of energy. Lucretius’s inductive methodology laid the foundation for his scientific conceptual scheme. Induction is the logical process of coming to general conclusions drawn from particular instances. For example, one can correctly reason that since Socrates is mortal, Aristotle is mortal, and Ralph is mortal that all humans are mortal. (It is not necessary to examine every single individual to know that humans are mortal.) As a methodology, induction itself rests upon important metaphysical concepts. A. N. Whitehead, for example, explains this point,

Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history until your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations. (A. N. Whitehead, Vol. 55, 156)

Whitehead explains what Lucretius understands intuitively and poetically. Induction, the process of generating generalized conclusions from particular instances, rests upon the idea that there is an order and unity to events in the world, and that past events can be understood in light of the present and applied to the future based on the principle of uniformity. Induction is one of the basic properties of Being. Lucretius showed that order, unity, and induction rely on prior philosophical postulates. The scientific method, which is based on induction and repeatable events, rests on metaphysical assumptions. This is one reason why questions about the physical universe always involve both empirical and philosophical concepts.

Works cited:

Lucretius. The Way Things Are. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 11. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

1Lucretius was not the first to hold such a view. The pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus was also an atomist. Ancient atomists believed atoms were indestructible. It is now known, however, that atoms are destructible, but in general, Lucretius seems to have been on the right track. In addition, it is unclear how strict an atomist Lucretius was. For example, he referred to the goddess Venus as the “creatress” in the first page of the poem and referres to her throughout the work.

Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy, Theology

Lutheran Scholasticism and Aquinas

by Dave Seng

Scholasticism was the predominant system or method of theological and philosophical teaching during the middle ages, based largely on the Church Fathers and Aristotle. Classical and medieval writers using scholastic methodology wrote in a question and answer catechetical style. Although it has sometimes been forgotten, confessional Lutheranism has maintained a strong form of scholastic reasoning and apologetic methodology especially surrounding the doctrine of God and the classical arguments for His existence. For example, Luther approved of the cosmological argument. In fact, Luther, Melanchton, and Chemnitz reasserted the classical arguments for the existence of God as did the scholastic Lutheran thinkers Jakob Andreae, David Hollatz, Johann Gerhard, and Abraham Calovius among others. In the nineteenth century the confessional Lutheran, Ernst Hengstenberg promoted the classical approach to apologetics and so did Otto Zöckler who corresponded with Charles Darwin and defended classical Christian theism. In the early twentieth century, some of the leading proponents of classical Lutheran Scholasticism were theologians Leander Keyser, and Christoph Luthardt. As noted in Geisler’s essay (see below), the contemporary philosopher David Johnson is considered a Lutheran Thomist.

Lutheranism has a long history, of course, and has embraced other approaches to apologetics as well. I will not go into various methodologies here. I believe, along with Luther and the Lutheran Scholastics, that since reason is a minister to the Christian faith, it should be employed and used well, including the utilization of theistic reasoning and argumentation. The ministerial use of reason (Luther’s distinction) means that reason is a minister and support to Christian faith (which is also Aquinas’s position as well).

Further, Lutherans embrace the three ecumenical creeds (Apostle’s, Nicene, and Athanasian) which all begin with an affirmation of the existence of God. This makes sense, because, without a conception of God, miracles, the Bible, Christ’s atoning death, the Trinity, and virtually every other teaching of historic Christianity does not make sense. What good is it to argue from miracle that Jesus is the Son of God without the prior conviction that God is? Every major doctrine of the faith ultimately rests on our understanding of Almighty God.

The misunderstanding that many Lutherans have today—due largely to the errors of pietism and fideism—falsely teaches that Luther was opposed in all ways to the Christian development of the mind and natural reason. After all, he famously called reason “the devil’s whore.” Nonetheless, it should be remembered that Luther did promote the ministerial use of reason (philosophy) and his relationship to philosophy and apologetics needs to be carefully understood. It is true that Luther had both praise and disdain for Aristotle at times, and that he preferred Cicero in some cases (although not a Christian, Cicero promoted a cosmological argument for a divine creator in his The Nature of the Gods). As Luther developed, he became a critic of Nominalism and, later, further embraced his Augustinianism. A great book that addresses this aspect of Luther’s thought is Grace and Reason: A Study in The Theology of Luther, by B. A. Gerrish. It is not the case that Luther threw out the use of philosophy or rejected the idea that reason is not a support or minister to faith.

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) is considered one of, if not the, greatest of scholastic theologians. I believe that Lutherans can learn much from St. Thomas. Among his intellectual accomplishments, Aquinas built upon the inductive and realist theories of Aristotle. Although Aquinas was a Christian Aristotelian, he successfully synthesized much of Augustine and gave us the great “classical” arguments for the existence of God such as a version of the cosmological argument (that the cosmos is a contingent being and depends on God for its existence), and the teleological argument (the cosmos exhibits design and was planned and designed by God), among others. Much of Aquinas’s arguments can be summarized this way: We know from experience that the world is contingent and it depends on something outside of itself for being or existence. Further, the order, harmony, and rationality of the cosmos must be the product of a mind or creator.

This is far too short of a summary of Aquinas and the Lutheran scholastics, but it must stand for now. In other ways, Aquinas comes very close to a Lutheran understanding of Sola Scripture (Scripture alone as authoritative for the Christian). After all, Aquinas was writing before the council of Trent. I do not want to make Aquinas into a kind of pre-Reformation Lutheran because that would not be fair to him. Lutherans do accept, however, that which is Scripturally true and accurate throughout Christian history. This is because truth endures across time and place. Lutherans have always wanted to keep, preserve, and care for the best of our Western Christian heritage.

At times, I have gone back and forth regarding my assessment of Aquinas. On occasion, I found his doctrine of God challenging and probably read too many critiques of Thomism, particularly from William Lane Craig. I keep coming back to Aquinas, however. One of the things that keep me coming back to Aquinas is his Aristotelian epistemology which is essentially correct. The mind has an innate, a priori capacity or potentiality to know, without which it would be impossible to know even first principles. It is a first principle that being is that which is, and that which is can be known. Regarding God as the foundation or ground of being, Dr. Mortimer Adler explains,

“Aquinas, for example, conceives “being taken simply as including all perfection of being”; and in the Judeo-Christian tradition, ‘being’ without qualification is taken as the most proper name for God. When Moses asked God His name, he received as answer: “I AM THAT I AM … Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.” Used in this sense, ‘being’ becomes the riches of terms—the one which has the greatest amplitude of meaning.” (Syntopicon, Vol. I, Great Books of the Western World, S.V. Being.)

Here are a couple of essays that explain how Aquinas has been received in general Protestantism. I wish I could find more from the Lutheran side. The first is from Norman Geisler, who argues that evangelicals can learn a lot from Aquinas, and Carl Russell Trueman who reviews the book, Aquinas Among the Protestants. If someone knows of a Lutheran source which speaks to this topic, please post in the comments below, I would really appreciate it. I am attempting to do my own research on Thomism and the Lutheran Scholastics.

I’d like to thank Lutheran scholars Dr. Adam Francisco and Dr. Joshua Pagan for their email correspondence which served as an inspiration for this post.

Does Thomism Lead to Catholicism, Norman Geisler

Thomas Aquinas, Not Just for Catholics Anymore, Carl Russell Trueman