Augustine’s Modified Platonism
There can be no change where there is no form.—St. Augustine
One thing that I have discovered in my reading of classical and contemporary philosophers is how those who consider themselves Platonists often have to modify their position to account for a more accurate understanding of concrete reality. For example, Plotinus had to adopt Aristotle’s categories of act and potency to account for change in the world, and Augustine, too, had to concede that form and matter must be united (in order to understand motion, change, and avoid some theological concerns). Contemporary Platonists are rarely strict Platonists. One way or another, everyone on the philosophical spectrum has to come to terms with physical reality. The question is, what is the correct approach? I believe Aristotle and Aquinas provide the best understanding of ontology (the nature of existing things) and metaphysics (the nature and properties of existence). I have already pointed out how Aristotle argues for the union of form and matter. Here, I want to explicate how and why Augustine, a Platonist, needs to modify his position in order to account for reality. Although it is rare to compare Augustine with Aristotle, in some ways he must adjust his overall approach and comes very close to Aristotle’s position.
In the physical and contingent world, matter and its forms must begin at their creation. Since matter and its forms can not exist separately, philosophers and theologians, of both Platonist and Aristotelian varieties, think that God could not have made them separately. It can not be thought, according to Augustine, “that God first created matter without form and then gave it form” (138). To explain this, he offers us an analogy of how music works. “Song is ordered sound, and although a thing may very well exist without order, order cannot be given to a thing which does not exist … We do not first emit formless sounds, which do not constitute song, and then adapt them and fashion them in the form of song (139). Thus, Augustine believes that God made form and matter at the same time. God “concreates” matter and form, puts them together at the same time and is the one who puts the form into matter. For Augustine, the form is not a separate entity, as Plato believed, but put into the matter by God. Augustine clearly modifies his Platonism at this point.
Struggling with the theological and philosophical implications of the created world, Augustine tells us “For the matter of heaven and earth is one thing, their form another. You [God] created the matter from absolutely nothing and the form of the world from the formless matter. But you created both in one act, so that the form followed upon the matter with no interval of delay” (italics added, 157).
The above passages are best read in light of Aquinas because Augustine provides the foundation for the Thomistic doctrine of concreation. Concreation simply means “created together.” In fact, it was Augustine’s teaching that form and matter had to be created at the same time, and that form must follow upon matter, that leads Aquinas to coin the term “concreation” meaning that God created Form and matter at the same time. Why do both Augustine (a Platonist) and Aquinas (an Aristotelian) believe that form and matter must have been created at the same time? Simply because it is impossible to have form without matter, and matter without form. Both Platonists and Aristotelians must face the concrete facts of reality.
Aquinas is helpful here. When examining Augustine’s position of concreation, Aquinas says “if formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration … To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without actuality, which is a contradiction in terms … Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless” (344). Neither, however can the form of a material thing be created without matter. Aquinas reminds us, “Forms and other non-subsisting things, which are said to co-exist rather than to exist, ought to be called concreated rather than created things. (245)” The old Aristotelian adage, “no form without matter, no matter without form” still holds true.
Even more fascinatingly, Augustine believes that the form must be in the material object itself in order to account for change. “There can be no change where there is no form” (129), according to Augustine. This parallels exactly what Aristotle and Aquinas hold to. Without the potentiality of form, something can not change. If the acorn does not have the form and potency of the oak tree, it will not grow into a majestic oak tree.
Aquinas was one of the first great thinkers to realize that Platonists must modify there position at times. He tells us in his Summa Theologica, “Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended” (446). Clearly, Augustine understood the metaphysical and theological problems which arise when form and matter are separated. For Christians, Christ shed real human pH typable blood on the cross—not some Platonic version where the real blood exists as an ideal in the transcendent realm. The union of form and matter has significant implications when it comes to Christ’s atoning death. For rightly believing Christians, Holy Communion makes no sense without the union of form and matter.
Christian Platonists such as Augustine, do need to modify their position in order to correspond to correct theology. They also need to modify their position to account for a correct understanding of ontology and metaphysics. When I read contemporary Christian Platonists, such as J. P. Moreland and Peter van Inwagen, they too make similar adjustments to their ontology and metaphysics. It is simply very difficult to account for a pure separation of form and matter in physical reality without going into one error or another. Reality has its own intractable way of being. Aristotle was on the right path by adopting a common-sense approach which accounts for reality as we know and experience it. As T. S. Eliot discovered after converting to Christianity, reality is the determinant of order.
Works Cited:
Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica, Volume 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 17. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999
Augustine. Confessions. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 16. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Aristotle’s Metaphyisics: Form
In the previous post, I explained a few of Aristotle’s objections to Plato’s teaching that essences, or Forms, are separated from matter and particular things. In this essay, I will explain what Aristotle’s idea of form and matter is, and why it is significant to Western metaphysics. Indeed, Aristotle’s conception of the world around us has important consequences for how we view reality today, especially in the areas of math, science, ethics, and ultimately what it means to be human.
As I have noted, Aristotle sought an answer to the question raised by Plato, “How do the Forms participate in the individual things we experience every day?” Plato did not have an answer to this question, and much of Aristotle’s project was to discover a solution. We have already seen that Aristotle did not throw out Plato’s theory of Forms entirely.
Essentially, Aristotle’s theory of Forms is that they must be in the things themselves. According to Aristotle, Forms, or essences, exist within the sensible particular things of this world. Matter and Form, or essences, are inseparable for Aristotle. Particular concrete things have mathematical properties such as weight, volume, and extension because the mathematical properties (Forms or essences) are in those things, not separated from them. In physical and biological life, Forms must be a natural and immanent part of material beings in order to account for the drive, impetus, and direction towards the good that all living things display. The technical term that has come to represent the Aristotelian position is called “hylomorphic composition” or “hylomorphism.” Hylomorphic composition literally means, “matter-form composition,” and represents the view that all natural things require for their existence both passive “stuff” and active, determining essence.
Forms can be causes of things only if they are in those things. Mathematical notions of symmetry, ratio, and order are considered the cause of beauty in the world. The Form must be in the thing itself and is the basis for causation. For these reasons, Aristotle’s view has come to be known as “immanent realism.” Realism is simply the idea that forms, or essences, actually exist in reality. Aristotle’s immanent realism can be easily understood. The form of a circle does not exist in a transcendent Platonic realm, but immanently within the circularity of the tire on my car, or the circularity of my coffee cup. (They may not be absolutely mathematically perfect Platonic circles, but the quest for absolute perfection has been the downfall of many philosophers and their theories.)
Since Forms exist within particular things, there is now an account for causation. Forms are causes because they are in those things. My coffee cup is circular only because the essence of circularity is in the cup. Essences are immanent and inherent to particular things. Against Plato, Aristotle emphasized that there is no “circularity” floating around in a transcendent realm outside the world of particular things. For a particular thing to exist, and to be considered real, the essence, that which makes something the kind of thing it is and without which it cannot be, must be combined with matter to give the essence a concrete and particular existence or expression. From a realist perspective, reality itself is the determinant of order, not disembodied Forms (for the Platonist), the categories of the mind (for the Idealist), or conventions of language (for the Nominalist). Forms are basic properties of being, or reality itself. The law of noncontradiction is not a principle hanging in suspended animation somewhere in a transcendent realm, but a concrete fundamental property of being. The laws of logic and principles of mathematics are essential properties of being.
The point of immanent realism or Aristotelian realism is that reality has its own intractable way of being. While not being pure naturalists or materialists, (because of the real existence of essences) Aristotelians believe that one can discern important mathematical, ethical, scientific, and philosophical truths from this world’s concrete objects of this world. What this also means is that all things in the natural world have an immaterial aspect to them. While there is no Form without matter and no matter without Form, it is also important to keep in mind that matter is not Form and Form is not matter.
Sometimes an objection is made to the Aristotelian view of reality. It could be queried that if someone were to destroy all the circular objects in the world, would then the essence of circularity be destroyed? There are a few Aristotelian responses to this challenge. One might counter that since essences and mathematical properties or foundational to being itself, a destruction of all circular objects would be the complete elimination of all being. In such a case, the question would be moot since there would be nothing left to discuss. There is another Aristotelian response to this challenge, however. One might appeal to the potentiality of essences. For Aristotle, all physically existing things have potential, so the matter in a thing or object has potential by virtue that it may be changed into something different. If something has the potential for circularity, the essence of circularity exists. In other words, the potential for circular objects is sufficient to ground mathematical circles. Yet another Aristotelian response can be made. Suppose we do not privilege the present in our understanding of time. Essences would exist in the things themselves, but they exist in all time equally—past, present, and future. Here, all things that ever had or ever will be at any time are included. If a circular coffee cup exists somewhere (in the past, present, or future), even if just once, circularity exists and is real.
With Plato, Aristotle understood that essences are a necessary part of reality and that it is really impossible to understand the nature of reality without them. When we recognize kinds, types, and species, we are dealing with manifestations of essences. Further, when we discern symmetry, ratio, and mathematical truths we are dealing with essences. As we have seen, the central problem with Form or essences, for the Platonist, is that the Form can never be in the ever-changing and unstable material thing. With the Aristotelian understanding, we recognize that essences are basic foundational properties of being and particular objects, without which we could not recognize what kind of thing something is. In the next post, I will briefly examine a few Platonists who struggle with their own position in confronting the fact that reality is the determinant of order.
For a great introduction to Aristotle, see Aristotle For Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy by Mortimer J. Adler.
For an interesting and easy understanding of an Aristotelian understanding of mathematical properties see James Franklin, Aristotle Was Right About Mathematics After All.
Empty Words and Poetical Metaphors: Aristotle’s Critique of Platonic Forms
For more context about Plato’s metaphysics these posts should be helpful. For Aristotle, these might provide a helpful background.
It is important to realize that Aristotle did not entirely reject Plato’s view of reality. He did, however, believe it needed improvement. In this essay, we turn to Aristotle’s view of ultimate reality and contrast it with Plato’s because that is where the biggest difference lies between the two thinkers. It is certainly the most significant difference when it comes to the development of metaphysics in Western intellectual history.
We saw in our series on Plato, that his conception of Forms1 (or universals) were his answer to the classical problem of the one and the many. He believed that by positing universal forms he could explain the unity of the diversity we see all around us. Aristotle agreed with Plato on this point. Only by the objective essences of things, can we account for the order around us, both in nature and in morality. Further, essences account for the very possibility of knowledge about things. The difference, however, between Plato and Aristotle, rests in how the Forms or essences are related to particular things.
Early in the Metaphysics, Aristotle provides his own summary of Plato’s conceptual scheme:
…[Plato], having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus2 and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation of these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they.3
Aristotle goes on in his Physics, Nichomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics, to critically examine Plato’s theory of Forms. Some scholars have found twenty five or more arguments against the Platonic theory in Aristotle’s works. Here, we will only focus on a few of the more important ones.
The first one, is famously known as the “third man argument.” He develops this argument in his Metaphysics and Sophistic Refutations. In this argument, Aristotle states that in order to explain the similarity between a man (1) and a second man (2) we must posit a third ideal man or form of a man, a third man. But then we must explain the similarity between the first two men and the form of a man with another, “higher” form of a man. The situation becomes an endless regression of positing further higher forms and the original instance of the first man or thing is never explained. Because the forms are not only patterns of sensible things, but of Forms themselves, nothing gets resolved.
In book two, chapter two of his Physics, Aristotle argues against the existence of separated Forms based on the mathematical properties inherent in physical objects. Here, Aristotle makes the point that physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines, and points, and these are all mathematical properties. Aristotle makes the common-sense observation that material objects have mathematical properties and uses this fact to mount an interesting critique of Plato’s Forms. Remember, for Plato, forms are separate from matter. Forms exist in an ideal transcendent realm away from the realm of becoming and change. According to Plato, there are not any Forms in material objects. Aristotle finds this situation incredibly hard to believe. Plato’s theory of the Forms says that among the Forms are mathematical objects such as the form of equality, the form of a triangle, the form of a triad, and so forth. Aristotle reasons that mathematical objects can not be separated from material objects because material objects have mathematical properties. He concludes that if mathematical objects (a sample of Forms) could not be separated from material objects (physical things), then forms can not be separated from matter. Physical things have mathematical order to them.
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes an important ethical objection. He points out that Plato’s Form of the Good is only an ideal to to be contemplated. It does not have effective power itself. The Form of the Good is an ideal that can not effect change or transmit potency. If, on the other hand, particulars have no form in them and are only matter, what then inclines the particular towards orderliness, beauty and to its good? What is there in matter, material beings, that gives them their natural impetus and direction towards the good, if Forms are transcendent and not immanent in matter?
All these questions and objections, point to the biggest problem that Aristotle believes is at the center of Plato’s theory. It is the problem that the Forms are separated from matter and sensible things. Aristotle correctly represents Plato as having placed the ultimate causes of things (the Forms) in a transcendent world and thus separated from the things they are supposed to be the causes of. Aristotle’s great concern was to discover the cause of a thing or the cause of a property of something. He thought that by studying individual things, one could rationally discern the basic causes and principles of all Being. To understand why something is the case, we must first examine its cause.
In book one, chapter nine of his Metaphysics, Aristotle describes what he thinks is the biggest problem with Plato’s view of reality:
Above all one might discuss the question what on earth the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor any change in them. But again they help in no wise either towards the knowledge of the other things (for they are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them), or towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which share in them; though if they were, they might be thought to be causes, as white causes whiteness in a white object by entering into its composition …
But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of “from.” And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors …
Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances of things exist apart? In the Phaedo the case is stated in this way—that the Forms are causes both of being and becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is something to originate movement.4
Aristotle points out that, by definition, Forms do not change because they exist in an unchangeable realm of being without becoming. The result is that Forms have no potency or ability to effect change. The separation between being and becoming, Form and matter, is very significant indeed. Platonic Forms have no way to account for the change, motion, coming into being and ceasing to be that one experiences every day.
As we have seen, Aristotle does not reject the idea of essence or Form entirely. In the next post, we will explore the most important elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics and his solution to the Platonic separation of Form and matter.
1It may not be entirely correct, but for our purposes, we’ll use “forms,” “universals,” and “essences” synonymously. The term “idea” is also used to describe the Platonic Form.
2Cratylus was a follower of Heraclitus but pushed the teaching of his master even further, for he said that one could not step into the same river even once!
3Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987a-b, tr. W. D. Ross, in Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
4Ibid., 991a-b.
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