Consensual Government, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Democracy, Part Twelve

by Dave Seng

Part eleven can be found here.

Republics historically have had more success against tyranny. This is where James Madison makes a distinction between a democracy and a republic. “A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking.”1 Madison clearly argues for a republican form of government and believes it is the best form of rule to protect against the rise of factions. Madison believes in two advantages of a republican form of government. The first is in the representation of the citizens, and the second is the sheer size of large republics as a deterrent to factions. Madison believes that a body of elected representatives will actually serve as a barrier and protection to factious elements in the population. He writes,

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves. 2

Madison believes a body of elected citizens would wisely protect the union in a better manner than the people themselves could. This could only work, however, if these elected citizens were well educated in civic virtue, and believed in the institutions they were protecting. Elected officials that do not have a sense of civic responsibility, respect the rule of law, or in Madison’s words “comprehend and pursue great and national objects” do little for the common good. Furthermore, Madison is concerned with national and federal concerns rather than local and state issues. He wants to leave particular and local issues up to the states and strike a balance between national and state concerns. Madison believes that giving people more power at the local level will be better for the public good in general.

James Madison wanted a republican solution to republican problems. He is aware of the problems inherent to democracy. He believes a large republic offers the best solution to the problem of factions. In his view, a small republic with few representatives will be easily corrupted by factious elements. On the other hand, a body of elected officials that was too large would only offer “the confusion of a multitude.” Madison understands that the body of elected representatives ought to be too big to bribe (or, at least not all of them at once). Madison argues for a mean between a body of elected officials that is neither too small nor too big. However, a larger republic will solve the problems found in smaller republics. He believes the larger the republic, the more likely it will be to find virtuous citizens as representatives. And he thinks that in a large republic, factions would be less likely to succeed. Madison explains,

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former rather than the latter. … Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater number variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other. 3

In other words, Madison believes that by extending the republic to the many rather than the few, collusion between factious parties will be deterred. He concludes by asking several fascinating questions.

Hence, it clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic – is enjoyed by the Union over the states composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union increase this security? Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.4

Madison’s questions and solutions offer many points for reflection. First, in other points of his writing and in Federalist Number 10, Madison argues for proportional representation. In Madison’s understanding the Union would not be the two-party system now in place but a multiparty arrangement that is proportionally represented according to the citizenry. Currently, it is very hard for third-party political candidates to even get on a ballot. Many people with views not sympathetic to either party are simply not represented and opt out of the political process altogether. Further, laws exist to keep third-party representation off ballots. In a proportional multiparty system, parties will be forced to work together for the common good. Harmony will have to be sought above political gain. Coalitions will have to work together rather than a tyranny of one party. Madison was clearly afraid of the tyranny of one party over others. That is clearly why he tells us that a proportional government would protect against “the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest?” When one party boasts of passing legislation without any input from the opposing party, that party is clearly acting in a tyrannical and undemocratic manner. However, a government with real proportional representation would depend on a genuine and authentic political conversation throughout the parties represented and at all levels. It would require a national conversation and it would also necessitate that the current parties relinquish their power (which is unlikely). Madison is also aware that an increase in the variety of parties represented would add to the increase of security of the nation. When people are truly represented factions will be discouraged. People will be given a voice in their government and legitimate concerns can be addressed.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., 52.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 53.

Metaphysics, Philosophy, Uncategorized

The Fantastic Four

by Dave Seng

It has been a while since I made a “top four” post. Here are the four most popular articles of 2021, in case you missed them the first time around. I will continue our study of democracy soon. Enjoy!

  1. Lutheran Scholasticism and Aquinas (still seems to be a favorite).
  2. Aristotle and Augustine on Being, Truth, and Logic, Pt. 2
  3. More Than A Feeling: Metaphysical Intuition in Aristotle and Bergson, Part One
  4. Plato’s Metaphysical Answer to the One and the Many, Part Two
Consensual Government, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Democracy, Part Eleven

by Dave Seng

Part ten can be found here.

In this post I examine the classical influence on the founding of America and the vision of James Madison.

Now we must jump many years to the founding of the American republic. It is not surprising to find that the founders of America were influenced by classical thought – and all the values of the Western intellectual and political tradition can be seen in the American State Papers and Federalist Papers, including debate, dissent, civic virtue, and the free exchange of ideas. The classical influence of early America can be discovered from the works they read, the architecture they built, and the documents they wrote. One obvious piece of evidence rests in the fact that the authors of the Federalist Papers wrote under the names of significant Roman leaders. Furthermore, many of the founders such as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, were well versed in the classics and read Latin.

In America, constitutional government evolved from the idea of constitutional monarchy found in Europe. Although the founders envisioned a republic and not a democracy (they were very cautious of an extreme democracy), America finally became a popular democracy in 1828 with the election of Andrew Jackson. Nonetheless, at the beginning of American Republicanism was the conviction that consensual rule was possible and that governments existed to protect citizen’s natural rights and to promote the common good of all people.1 This is the idea of classical liberalism and has become the social-political theory that stresses freedom from undue governmental interference and views the state as the guarantor of the basic liberties and rights of the individual. This is basically a classical idea; however, a thinker like Aristotle would see a closer relationship between the individual and the state.

In the early days of the American republic, there was much debate about the constitution itself. The parties were divided between those who wanted a stronger national government, the federalists, and those who wanted more sovereignty among the individual states – the antifederalists. The friends of the Constitution (the federalists) had the advantage of superior intellectual firepower. Among the federalists were the two most eminent men in America at the time, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington.2 Washington himself declared that the choice lay between the Constitution and disunion. Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay, under the joint pseudonym “Publius,” wrote a long series of newspaper essays explaining and extolling the new document.3 These essays were later published in book form and are considered the greatest intellectual defense of the Constitution by some of the early Republic’s greatest thinkers.

For example, James Madison, one of the writers of the Federalist Papers, was very concerned about the role of human nature and the propensity for people to divide into factions. For Madison, factions are different than regular political parties. He defines a faction as, “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”4 In other words, factions are those groups which will seek there own power illegitimately and disregard the rights of others in the process. Factions do not regard the democratic principle of equality as an important ideal nor understand or value the idea that in a democracy harmony is essential. People have to be united – a government for the people and by the people must first of all be supported by the people and truly believed in if it is going to work. Madison understands the corrosive effects of factions on a consensual government. Nonetheless, it seems to be part of human nature to divide into factions as soon as individuals are given the freedom to do so. Madison was concerned about how to keep a faction from becoming a tyranny on one hand and how to maintain fair representation on the other. But Madison understood that factions would be a problem to any liberal republic because it is so basic to the human instinct,

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions and many other points as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment of different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their most violent conflicts.5

Madison understands that factions are a part of any liberal society. He is also aware that there are only two solutions to the problem of factions. The first is to eliminate the cause of factions. But this would require the elimination of liberty, an unacceptable option. The other is to give every citizen the same interests, passions, and opinions – and this option is clearly impossible. Madison knows there will always be independent thinkers. So the third option for Madison is to control the effects of factions. Madison believes the best possibility for this rests in the rule of law and to allow factions a voice in their own government.6 He explains, “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.”7 Much like Aristotle, Madison understands the value of allowing differing parties a voice in their own government functioning under legitimate legal protection and constraints (consensual government always seeks a check on majority rule to ensure the rights of the minority). Of course, when factions are in the minority they are less likely to prevail in their evil intentions. Madison’s concern rests in what could happen if a faction became a majority. Madison concludes that a pure democracy can not protect itself from this phenomenon. “From this view of the subject it may be concluded that pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.”8 He goes on to explain,

A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.9

For Madison then, a pure democracy is a government in which every citizen participates, is small in size, and contains no check on majority rule. It is unclear, however, if any such government has existed because the ancient Athenians functioned under the rule of law, and was regulated by assembly, councils, and archons. Rome itself transformed from a republic (also under the rule of law) to an empire without becoming a direct democracy. Nonetheless, Athens was close to being a direct democracy and Thucydides does point out the mob mentality of the Athenians after the death of Pericles. But the point that a democracy can become a tyranny is a legitimate concern, the French revolution being the primary example. The ancient Greek political thinkers were all aware of the tyranny of the majority. And there was nothing more they hated than tyranny.

Next time, I will examine the particular definition of republic held by Madison.

1 Goodwin, Gerald, Richard Current, Paula A. Franklin. A History of the United States. 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985), 119.

2 Ibid., 131.

3 Ibid.

4 The Federalist, Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 43, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 50.

5 Ibid.

6 Hamilton believes most factions arise from differences between the propertied and non-propertied classes.

7 Ibid., 50.

8 Ibid. 51.

9 Ibid.