Part eleven can be found here.

Republics historically have had more success against tyranny. This is where James Madison makes a distinction between a democracy and a republic. “A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking.”¹ Madison clearly argues for a republican form of government and believes it is the best form of rule to protect against the rise of factions. Madison believes in two advantages of a republican form of government. The first is in the representation of the citizens, and the second is the sheer size of large republics as a deterrent to factions. Madison believes that a body of elected representatives will actually serve as a barrier and protection to factious elements in the population. He writes,

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves. ²

Madison believes a body of elected citizens would wisely protect the union in a better manner than the people themselves could. This could only work, however, if these elected citizens were well educated in civic virtue, and believed in the institutions they were protecting. Elected officials that do not have a sense of civic responsibility, respect the rule of law, or in Madison’s words “comprehend and pursue great and national objects” do little for the common good. Furthermore, Madison is concerned with national and federal concerns rather than local and state issues. He wants to leave particular and local issues up to the states and strike a balance between national and state concerns. Madison believes that giving people more power at the local level will be better for the public good in general.

James Madison wanted a republican solution to republican problems. He is aware of the problems inherent to democracy. He believes a large republic offers the best solution to the problem of factions. In his view, a small republic with few representatives will be easily corrupted by factious elements. On the other hand, a body of elected officials that was too large would only offer “the confusion of a multitude.” Madison understands that the body of elected representatives ought to be too big to bribe (or, at least not all of them at once). Madison argues for a mean between a body of elected officials that is neither too small nor too big. However, a larger republic will solve the problems found in smaller republics. He believes the larger the republic, the more likely it will be to find virtuous citizens as representatives. And he thinks that in a large republic, factions would be less likely to succeed. Madison explains,

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former rather than the latter. … Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater number variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other. ³

In other words, Madison believes that by extending the republic to the many rather than the few, collusion between factious parties will be deterred. He concludes by asking several fascinating questions.

Hence, it clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic – is enjoyed by the Union over the states composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union increase this security? Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.⁴

Madison’s questions and solutions offer many points for reflection. First, in other points of his writing and in Federalist Number 10, Madison argues for proportional representation. In Madison’s understanding the Union would not be the two-party system now in place but a multiparty arrangement that is proportionally represented according to the citizenry. Currently, it is very hard for third-party political candidates to even get on a ballot. Many people with views not sympathetic to either party are simply not represented and opt out of the political process altogether. Further, laws exist to keep third-party representation off ballots. In a proportional multiparty system, parties will be forced to work together for the common good. Harmony will have to be sought above political gain. Coalitions will have to work together rather than a tyranny of one party. Madison was clearly afraid of the tyranny of one party over others. That is clearly why he tells us that a proportional government would protect against “the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest?” When one party boasts of passing legislation without any input from the opposing party, that party is clearly acting in a tyrannical and undemocratic manner. However, a government with real proportional representation would depend on a genuine and authentic political conversation throughout the parties represented and at all levels. It would require a national conversation and it would also necessitate that the current parties relinquish their power (which is unlikely). Madison is also aware that an increase in the variety of parties represented would add to the increase of security of the nation. When people are truly represented factions will be discouraged. People will be given a voice in their government and legitimate concerns can be addressed.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., 52.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 53.