Metaphysics, Philosophy

A Very Short Introduction To Aristotelian-Thomist Metaphysics: Act and Potency, Part. 1

by Dave Seng

Although Aristotle and Aquinas define the term “metaphysics” in various ways, one common rendering both use is “first principles.” For these thinkers, metaphysics is the study of the first principles of reality and how one views the world. One of the guiding first principles for Aquinas, especially in his metaphysics or understanding of reality, is his distinction between “act” and “potency.” Act and potency are not unique to Aquinas; these categories are first developed by Aristotle who uses these categories to describe how causation and change work in the physical world. Nonetheless, Aquinas, following Aristotle, applies the categories of act and potency to virtually every aspect of reality. In addition to act and potency, Aquinas also uses the categories of form and matter to make sense out of reality as Being. With the categories of act and potency and form and matter, Aquinas describes the immaterial structure and nature of all of reality and explains how potency accounts for change. He uses the categories of act and potency to such a degree, and so broadly, that they are among the most important principles for understanding Aquinas’s metaphysics and have broad implications to how one understands nature, science, and human potential.

For Aquinas, and many philosophers in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, the proper object of study for metaphysicians is the concept of Being1. In the simplest terms, Being is the study of all that exists, including concrete physical phenomena such as humans, tables, quadrupeds, things that can be discerned from the senses, and abstract mental concepts such as mathematics, goodness, and other ideas. Being, therefore, is the study of the nature and framework of all reality. It is important to note that Being is not a particular genus or species, but rather that in which all genera and species participate. That which exists and all that which stands out of non-being, participates in Being, but Being itself is not a genus or species. “Being itself is considered as formal, and as something received, and not as that to which Being belongs” (21). As Aquinas reminds us in the most general terms, “Being is common to all” (22). It is important to note that for Aquinas, the physical and metaphysical are not separated. The physical things that exist in act or being also participate in the metaphysical notion of potency. Through act and potency, Aquinas provides an important conceptual scheme for things which participate in being and also undergo change.

Much of philosophical history is an attempt to understand the mystery of change. Although Aquinas uses Aristotle’s categories of act and potency to reveal important insights about reality and to explain how change is possible, the discussion begins with Plato. Plato, following Parmenides, insisted that true Being implies permanence. Parmenides teaches that Being and Non-Being are the only genuine realities of existence, and change, therefore, is impossible because Non-Being cannot be the cause of Being. Change, although obvious to the senses, is an illusion. Plato, influenced by Parmenides, holds that the changing and mutable things of this world are not real Being or existence in the highest sense — only the Forms existing in a transcendent realm, participate in true Being. Aristotle, however, being firmly grounded in nature and the physical world, knows that change and motion are real and must be accounted for. In Aristotelian and Thomist terms, motion means change in the broad sense and not just movement from one place to another. Drawing on Aristotle, Aquinas explains, “For because ‘motion from place to place is naturally the first of movements,’ as is proved in the Physics, we use terms belonging to local motion in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds” (351). For Aristotle and Aquinas, physical things, existing in reality actually change. Change is part of Becoming. Influenced by Aristotle, Aquinas knows that things change according to their nature and he uses the concept of potency to explain how change is possible. Things do not change at random or whimsically, but according to their nature. For example, an acorn has the natural potential or capacity (if nothing hinders it) to become a mighty oak tree. In the case of natural or biological generation (a type of change) Aquinas states, “It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed…” (367). Just as biological matter has inherent tendencies towards life, Aquinas also explains that human beings have intrinsic potencies. Relating human potential to the “intellectual soul” (395) as that property humans have to comprehend universals and to use their reason to understand and create things, Aquinas explains, “Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of the body only, but ‘the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially’; and that this potency does not reject the soul’ … In like manner, the soul is said to be ‘the act of the body,’ etc., because by the soul it is a body and is organic, and has life potentially” (394). In other words, a student has the potential to become a doctor if she studies and applies her intellectual abilities. Potency, then, contains the possibilities that something can change into according to its nature.

1 Many philosophers in the Aristotelian and Thomist traditions prefer the term “ontology” in describing their approach to the study of Being.

Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica, Volume 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 17. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Metaphysics, Philosophy

Final Thoughts on Intuition

by Dave Seng

Hopefully, this will wrap up some ideas from my last three posts. As always, this feels unfinished but that is the nature of philosophy.

The proper understanding of intuition speaks to how we understand reality. Many philosophers (and non-philosophers for that matter) have a deep distrust of intuition. There is good reason for this skepticism, but not if intuition is properly understood and the totality of person-hood is considered. Intuition, rightly understood, is the idea that we all have ultimate presuppositions, basic assertions, and self-evident truths which are known with certainty as the foundations of all other ideas but which themselves cannot be proved. This position is known as foundationalism. From a strictly logical standpoint, not everything can be argued or there would never be an end to arguing. Aristotle still provides the best presentation and defense of foundationalism and is correct to point out that every argument finally rests on something that cannot be proved, and that it is the mark of an uneducated person not to realize that. How strict should we then be when thinking about intuition as foundational? Philosophers are divided over this point. I would argue that we can learn the truth about ourselves and the world around us not only from science but from imaginative literature and the great works of art, music, and history. Ideas are communicated non-rationally as well as rationally. Intuition and the non-rational make a contribution to what we know. To be healthy human beings we need to integrate the non-rational with the rational. (To become unhealthy, all we need to do is embrace the irrational.) As rational beings, and that which distinguishes human beings from animals, we are able to weigh evidence through careful examination and make evaluations either empirically or through intellectual demonstration by way of argument. Intuition, reason, abstraction, and empiricism must be seen holistically in such a way that they work together—not against each other as Bergson and other philosophers of the twentieth century believe.

We develop ontological constancy and perceive self-evident truths (the law of non-contradiction, for example) at a very young age, even when we can not articulate them. Any parent of a young child knows this to be true. Most individuals achieve psychological permanency by the time they are three years old. This means Aristotle is correct when he describes intuition as the inherent human capacity to grasp self-evident truths. Both cognitively and physically we are all part of and directed toward understanding the external physical world. Intuition is part of that human capacity. In various ways, philosophers like Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant have tried to prove the existence of external reality. This is because they made consciousness epistemically autonomous and discarded common sense intuition. The question of external reality, however, is not a philosophical problem at all. It is impossible to say one is having a sense perception and deny that the external object exists. Perception cannot be separated from reality. If that were not the case, there would be no difference between hallucinating and perception. As Aristotle explains, intuition and perception work together to grasp this foundational truth of reality.

As I indicated in my last post and from the comments above, it should be clear that I lean toward a broad intuitive foundationalism. There are many places in human interactions and the world around us that can not be simply reduced to strictly rational premises. Not everything is rationally analyzable. Human love, true friendship, great aesthetic experiences from works of art, literature, music, and various forms of religious illumination, simply cannot be condensed and downgraded to analytic propositions. Reason, however, plays a part in bringing these things together. Finally, it is important to realize that epistemology (how we know reality) and metaphysics (the nature of reality itself) are two different questions. Epistemology should never drive metaphysics—but that will be the topic of another post.

Metaphysics, Philosophy

More Than A Feeling: Metaphysical Intuition in Aristotle and Bergson, Part Three.

by Dave Seng

Part two can be found here.

Aristotle provides a framework for understanding reality based on foundationalism and the idea that the first principles of reality can be known, either through sense perception, empirically, or intellectually through reasonable demonstration. Intuition is the foundational aspect of sense data and non-discursive reasoning because it apprehends immediate self-evident truths. In Aristotle’s epistemology, human beings are hardwired with a latent ability or capacity to apprehend the world around them. Our rational abilities seem to be tuned to comprehending reality. When the mind is functioning correctly, it makes no sense for someone to assert that they are having a perception of an object and claim at the same time that it does not exist. In ordinary human sense experience, it is impossible to separate a perception from actual existence. The Aristotelian premise that the external world is knowable is based on the common sense judgment that perception is awareness of external objects. This human capacity of apprehending immediate self-evident truths is the rational intuition to which Aristotle points us.

Perhaps the Aristotelian position that describes human knowledge and the interaction between the self and the world can be understood as “embodied intuitive rationalism.” (Aristotle points us in this direction throughout his works but especially in his work On the Soul.) His argument suggests that humans have an inherent capacity through memory, imagination, the intellect, and use of sense perception (empiricism) to make meaning and intelligibility out of the world around them. If this is true, then in human cognition, the body and mind work together in a symbiotic relationship. If the nature of human beings is essentially rational, and dependent on and directed toward external reality, then a proper understanding of intuition is an essential element of embodied rationalism. To be embodied means to have an innate capacity of intuitive reasoning which allows one to grasp the fundamental first principles of reality.

If there is a kind of embodied intuitive rationalism that all humans possess, there might be a significant implication for Bergson’s approach to metaphysics. Some concluding thoughts are in order. While Bergson’s text An Introduction to Metaphysics can be read as an extended critique of Kant’s transcendental idealism, his description of metaphysics as the rejection of symbols and analysis is misplaced. If human beings are essentially rational, it is hard to figure out how analysis, reason, and symbols for communication are not helpful when struggling to think critically about the most important questions of life and reality. Language, analytical reasoning, and the examination of evidence are simply the ways human beings rationally make sense out of reality. Analysis and symbols are used in everyday life and it is impossible to imagine how anyone could live a significantly meaningful life without the use of symbols, analysis, and critical reasoning. It is why parents tell toddlers to “use your words.” Words provide meaning and structure to reality. If Aristotle is correct, all things tend towards their nature, including human nature. If the nature of human kind is to be rational then analysis, examination, evaluation, the use of symbols, and intellectual demonstration are essential and must be used to make sense and order out of the world. Reason is what human beings use to explore the ultimate questions and theories of reality. Discarding reason or throwing out the affirmation of rationalism is not the correct approach to metaphysics.

Bergson’s approach to philosophy is similar to Descartes. He starts with the immediate awareness of the self and distrust of sense data in providing a reliable understanding of reality. Bergson goes further than Descartes, however, and demonstrates an even stronger distrust of external reality than did Descartes. Even mental concepts, because they are products of analysis, render an artificial understanding of reality (74). Bergson explains that if metaphysics is to be a serious project, “it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition” (75). What is clear from Bergson, is that reason, abstraction, concepts, and analytical thought will never allow one to correctly understand reality. Intuition, for Bergson is the rejection of critical discourse, observation, evaluation, and reason in general. Bergson’s understanding of intuition is irrational and he says quite clearly that the correct way to understand reality is not through analysis or reason. On the other hand, Aristotle holds that intuition is that which apprehends immediate self-evident truths which provide the basis for interpreting reality to a very high degree of accuracy. Reason, whether it is understood as the evaluation of empirical evidence or through the cognitive intellectual processes of the mind alone, is an integral part of what it means to be human and should not be thrown out when examining the great questions of existence.

In some ways, Bergson lays the groundwork for the later twentieth century existentialists such as Martin Heidegger. These thinkers believe that human passions and moods are superior to reason in interpreting reality. Heidegger, in his work, What is Metaphysics? claims that the mood of dread is what opens one up to a proper understanding of being and non-being. Some of these philosophers put moods, intuition, and mystical experience into the category of the nonrational—that which is apart from reason, but not necessarily against reason. Even if the nonrational is a valid category for knowledge development, Bergson goes further and ultimately embraces the irrational. For Aristotle, intuition is not in the realm of the nonrational, or irrational, but a pre-discursive starting point for reason and science itself—and really for any body of knowledge that can be discovered, collected, categorized, and developed.

Bergson might be right in the sense that there could be things in life that are not completely rationally analyzable, such as human love, true friendship, great works of art, indescribable aesthetic or religious experience, but he goes astray by rejecting reason and substituting intuition as the only valid way to interpret reality. Bergson’s concept of intuition must be evaluated, checked, or modified by sound reason and empiricism. Many philosophers, including Aristotle, believe that there is an element of intuition in human knowledge. Aristotle’s approach, as it turns out, is correct. Intuition, sense experience, and reason must work together—not against each other—in the quest for knowledge.

Works cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Metaphysics, Philosophy

More Than A Feeling: Metaphysical Intuition in Aristotle and Bergson, Part Two

by Dave Seng

Note: This is the second part of a reflection on Bergson’s understanding of metaphysical intuition read against Aristotle’s position. This part explicates Aristotle’s foundationalism. Next time, we’ll examine embodied rational intuition. For context, part one can be found here.

Aristotle is sometimes typified as the great philosopher of induction and empiricism with no place for non-inferential reasoning. However, his overall approach is much more developed and nuanced. Along with Bergson, Aristotle holds that there is an essential nature—the universal—to each thing, animal, and individual person. Aristotle differs, however, in his definition and understanding of the role of intuition in human understanding and the discovery of the essential nature of things. Aristotle’s approach to intuition is the basis of his emphasis on induction, evidence, and examination in his attempt to understand reality. It is closely related to his epistemological foundationalism, the concept that all knowledge rests on primary truths which are not subject to further proof, and are the foundation of all other truths, and his ontological realism, which is the idea that essences or universals are objectively real. In this sense, intuition is genuinely foundational for Aristotle, and he believes it establishes “science in the sphere of being” (Posterior Analytics, 136). To get there, however, Aristotle says this comes to us in “thinking states” or an epistemological cognitive condition “by which we grasp truth” (Posterior Analytics, 136). According to Aristotle:

“Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error—opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive.” (Posterior Analytics, 136)

Aristotle makes two interesting claims. The first is that scientific knowledge and intuition are always true. The second is that intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge because scientific knowledge is discursive in nature. These are intriguing ideas especially since they come at the end of a scientific treatise on physical reality. What could Aristotle mean? If intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, should one rely solely on intuition? Is intuition, in the final analysis, a means to throw out rational and careful thinking? Aristotle, however, does not throw out reason or make intuition into a kind of mystical method as Bergson does. Having a firm grasp on reality, Aristotle places intuition into an epistemological hierarchy which is the basis for his foundationalism. Aristotle goes on:

“From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises—a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.” (Posterior Analytics 136 – 137)

Much of Aristotle’s project to understand reality is an attempt to discover and explain the primary premises of Being—the principles, axioms, and postulates that make reality intelligible and discernible in the first place. Instead of doing away with analysis, evaluation, and symbols, as Bergson does, intuition, for Aristotle, is the indemonstrable and non-inferential starting point which grounds discursive and rational thinking. Intuition, rightly understood, is that which apprehends the primary premises which lead to discursive reasoning and scientific knowledge. This is why Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, “… it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles” (389). This concept of intuition also serves to counter the kinds of circular arguments Aristotle wishes to avoid. Neither scientific knowledge nor demonstration can be originative because that would mean the premise is assumed in the conclusion (circular reasoning). In addition, Aristotle’s concept of intuitive knowledge provides an epistemological foundation which avoids an infinite regress. Aristotle draws this conclusion, “If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premise, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact” (Posterior Analytics, 137). Ultimately, Aristotle explains that metaphysics and science are connected. Aristotle seeks to get at the first principles of reality and, intuition, as he explains it, is that inherent human capacity to apprehend these primary truths. In this sense, intuition is the original source which provides the foundation for physical science. Science, then, becomes originative in the sense that it contributes to and expands upon the whole particular body of knowledge. (For Aristotle, “science” is any body of knowledge that can be collected, categorized, and organized.) In the next post, we will make a final analysis of Bergson’s and Aristotle’s approach to intuition and explore what it might mean to be embodied, intuitive, and rational beings.

Note: Foundationalism and realism are not unique to Aristotle, as Plato held similar views, but Aristotle explicates his version of these concepts most clearly in both of his Analytics, On the Soul, and Metaphysics.

Works cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999