Hopefully, this will wrap up some ideas from my last three posts. As always, this feels unfinished but that is the nature of philosophy.
The proper understanding of intuition speaks to how we understand reality. Many philosophers (and non-philosophers for that matter) have a deep distrust of intuition. There is good reason for this skepticism, but not if intuition is properly understood and the totality of person-hood is considered. Intuition, rightly understood, is the idea that we all have ultimate presuppositions, basic assertions, and self-evident truths which are known with certainty as the foundations of all other ideas but which themselves cannot be proved. This position is known as foundationalism. From a strictly logical standpoint, not everything can be argued or there would never be an end to arguing. Aristotle still provides the best presentation and defense of foundationalism and is correct to point out that every argument finally rests on something that cannot be proved, and that it is the mark of an uneducated person not to realize that. How strict should we then be when thinking about intuition as foundational? Philosophers are divided over this point. I would argue that we can learn the truth about ourselves and the world around us not only from science but from imaginative literature and the great works of art, music, and history. Ideas are communicated non-rationally as well as rationally. Intuition and the non-rational make a contribution to what we know. To be healthy human beings we need to integrate the non-rational with the rational. (To become unhealthy, all we need to do is embrace the irrational.) As rational beings, and that which distinguishes human beings from animals, we are able to weigh evidence through careful examination and make evaluations either empirically or through intellectual demonstration by way of argument. Intuition, reason, abstraction, and empiricism must be seen holistically in such a way that they work together—not against each other as Bergson and other philosophers of the twentieth century believe.
We develop ontological constancy and perceive self-evident truths (the law of non-contradiction, for example) at a very young age, even when we can not articulate them. Any parent of a young child knows this to be true. Most individuals achieve psychological permanency by the time they are three years old. This means Aristotle is correct when he describes intuition as the inherent human capacity to grasp self-evident truths. Both cognitively and physically we are all part of and directed toward understanding the external physical world. Intuition is part of that human capacity. In various ways, philosophers like Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant have tried to prove the existence of external reality. This is because they made consciousness epistemically autonomous and discarded common sense intuition. The question of external reality, however, is not a philosophical problem at all. It is impossible to say one is having a sense perception and deny that the external object exists. Perception cannot be separated from reality. If that were not the case, there would be no difference between hallucinating and perception. As Aristotle explains, intuition and perception work together to grasp this foundational truth of reality.
As I indicated in my last post and from the comments above, it should be clear that I lean toward a broad intuitive foundationalism. There are many places in human interactions and the world around us that can not be simply reduced to strictly rational premises. Not everything is rationally analyzable. Human love, true friendship, great aesthetic experiences from works of art, literature, music, and various forms of religious illumination, simply cannot be condensed and downgraded to analytic propositions. Reason, however, plays a part in bringing these things together. Finally, it is important to realize that epistemology (how we know reality) and metaphysics (the nature of reality itself) are two different questions. Epistemology should never drive metaphysics—but that will be the topic of another post.
Aristotle provides a
framework for understanding reality based on foundationalism and the
idea that the first principles of reality can be known, either
through sense perception, empirically, or intellectually through
reasonable demonstration. Intuition is the foundational aspect of
sense data and non-discursive reasoning because it apprehends
immediate self-evident truths. In Aristotle’s epistemology, human
beings are hardwired with a latent ability or capacity to apprehend
the world around them. Our rational abilities seem to be tuned to
comprehending reality. When the mind is functioning correctly, it
makes no sense for someone to assert that they are having a
perception of an object and claim at the same time that it does not
exist. In ordinary human sense experience, it is impossible to
separate a perception from actual existence. The Aristotelian
premise that the external world is knowable is based on the common
sense judgment that perception is awareness of external objects.
This human capacity of apprehending immediate self-evident truths is
the rational intuition to which Aristotle points us.
Perhaps the Aristotelian position that describes human knowledge and the interaction between the self and the world can be understood as “embodied intuitive rationalism.” (Aristotle points us in this direction throughout his works but especially in his work On the Soul.) His argument suggests that humans have an inherent capacity through memory, imagination, the intellect, and use of sense perception (empiricism) to make meaning and intelligibility out of the world around them. If this is true, then in human cognition, the body and mind work together in a symbiotic relationship. If the nature of human beings is essentially rational, and dependent on and directed toward external reality, then a proper understanding of intuition is an essential element of embodied rationalism. To be embodied means to have an innate capacity of intuitive reasoning which allows one to grasp the fundamental first principles of reality.
If there is a kind
of embodied intuitive rationalism that all humans possess, there
might be a significant implication for Bergson’s approach to
metaphysics. Some concluding thoughts are in order. While Bergson’s
text An Introduction to Metaphysics can be read as an extended
critique of Kant’s transcendental idealism, his description of
metaphysics as the rejection of symbols and analysis is misplaced.
If human beings are essentially rational, it is hard to figure out
how analysis, reason, and symbols for communication are not helpful
when struggling to think critically about the most important
questions of life and reality. Language, analytical reasoning, and
the examination of evidence are simply the ways human beings
rationally make sense out of reality. Analysis and symbols are used
in everyday life and it is impossible to imagine how anyone could
live a significantly meaningful life without the use of symbols,
analysis, and critical reasoning. It is why parents tell toddlers to
“use your words.” Words provide meaning and structure to
reality. If Aristotle is correct, all things tend towards their
nature, including human nature. If the nature of human kind is to be
rational then analysis, examination, evaluation, the use of symbols,
and intellectual demonstration are essential and must be used to make
sense and order out of the world. Reason is what human beings use to
explore the ultimate questions and theories of reality. Discarding
reason or throwing out the affirmation of rationalism is not the
correct approach to metaphysics.
Bergson’s
approach to philosophy is similar to Descartes. He starts with the
immediate awareness of the self and distrust of sense data in
providing a reliable understanding of reality. Bergson goes further
than Descartes, however, and demonstrates an even stronger distrust
of external reality than did Descartes. Even mental concepts,
because they are products of analysis, render an artificial
understanding of reality (74). Bergson explains that if metaphysics
is to be a serious project, “it must transcend concepts in order to
reach intuition” (75). What is clear from Bergson, is that reason,
abstraction, concepts, and analytical thought will never allow one to
correctly understand reality. Intuition, for Bergson is the
rejection of critical discourse, observation, evaluation, and reason
in general. Bergson’s understanding of intuition is irrational and
he says quite clearly that the correct way to understand reality is
not through analysis or reason. On the other hand, Aristotle holds
that intuition is that which apprehends immediate self-evident truths
which provide the basis for interpreting reality to a very high
degree of accuracy. Reason, whether it is understood as the
evaluation of empirical evidence or through the cognitive
intellectual processes of the mind alone, is an integral part of what
it means to be human and should not be thrown out when examining the
great questions of existence.
In some ways,
Bergson lays the groundwork for the later twentieth century
existentialists such as Martin Heidegger. These thinkers believe
that human passions and moods are superior to reason in interpreting
reality. Heidegger, in his work, What is Metaphysics? claims
that the mood of dread is what opens one up to a proper understanding
of being and non-being. Some of these philosophers put moods,
intuition, and mystical experience into the category of the
nonrational—that which is apart from reason, but not necessarily
against reason. Even if the nonrational is a valid category for
knowledge development, Bergson goes further and ultimately embraces
the irrational. For Aristotle, intuition is not in the realm of the
nonrational, or irrational, but a pre-discursive starting point for
reason and science itself—and really for any body of knowledge that
can be discovered, collected, categorized, and developed.
Bergson might be
right in the sense that there could be things in life that are not
completely rationally analyzable, such as human love, true
friendship, great works of art, indescribable aesthetic or religious
experience, but he goes astray by rejecting reason and substituting
intuition as the only valid way to interpret reality. Bergson’s
concept of intuition must be evaluated, checked, or modified by sound
reason and empiricism. Many philosophers, including Aristotle,
believe that there is an element of intuition in human knowledge.
Aristotle’s approach, as it turns out, is correct. Intuition,
sense experience, and reason must work together—not against each
other—in the quest for knowledge.
Works cited
Aristotle. The
Works ofAristotle:
1. Great Books of the
Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Aristotle. The
Works ofAristotle:
2. Great Books of the
Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Bergson, Henri. An
Introduction to Metaphysics.
Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc., 1999
Note: This is the second part of a reflection on Bergson’s understanding of metaphysical intuition read against Aristotle’s position. This part explicates Aristotle’s foundationalism. Next time, we’ll examine embodied rational intuition. For context, part one can be found here.
Aristotle is sometimes typified as the great philosopher of induction and empiricism with no place for non-inferential reasoning. However, his overall approach is much more developed and nuanced. Along with Bergson, Aristotle holds that there is an essential nature—the universal—to each thing, animal, and individual person. Aristotle differs, however, in his definition and understanding of the role of intuition in human understanding and the discovery of the essential nature of things. Aristotle’s approach to intuition is the basis of his emphasis on induction, evidence, and examination in his attempt to understand reality. It is closely related to his epistemological foundationalism, the concept that all knowledge rests on primary truths which are not subject to further proof, and are the foundation of all other truths, and his ontological realism, which is the idea that essences or universals are objectively real. In this sense, intuition is genuinely foundational for Aristotle, and he believes it establishes “science in the sphere of being” (Posterior Analytics, 136). To get there, however, Aristotle says this comes to us in “thinking states” or an epistemological cognitive condition “by which we grasp truth” (Posterior Analytics, 136). According to Aristotle:
“Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error—opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive.” (Posterior Analytics, 136)
Aristotle makes two
interesting claims. The first is that scientific knowledge and
intuition are always true. The second is that intuition is more
accurate than scientific knowledge because scientific knowledge is
discursive in nature. These are intriguing ideas especially since
they come at the end of a scientific treatise on physical reality.
What could Aristotle mean? If intuition is more accurate than
scientific knowledge, should one rely solely on intuition? Is
intuition, in the final analysis, a means to throw out rational and
careful thinking? Aristotle, however, does not throw out reason or
make intuition into a kind of mystical method as Bergson does.
Having a firm grasp on reality, Aristotle places intuition into an
epistemological hierarchy which is the basis for his foundationalism.
Aristotle goes on:
“From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises—a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.” (Posterior Analytics 136 – 137)
Much of Aristotle’s project to understand reality is an attempt to discover and explain the primary premises of Being—the principles, axioms, and postulates that make reality intelligible and discernible in the first place. Instead of doing away with analysis, evaluation, and symbols, as Bergson does, intuition, for Aristotle, is the indemonstrable and non-inferential starting point which grounds discursive and rational thinking. Intuition, rightly understood, is that which apprehends the primary premises which lead to discursive reasoning and scientific knowledge. This is why Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, “… it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles” (389). This concept of intuition also serves to counter the kinds of circular arguments Aristotle wishes to avoid. Neither scientific knowledge nor demonstration can be originative because that would mean the premise is assumed in the conclusion (circular reasoning). In addition, Aristotle’s concept of intuitive knowledge provides an epistemological foundation which avoids an infinite regress. Aristotle draws this conclusion, “If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premise, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact” (Posterior Analytics, 137). Ultimately, Aristotle explains that metaphysics and science are connected. Aristotle seeks to get at the first principles of reality and, intuition, as he explains it, is that inherent human capacity to apprehend these primary truths. In this sense, intuition is the original source which provides the foundation for physical science. Science, then, becomes originative in the sense that it contributes to and expands upon the whole particular body of knowledge. (For Aristotle, “science” is any body of knowledge that can be collected, categorized, and organized.) In the next post, we will make a final analysis of Bergson’s and Aristotle’s approach to intuition and explore what it might mean to be embodied, intuitive, and rational beings.
Note: Foundationalism and realism are not unique to Aristotle, as Plato held similar views, but Aristotle explicates his version of these concepts most clearly in both of his Analytics, On the Soul, and Metaphysics.
Works cited
Aristotle. The
Works ofAristotle:
1. Great Books of the
Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Aristotle. The
Works ofAristotle:
2. Great Books of the
Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Bergson, Henri. An
Introduction to Metaphysics.
Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc., 1999
Ever since Aristotle first discussed the role of intuition in human knowledge development, philosophers have debated its significance and purpose throughout history. The debate centers around whether or not intuition is a valid source of knowledge. If intuition is a genuine part of human understanding, how can it be rightly understood? Philosophers have held different conceptions of intuition and have proposed a number of answers. For example, Aristotle held that intuition is the human capacity to apprehend primary premises and is “the originative source of scientific knowledge” (Posterior Analytics, 136-137). For Kant, intuition was immediate sense perception (23). In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Henri Bergson makes intuition a central part of his philosophical approach to understanding reality, and makes the claim that intuition is the “kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” (italics in original, 72). In each case, intuition seems to be more than a “feeling” or vague emotional awareness of something. Although they have different concepts of intuition, these philosophers indicate that it might play a part in understanding reality. If intuition is a kind of knowing—or perhaps a way to knowledge—how can it be rightly understood? Could it really be a valid approach to knowledge? Although they do have differing understandings of intuition, Aristotle, Kant, and Bergson seem to be in agreement that intuition can be a basic starting point for understanding the world.
Since, however, Bergson makes intuition central to his philosophical approach, and given that his concept of intuition is unique in Western philosophy, it is helpful to examine his understanding of the idea. Ultimately, it must be decided whether or not his definition of intuition is helpful for gaining a better grasp of reality. In addition, Aristotle’s conception of intuition will be explored and examined for the purpose of critically evaluating the role of intuition in knowledge formation and how it might help one develop a better understanding of reality. Aristotle and Bergson present two very different understandings of intuition and, ultimately, very different presentations of reality. An examination of these two positions helps us to discover the proper role that intuition has with one’s theory of knowledge, including how knowledge of reality relates to metaphysics. Furthermore, for any conception of intuition to be valid, it must conform to the right use of reason. For example, it is reasonable to reject the irrational (that which is against reason), and it must be decided whether or not a properly conceived understanding of intuition is irrational. Both Bergson, and Aristotle present interesting and complex positions about the role of intuition in the human intellect. By exploring each position, the correct role of intuition is discovered in the cognitive apprehension of reality.
In AnIntroduction to Metaphysics, Bergson presents two different ways of knowing reality. The first is the “relative” and the second is the “absolute.” This dichotomy is used to support his categories of “analysis” and “intuition” and is closely related. For Bergson, the relative corresponds to analysis and intuition is how the absolute is known. According to Bergson, there are two ways of knowing an object. The first way, that of analysis, is to “move round” the object and the second, the way of intuition, is to “enter into it” (71). The first depends on point of reference, perception, and symbols to express the object. The first way will always be relative, dependent on the individual, and analytical. The second way is to embrace the “absolute” by attributing to the object “states of mind” and developing sympathy with those states; inserting oneself into them by effort of imagination (71). One is able to embrace the absolute of an object because he or she will enter into the object by sympathy, imagination, and coincide with it in some inexpressible way (71 – 72). Regarding intuition, Bergson explains, “In short, I shall no longer grasp the movement from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess the absolute” (71). Intuition, then, becomes the mode of knowing an object in an absolute manner, from within the object. As Bergson explains:
“It follows from this that an absolute could only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls within the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself.” (72)
In other words, Bergson holds that intuition is that which allows one to enter into an object and know it absolutely. On the other hand, analysis is always relative to the observer and therefore no amount of symbols will ever be able to adequately or precisely explain the absolute nature or essence of the object. For example, Bergson uses the process of literary analysis as an illustration. No matter how well he could translate and describe the meaning of a poem, he will never be able to arrive at the genuine essence of the poem (72). Bergson describes analysis this way:
“Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already.” (72)
For
Bergson, analysis is an unending process of description which uses
symbols that will always render an imperfect translation, and is
completely relative to the observer. No amount of words, logic,
reason, or analysis will ever describe the nature of the self, great
works of art, or objects. Analysis will always place the observer
outside the object or person, and will always rely on description and
translation (71 – 73). Bergson concludes by describing the
ultimate end of metaphysics:
“If there exists any means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead of making the analysis: in short of seizing it without any expression, translation, or symbolic representation—metaphysics is that means. Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols.” (italics in original, 72)
As a metaphysician, Bergson wants to discover the essence, or absolute nature of things. However, he believes the quest for the absolute cannot be done through the traditionally Western approach of evidence, examination, evaluation, or induction. Rather, metaphysics should entirely do away with analysis, symbols, translation, and, ultimately, reason because any objective process which details an examination of a thing in order to understand its nature or to determine its essential features will fail from the start and turn out to be relative. It is interesting to note, here, that Bergson takes on a similar tone as Descartes and Kant in his methodology. If an approach to philosophy does not provide absolute and exact certainty, it should be rejected. Bergson indicates that because evaluation, careful reasoning, and symbolic communication will always be relative, an entirely new method to understanding reality is needed. For Bergson, intuition is the only way to know something and its essence absolutely. Is this version of intuition the correct approach to understanding reality? Is it true that the only way to know something absolutely is through an imaginative sympathy with the object? Although Aristotle has a place for intuition in human understanding, he believes it should be formulated in a different way. In part two, we’ll explore the Aristotelian understanding of intuition and its foundational relationship to metaphysics.
Note: Aristotle discusses intuition in Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics. Also, Bergson indicates that “absolute” means “essence.” Essence, in ontological terms, is that which makes something the kind of thing it is in its unique act of being.
Works Cited
Aristotle. The Works ofAristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Aristotle. The
Works ofAristotle:
2. Great Books of the
Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Bergson, Henri. An
Introduction to Metaphysics.
Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc., 1999
Kant, Immanuel. The
Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other
Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgement.
Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 39. Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc., 1999.
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