Ever since Aristotle first discussed the role of intuition in human knowledge development, philosophers have debated its significance and purpose throughout history. The debate centers around whether or not intuition is a valid source of knowledge. If intuition is a genuine part of human understanding, how can it be rightly understood? Philosophers have held different conceptions of intuition and have proposed a number of answers. For example, Aristotle held that intuition is the human capacity to apprehend primary premises and is “the originative source of scientific knowledge” (Posterior Analytics, 136-137). For Kant, intuition was immediate sense perception (23). In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Henri Bergson makes intuition a central part of his philosophical approach to understanding reality, and makes the claim that intuition is the “kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” (italics in original, 72). In each case, intuition seems to be more than a “feeling” or vague emotional awareness of something. Although they have different concepts of intuition, these philosophers indicate that it might play a part in understanding reality. If intuition is a kind of knowing—or perhaps a way to knowledge—how can it be rightly understood? Could it really be a valid approach to knowledge? Although they do have differing understandings of intuition, Aristotle, Kant, and Bergson seem to be in agreement that intuition can be a basic starting point for understanding the world.

Since, however, Bergson makes intuition central to his philosophical approach, and given that his concept of intuition is unique in Western philosophy, it is helpful to examine his understanding of the idea. Ultimately, it must be decided whether or not his definition of intuition is helpful for gaining a better grasp of reality. In addition, Aristotle’s conception of intuition will be explored and examined for the purpose of critically evaluating the role of intuition in knowledge formation and how it might help one develop a better understanding of reality. Aristotle and Bergson present two very different understandings of intuition and, ultimately, very different presentations of reality. An examination of these two positions helps us to discover the proper role that intuition has with one’s theory of knowledge, including how knowledge of reality relates to metaphysics. Furthermore, for any conception of intuition to be valid, it must conform to the right use of reason. For example, it is reasonable to reject the irrational (that which is against reason), and it must be decided whether or not a properly conceived understanding of intuition is irrational. Both Bergson, and Aristotle present interesting and complex positions about the role of intuition in the human intellect. By exploring each position, the correct role of intuition is discovered in the cognitive apprehension of reality.

In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson presents two different ways of knowing reality. The first is the “relative” and the second is the “absolute.” This dichotomy is used to support his categories of “analysis” and “intuition” and is closely related. For Bergson, the relative corresponds to analysis and intuition is how the absolute is known. According to Bergson, there are two ways of knowing an object. The first way, that of analysis, is to “move round” the object and the second, the way of intuition, is to “enter into it” (71). The first depends on point of reference, perception, and symbols to express the object. The first way will always be relative, dependent on the individual, and analytical. The second way is to embrace the “absolute” by attributing to the object “states of mind” and developing sympathy with those states; inserting oneself into them by effort of imagination (71). One is able to embrace the absolute of an object because he or she will enter into the object by sympathy, imagination, and coincide with it in some inexpressible way (71 – 72). Regarding intuition, Bergson explains, “In short, I shall no longer grasp the movement from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess the absolute” (71). Intuition, then, becomes the mode of knowing an object in an absolute manner, from within the object. As Bergson explains:

“It follows from this that an absolute could only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls within the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself.” (72)

In other words, Bergson holds that intuition is that which allows one to enter into an object and know it absolutely. On the other hand, analysis is always relative to the observer and therefore no amount of symbols will ever be able to adequately or precisely explain the absolute nature or essence of the object. For example, Bergson uses the process of literary analysis as an illustration. No matter how well he could translate and describe the meaning of a poem, he will never be able to arrive at the genuine essence of the poem (72). Bergson describes analysis this way:

“Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already.” (72)

For Bergson, analysis is an unending process of description which uses symbols that will always render an imperfect translation, and is completely relative to the observer. No amount of words, logic, reason, or analysis will ever describe the nature of the self, great works of art, or objects. Analysis will always place the observer outside the object or person, and will always rely on description and translation (71 – 73). Bergson concludes by describing the ultimate end of metaphysics:

“If there exists any means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead of making the analysis: in short of seizing it without any expression, translation, or symbolic representation—metaphysics is that means. Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols.” (italics in original, 72)

As a metaphysician, Bergson wants to discover the essence, or absolute nature of things. However, he believes the quest for the absolute cannot be done through the traditionally Western approach of evidence, examination, evaluation, or induction. Rather, metaphysics should entirely do away with analysis, symbols, translation, and, ultimately, reason because any objective process which details an examination of a thing in order to understand its nature or to determine its essential features will fail from the start and turn out to be relative. It is interesting to note, here, that Bergson takes on a similar tone as Descartes and Kant in his methodology. If an approach to philosophy does not provide absolute and exact certainty, it should be rejected. Bergson indicates that because evaluation, careful reasoning, and symbolic communication will always be relative, an entirely new method to understanding reality is needed. For Bergson, intuition is the only way to know something and its essence absolutely. Is this version of intuition the correct approach to understanding reality? Is it true that the only way to know something absolutely is through an imaginative sympathy with the object? Although Aristotle has a place for intuition in human understanding, he believes it should be formulated in a different way. In part two, we’ll explore the Aristotelian understanding of intuition and its foundational relationship to metaphysics.

Note: Aristotle discusses intuition in Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics. Also, Bergson indicates that “absolute” means “essence.” Essence, in ontological terms, is that which makes something the kind of thing it is in its unique act of being.

Works Cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgement. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 39. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.