Note: This is the second part of a reflection on Bergson’s understanding of metaphysical intuition read against Aristotle’s position. This part explicates Aristotle’s foundationalism. Next time, we’ll examine embodied rational intuition. For context, part one can be found here.

Aristotle is sometimes typified as the great philosopher of induction and empiricism with no place for non-inferential reasoning. However, his overall approach is much more developed and nuanced. Along with Bergson, Aristotle holds that there is an essential nature—the universal—to each thing, animal, and individual person. Aristotle differs, however, in his definition and understanding of the role of intuition in human understanding and the discovery of the essential nature of things. Aristotle’s approach to intuition is the basis of his emphasis on induction, evidence, and examination in his attempt to understand reality. It is closely related to his epistemological foundationalism, the concept that all knowledge rests on primary truths which are not subject to further proof, and are the foundation of all other truths, and his ontological realism, which is the idea that essences or universals are objectively real. In this sense, intuition is genuinely foundational for Aristotle, and he believes it establishes “science in the sphere of being” (Posterior Analytics, 136). To get there, however, Aristotle says this comes to us in “thinking states” or an epistemological cognitive condition “by which we grasp truth” (Posterior Analytics, 136). According to Aristotle:

“Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error—opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive.” (Posterior Analytics, 136)

Aristotle makes two interesting claims. The first is that scientific knowledge and intuition are always true. The second is that intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge because scientific knowledge is discursive in nature. These are intriguing ideas especially since they come at the end of a scientific treatise on physical reality. What could Aristotle mean? If intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, should one rely solely on intuition? Is intuition, in the final analysis, a means to throw out rational and careful thinking? Aristotle, however, does not throw out reason or make intuition into a kind of mystical method as Bergson does. Having a firm grasp on reality, Aristotle places intuition into an epistemological hierarchy which is the basis for his foundationalism. Aristotle goes on:

“From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises—a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.” (Posterior Analytics 136 – 137)

Much of Aristotle’s project to understand reality is an attempt to discover and explain the primary premises of Being—the principles, axioms, and postulates that make reality intelligible and discernible in the first place. Instead of doing away with analysis, evaluation, and symbols, as Bergson does, intuition, for Aristotle, is the indemonstrable and non-inferential starting point which grounds discursive and rational thinking. Intuition, rightly understood, is that which apprehends the primary premises which lead to discursive reasoning and scientific knowledge. This is why Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, “… it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles” (389). This concept of intuition also serves to counter the kinds of circular arguments Aristotle wishes to avoid. Neither scientific knowledge nor demonstration can be originative because that would mean the premise is assumed in the conclusion (circular reasoning). In addition, Aristotle’s concept of intuitive knowledge provides an epistemological foundation which avoids an infinite regress. Aristotle draws this conclusion, “If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premise, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact” (Posterior Analytics, 137). Ultimately, Aristotle explains that metaphysics and science are connected. Aristotle seeks to get at the first principles of reality and, intuition, as he explains it, is that inherent human capacity to apprehend these primary truths. In this sense, intuition is the original source which provides the foundation for physical science. Science, then, becomes originative in the sense that it contributes to and expands upon the whole particular body of knowledge. (For Aristotle, “science” is any body of knowledge that can be collected, categorized, and organized.) In the next post, we will make a final analysis of Bergson’s and Aristotle’s approach to intuition and explore what it might mean to be embodied, intuitive, and rational beings.

Note: Foundationalism and realism are not unique to Aristotle, as Plato held similar views, but Aristotle explicates his version of these concepts most clearly in both of his Analytics, On the Soul, and Metaphysics.

Works cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999