Metaphysics, Philosophy

More Than A Feeling: Metaphysical Intuition in Aristotle and Bergson, Part Two

by Dave Seng

Note: This is the second part of a reflection on Bergson’s understanding of metaphysical intuition read against Aristotle’s position. This part explicates Aristotle’s foundationalism. Next time, we’ll examine embodied rational intuition. For context, part one can be found here.

Aristotle is sometimes typified as the great philosopher of induction and empiricism with no place for non-inferential reasoning. However, his overall approach is much more developed and nuanced. Along with Bergson, Aristotle holds that there is an essential nature—the universal—to each thing, animal, and individual person. Aristotle differs, however, in his definition and understanding of the role of intuition in human understanding and the discovery of the essential nature of things. Aristotle’s approach to intuition is the basis of his emphasis on induction, evidence, and examination in his attempt to understand reality. It is closely related to his epistemological foundationalism, the concept that all knowledge rests on primary truths which are not subject to further proof, and are the foundation of all other truths, and his ontological realism, which is the idea that essences or universals are objectively real. In this sense, intuition is genuinely foundational for Aristotle, and he believes it establishes “science in the sphere of being” (Posterior Analytics, 136). To get there, however, Aristotle says this comes to us in “thinking states” or an epistemological cognitive condition “by which we grasp truth” (Posterior Analytics, 136). According to Aristotle:

“Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error—opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive.” (Posterior Analytics, 136)

Aristotle makes two interesting claims. The first is that scientific knowledge and intuition are always true. The second is that intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge because scientific knowledge is discursive in nature. These are intriguing ideas especially since they come at the end of a scientific treatise on physical reality. What could Aristotle mean? If intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, should one rely solely on intuition? Is intuition, in the final analysis, a means to throw out rational and careful thinking? Aristotle, however, does not throw out reason or make intuition into a kind of mystical method as Bergson does. Having a firm grasp on reality, Aristotle places intuition into an epistemological hierarchy which is the basis for his foundationalism. Aristotle goes on:

“From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises—a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.” (Posterior Analytics 136 – 137)

Much of Aristotle’s project to understand reality is an attempt to discover and explain the primary premises of Being—the principles, axioms, and postulates that make reality intelligible and discernible in the first place. Instead of doing away with analysis, evaluation, and symbols, as Bergson does, intuition, for Aristotle, is the indemonstrable and non-inferential starting point which grounds discursive and rational thinking. Intuition, rightly understood, is that which apprehends the primary premises which lead to discursive reasoning and scientific knowledge. This is why Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, “… it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles” (389). This concept of intuition also serves to counter the kinds of circular arguments Aristotle wishes to avoid. Neither scientific knowledge nor demonstration can be originative because that would mean the premise is assumed in the conclusion (circular reasoning). In addition, Aristotle’s concept of intuitive knowledge provides an epistemological foundation which avoids an infinite regress. Aristotle draws this conclusion, “If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premise, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact” (Posterior Analytics, 137). Ultimately, Aristotle explains that metaphysics and science are connected. Aristotle seeks to get at the first principles of reality and, intuition, as he explains it, is that inherent human capacity to apprehend these primary truths. In this sense, intuition is the original source which provides the foundation for physical science. Science, then, becomes originative in the sense that it contributes to and expands upon the whole particular body of knowledge. (For Aristotle, “science” is any body of knowledge that can be collected, categorized, and organized.) In the next post, we will make a final analysis of Bergson’s and Aristotle’s approach to intuition and explore what it might mean to be embodied, intuitive, and rational beings.

Note: Foundationalism and realism are not unique to Aristotle, as Plato held similar views, but Aristotle explicates his version of these concepts most clearly in both of his Analytics, On the Soul, and Metaphysics.

Works cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Metaphysics, Philosophy

More Than A Feeling: Metaphysical Intuition in Aristotle and Bergson, Part One.

by Dave Seng

Ever since Aristotle first discussed the role of intuition in human knowledge development, philosophers have debated its significance and purpose throughout history. The debate centers around whether or not intuition is a valid source of knowledge. If intuition is a genuine part of human understanding, how can it be rightly understood? Philosophers have held different conceptions of intuition and have proposed a number of answers. For example, Aristotle held that intuition is the human capacity to apprehend primary premises and is “the originative source of scientific knowledge” (Posterior Analytics, 136-137). For Kant, intuition was immediate sense perception (23). In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Henri Bergson makes intuition a central part of his philosophical approach to understanding reality, and makes the claim that intuition is the “kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” (italics in original, 72). In each case, intuition seems to be more than a “feeling” or vague emotional awareness of something. Although they have different concepts of intuition, these philosophers indicate that it might play a part in understanding reality. If intuition is a kind of knowing—or perhaps a way to knowledge—how can it be rightly understood? Could it really be a valid approach to knowledge? Although they do have differing understandings of intuition, Aristotle, Kant, and Bergson seem to be in agreement that intuition can be a basic starting point for understanding the world.

Since, however, Bergson makes intuition central to his philosophical approach, and given that his concept of intuition is unique in Western philosophy, it is helpful to examine his understanding of the idea. Ultimately, it must be decided whether or not his definition of intuition is helpful for gaining a better grasp of reality. In addition, Aristotle’s conception of intuition will be explored and examined for the purpose of critically evaluating the role of intuition in knowledge formation and how it might help one develop a better understanding of reality. Aristotle and Bergson present two very different understandings of intuition and, ultimately, very different presentations of reality. An examination of these two positions helps us to discover the proper role that intuition has with one’s theory of knowledge, including how knowledge of reality relates to metaphysics. Furthermore, for any conception of intuition to be valid, it must conform to the right use of reason. For example, it is reasonable to reject the irrational (that which is against reason), and it must be decided whether or not a properly conceived understanding of intuition is irrational. Both Bergson, and Aristotle present interesting and complex positions about the role of intuition in the human intellect. By exploring each position, the correct role of intuition is discovered in the cognitive apprehension of reality.

In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson presents two different ways of knowing reality. The first is the “relative” and the second is the “absolute.” This dichotomy is used to support his categories of “analysis” and “intuition” and is closely related. For Bergson, the relative corresponds to analysis and intuition is how the absolute is known. According to Bergson, there are two ways of knowing an object. The first way, that of analysis, is to “move round” the object and the second, the way of intuition, is to “enter into it” (71). The first depends on point of reference, perception, and symbols to express the object. The first way will always be relative, dependent on the individual, and analytical. The second way is to embrace the “absolute” by attributing to the object “states of mind” and developing sympathy with those states; inserting oneself into them by effort of imagination (71). One is able to embrace the absolute of an object because he or she will enter into the object by sympathy, imagination, and coincide with it in some inexpressible way (71 – 72). Regarding intuition, Bergson explains, “In short, I shall no longer grasp the movement from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess the absolute” (71). Intuition, then, becomes the mode of knowing an object in an absolute manner, from within the object. As Bergson explains:

“It follows from this that an absolute could only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls within the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself.” (72)

In other words, Bergson holds that intuition is that which allows one to enter into an object and know it absolutely. On the other hand, analysis is always relative to the observer and therefore no amount of symbols will ever be able to adequately or precisely explain the absolute nature or essence of the object. For example, Bergson uses the process of literary analysis as an illustration. No matter how well he could translate and describe the meaning of a poem, he will never be able to arrive at the genuine essence of the poem (72). Bergson describes analysis this way:

“Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already.” (72)

For Bergson, analysis is an unending process of description which uses symbols that will always render an imperfect translation, and is completely relative to the observer. No amount of words, logic, reason, or analysis will ever describe the nature of the self, great works of art, or objects. Analysis will always place the observer outside the object or person, and will always rely on description and translation (71 – 73). Bergson concludes by describing the ultimate end of metaphysics:

“If there exists any means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead of making the analysis: in short of seizing it without any expression, translation, or symbolic representation—metaphysics is that means. Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols.” (italics in original, 72)

As a metaphysician, Bergson wants to discover the essence, or absolute nature of things. However, he believes the quest for the absolute cannot be done through the traditionally Western approach of evidence, examination, evaluation, or induction. Rather, metaphysics should entirely do away with analysis, symbols, translation, and, ultimately, reason because any objective process which details an examination of a thing in order to understand its nature or to determine its essential features will fail from the start and turn out to be relative. It is interesting to note, here, that Bergson takes on a similar tone as Descartes and Kant in his methodology. If an approach to philosophy does not provide absolute and exact certainty, it should be rejected. Bergson indicates that because evaluation, careful reasoning, and symbolic communication will always be relative, an entirely new method to understanding reality is needed. For Bergson, intuition is the only way to know something and its essence absolutely. Is this version of intuition the correct approach to understanding reality? Is it true that the only way to know something absolutely is through an imaginative sympathy with the object? Although Aristotle has a place for intuition in human understanding, he believes it should be formulated in a different way. In part two, we’ll explore the Aristotelian understanding of intuition and its foundational relationship to metaphysics.

Note: Aristotle discusses intuition in Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics. Also, Bergson indicates that “absolute” means “essence.” Essence, in ontological terms, is that which makes something the kind of thing it is in its unique act of being.

Works Cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgement. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 39. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Ethics, Happiness, Philosophy

Eudaemonia: An Existential Exploration

by Dave Seng

Call no man happy until you know the nature of his death. — Herodotus, Clio, I, 32.

But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy. – Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.

This is a follow up to my post: Wisdom, Virtue, and Happiness.

In this post, we revisit the moral and ethical elements of the classical conception of eudaemonia and explore the implications of happiness as the final cause of our lives. An examination of the moral or ethical definitions of happiness is important because the psychological definitions of happiness as desire and fulfillment are often fleeting, vague, and temporal. Further, our desires are often misplaced and we become misguided in a false pursuit of happiness. Nonetheless, the issue of what constitutes happiness is valid. “Man wishes to be happy, and only wishes to be happy, and cannot wish not to be so,” writes Blaise Pascal. On the question of what moves human desire, John Locke tells us “happiness and that alone.” In fact, many philosophers—from a variety of perspectives—have made happiness the primary object of human action (which, by the way, implies an ethical element). Here I’m thinking of philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, or J.S. Mill. Happiness and its pursuit seems to be a universal quest for humanity and the human impulse for happiness seems to be intuitively correct. Therefore, seeking the correct definition of happiness is important for several reasons. As noted in my previous post, social scientists are able to talk about the need for human happiness without giving a definition of it. Statistics mean little if no definition or perhaps a wrong definition of happiness is given. However, if we can define happiness correctly, we will have a better understanding of how to attain it.

Wisdom is the discovery and understanding of first principles combined with the virtue of using our knowledge well. In the classical Western tradition, Eudaemonia is among the first principles in correctly understanding happiness. It is the idea that happiness as the highest good of the individual is achieved rationally without the extremes of excessive repression or inordinate indulgence. Happiness understood as the harmony and consonancy of a rationally well lived life will help in understanding why it is thought to be the final end or purpose in human activity.

In this sense, happiness is said to be the goal or final end of mankind. We begin at the end as T.S. Eliot reminds us. In this case, the end is the purpose or reason for the goal-directed activity that all of us partake in one way or another. What is the end of human existence? Happiness. This is why many philosophers have said that the happy life is one with a good ending. Think of someone who is suffering with chronic pain or experiencing genuine existential tragedy in his or her life but is also happy. A play or TV show is considered a comedy although the characters themselves display a painful existence and many tragic flaws. Think of the talented genius, gifted artist, or young entrepreneur whose life is suddenly cut short in a horrible way. We call this a catastrophe, not happiness. I think this is one reason Herodotus reminds us to “call no man happy until you know the nature of his death”. Happiness, therefore, is seen as the end, purpose, or goal-directed nature of human existence and what it means to be and become in this temporary life. It is that which mankind tends toward—as all things tend toward the fulfillment of their nature.

Understanding that there is nothing beyond happiness for which humans seek, Aristotle uses the term happiness as the ultimate good, last end, or summum bonum (highest good).

“The chief good,” he writes, “is evidently something final . . . Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing. Therefore, we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Such a thing, happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else.” (Nicomachean Ethics)

Aristotle supports his argument that happiness is the final end of human activity with the notion of self-sufficiency or completeness. It would make no sense to pursue happiness as a final end if it were incomplete or something in addition is needed to make it complete. One would run into an endless regression of desire fulfillment. Ultimately, the happy life leaves nothing to be desired. As Aristotle explains:

“The self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others—if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action” (Nicomachean Ethics)

When you ask someone why they do what they do, you will find that happiness is the chief end of human activity. Perhaps you have questioned someone, “why do you work so hard?” They might say, so I can meet the needs of my family and buy things.” But when you drill down and ask why do you want to meet your family’s needs or buy things, you will discover that happiness is the ultimate pursuit. Whatever we do, it is with the end of some good in mind. Happiness understood as the harmony and consonancy of a rationally well-lived life will help guide one in making the right goal directed choices for their life. This is why Aristotle explains that “human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue.”

It is simply impossible to cover the entire range of human happiness in just two posts. I hope to come back to it again. There is much more to be discussed such as the function of wisdom and the happy life, the role of virtue in the pursuit of happiness, and perhaps the social aspects of happiness as the common good. Nonetheless, understanding happiness as the primary goal-directed nature of human existence is the primary first principle one must grasp.

Until I get to this topic again, I recommend the following for further reading:

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Aquinas’ section on happiness in his Summa Theologica

Josef Pieper’s book Happiness and Contemplation

Martin Seligman’s book Authentic Happiness

Miguel de Unamuno’s book Tragic Sense of Life

Metaphysics, Philosophy

Descartes, Kant, and Why Metaphysics Matters

by Dave Seng

“Let us call to our aid those who have attacked the investigation of being and philosophized about reality before us.” – Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 3.

Being is the fundamental object of study for the metaphysician. In this essay, I will outline why the study of Being as Being is foundational, and perhaps the most basic to all other issues related to philosophy. This is not a purely academic question or one that is the sole concern of philosophers. As the Canadian philosopher George Grant reminds us, all civilizations have paradigms of knowledge and such paradigms dramatically shape every part of the society (36). The way we think about the ultimate issues and conditions of reality impacts the way we think and interact with each other in society. I have become convinced that the more I study the nature of Being, the more connections I find at the human level of technology, economics, law, and education.

To start, Being includes all reality including physical nature, conceptual abstractions, essences, and potentialities. In Aristotelian and Thomist terms, Being incorporates all that which is in act and potential, being and essence. The concepts of essence, act, and potency are the most helpful and importat for understanding reality. Philosophers from the time of Heraclitus to Martin Heidegger have tried to unlock the mystery of Being because it is believed that understanding Being leads one to what it means to be and become in this world. When one makes sense of Being, it is easier to make helpful judgments about reality, whether it is one or many, completely fluid or essentially static, ordered or chaotic, and good or bad, or perhaps both. If the world is essentially chaotic, as Heraclitus believed, how does one live meaningfully and “become” in such a world? Being includes both being and becoming, essences, values, and change and how one answers these questions have important implications for human life and activity. These questions are foundational to human flourishing. The philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) believed that these kinds of metaphysical questions are unavoidable. He tells us in the preface to the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason:

For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. (1, italics in original)

It is true that in today’s intellectual climate, Being is thought to be unimportant or impossible to figure out. But have you ever heard someone—perhaps Kant would call an indifferentist—turn around and give her explanation for doing something based on her understanding of reality? If someone were to tell you that all reality is simple matter and mechanics, you would have a good idea of what she thinks on other important issues. Metaphysical questions are unavoidable and everyone seems to have something to say about these ultimate matters even when they claim they are indifferent or agnostic to them. Our understanding of reality shapes many other things in our lives. The question is, “are we going to have a well-developed notion of Being or not”?

One way to evaluate a philosophy or particular philosopher is to examine how the concept of Being is handled. Does the philosophy illuminate and help us to understand the nature of Being or is the issue sidestepped or simply untouched? Does the philosophy help us to understand the nature of existence a little more or does the philosophy or philosopher think the attempt is futile? These are the questions we are going to keep in mind as we explore the philosophical assumptions of Rene Descartes in regards to his conception of Being. This time, however, we will use Kant and Aristotle as helpful guides.

Descartes was an interesting and important philosopher who contributed much to the rational approach to philosophy. And he really did not have that much to say about Being as Being in the way Aristotle did. Descartes’ main project was to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul. Since he was very skeptical of the fundamental principles of Being—act, potency, essences, and most of causation—he ended up painting himself into a corner, and the only way he could describe physical reality was by way of mechanism. In this aspect of his thought, he really is close to Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. When it comes to physical reality all we need to do is “render ourselves masters and possessors of nature” (285). (Along with Bacon and Hobbes, Descartes was very triumphant about the scientific “new method” and mankind’s newfound destiny to master nature. Today many philosophers of technology are exploring the question of whether or not something should be done simply because it can be done.) Descartes was very clear in his Meditations on First Philosophy that he was indifferent to matters of metaphysics or the claims of ultimate reality. If the issue was not immediately clear, certain, and indubitable, he would reject it. Of course, Descartes’ metaphysical skepticism was based on theological grounds because he did not want to assume the purposes or mind of God regarding nature. Nonetheless, his interpretive scheme has consequences. Metaphysics, according to Descartes is seen as doubtful. And those following Descartes believed that the project of laying out the first principles of reality was a worthless task.

This, however, brings us again to the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant’s entire project in his Critique of Pure Reason was to revive the corpse of metaphysics. He took upon the task of reviving metaphysics when in his day most scholars believed such a project was pointless. He reminds us,

Yet in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. (19)

For Kant, metaphysics is an innate natural disposition of every human being. It is unavoidable. It would be impossible to go into all of Kant’s philosophy at this point. But in summary, much of Kant’s thought highlights the importance of basic laws and principles that must be in place to render anything intelligible, including metaphysical knowledge. Aristotle says much the same thing in his Posterior Analytics and Analytics (and, of course, was the first philosopher to elucidate the human need to understand the first principles of reality in his Metaphysics). The philosopher Daniel Sullivan reminds us that, “our most commonplace expressions of optimism or pessimism, selfishness or high-mindedness, idealism or cynicism, carry along with them unacknowledged assumptions about the nature of the universe as a whole and man’s place in it” (7). Why does metaphysics matter? Because in unpredictable ways, an understanding of reality is assumed in the conversations we have, the books we read, the movies we watch and the political associations we keep. All these, and more imply a philosophy or perspective on reality and life.

Works Cited

Descartes, Rene. Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 28. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Grant, George. Technology & Justice. House of Anansi Press, 1986.

Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgement. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 39. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Sullivan, Daniel J. An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition. Tan Books, 1957.