Intellectual History, Metaphysics, Philosophy

Berkeley, Classical Realism, and the Metaphysical First Principles of Being, Part One

by Dave Seng
George Berkeley

Introductory Note: In 1995 Dr. Mortimer Adler wrote that idealism is “the greatest of all modern philosophical mistakes” (Adler 118). I believe that Dr. Adler is correct. Today, much of postmodernism, post-structuralism, and critical theory in all its forms is the result of idealism. To echo Richard Weaver, ideas have consequences. The next few posts will examine a particular form of idealism as represented by the Anglican bishop George Berkeley (1685 – 1753). The following posts will only look at Berkeley’s subjective idealism in general terms and then follow with the classical realist response. Berkeley’s most important and specific errors will be addressed later (such as his implicit Gnosticism). For now, just keep St. Athanasius in mind — That which is not assumed is not redeemed.

When it comes to understanding what is ultimately real (metaphysics), many of the truly great authors in the Western intellectual tradition can be divided between those who hold to idealism (that reality consists of mind and its ideas), and realism (that objects of sense perception exist independently of their being known). For the idealist, the mind is ultimate in determining reality, while the realist holds that being, or reality itself, is the proper starting point for philosophical reflection. The realist asserts that the realms of both consciousness (mind) and external objects exist and belong to the overall structure of Being. In one form or another, idealists believe that the contents of the mind are all that can be really known and the mind is the arbiter and, in some ways, creator of reality. In the history of Western thought, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel hold to forms of idealism, and Aristotle, Aquinas, and Whitehead represent realism.1 The next few posts will explore George Berkeley’s subjective idealism in light of classical realism (understood from the perspective of Aristotle and Aquinas), and assess the merits of holding to both mind and matter as the essential structure of reality, and explores whether or not Berkeley’s metaphysical position takes into account the first principles of being.

It is helpful to understand Berkeley’s version of subjective idealism before presenting and explicating classical realism. For Berkeley, perception is not simply direct sensation, it includes all the physical senses and mental ideas, including thinking, memory, imagination, and other faculties of the mind. In other words, perception extends to ideas, thoughts, consciousness, or mind. In fact, Berkeley specifically includes thinking with perception, “But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it” (414). He further explains, “For the existence of an idea consists in being perceived” (413). For Berkeley, every thought, imagination, and memory, constitute perception and, further, all that one really has access to is idea or mental experience. The cognitive faculties of the mind—our images (including memory, imagination, or imaginary figures such as unicorns), concepts (conceptual truths such as mathematics and the laws of logic), and physical percepts all reside in the mind, and it is mental experience that is all one can know. All reality is ultimately reducible to mind or consciousness. Perception is mental experience and all reality equates to perception, “What do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensation” (413)? Accordingly, Berkeley insists that something must be perceived by the mind in order for it to be considered real, “It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding” (414). For Berkeley, the individual perceiver is all-determining, since every thought, idea, and object is included in Berkeley’s definition of perception. This is Berkeley’s subjective idealism because all reality ultimately depends on the personal mental experiences of the perceiver.

Berkeley further explicates this notion with his famous phrase “esse is percepi”—to be is to be perceived, “For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them” (414). For Berkeley, the idea of an external reality that exists independently of the mind, or perception is conceptually incoherent. If a thing is not perceived, it does not exist. Essentially, Berkeley’s idealism follows this line of reasoning—all perceptions, concepts, and thoughts are ideas and can only exist in the mind. Therefore, everything exists only in minds. This does not mean, however, that something does not exist, or goes out of existence if it is not perceived or is no longer perceived. As an Anglican bishop, Berkeley believes God perceives everything and is the foundation of all reality. Because God perceives something, it is real and exists in reality (as part of God’s mind) even if no other individual is around to perceive it:

Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit—it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. (414)

In this manner, Berkeley suggests, as he does throughout his Principles of Knowledge, that he really does believe in an external reality because God or an Eternal Spirit perceives all things. For Berkeley, reality of a sort is possible and he narrowly escapes solipsism, which is often the end result of subjectivism. Nonetheless, all reality is fundamentally a mental perception or experience of the mind. For Berkeley, all reality is immaterial and ultimately exists in the mind of God.

As reality is not based on external matter, but on mind or a perceiving spirit, matter itself is illusory (429, 439-440). Only the most ignorant would believe that matter actually exists (423). In fact, Berkeley rejects the notion that a material world exists apart from mind, “But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable” (416)? Further, “The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance” (419).2 Berkeley posits that immaterial mind is the foundation of all reality. For Berkeley, if there is a conflict between mind and matter, the subjective and objective, or appearance and reality, all one needs to do is simply eliminate external material existence and the problem is solved. What is left is mind-dependent subjective appearance.

In the next post, we will explore why Berkeley thought it was important for something to be perceived in order to exist which is the point of contention for classical realists.

1Both idealism and realism show up in Western thought in various forms. The categorization of these thinkers is for the purpose of a general grouping while acknowledging that particular differences and emphases can be found in each individual thinker. Neither school is monochrome in its outlook.

2Italics in the original. It is not clear to which specific philosophers Berkeley is referring. However, it is likely he has something like Aristotle’s definition of substance as a combination of matter and form in view.

Works cited

Adler, Mortimer. Adler’s Philosophical Dictionary: 125 Key Terms for the Philosopher’s Lexicon. Scribner, 1995.

Berkeley, George. The Principles of Human Knowledge. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Ethics, Great Books, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Plutarch, Moral Excellence, And History: An Examination of the Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, Part One

by Dave Seng
Plutarch 46 – 119 AD

This is part one of a three part examination of Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans

The reason Plutarch is listed among the great authors is his ability to make his readers think about enduring human questions across academic disciplines. Plutarch is not merely a good historian but he also helps his readers think about truly significant questions of human existence. Some of the great questions of the Western intellectual tradition are – What does it mean to live a good life? In particular, what does it mean to determine right from wrong human conduct? What is the virtuous life and how does one attain it? And how do my actions affect the larger community? One of the reasons Plutarch wrote his Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans is to encourage his readers to pursue moral excellence. He wants his readers to examine the lives he is writing about and then spur them on to virtuous action. Since Plutarch does not give a clear definition of what kind of moral improvement he is discussing or what kind of virtue he is thinking of, it is helpful to explore the history in which he is writing and some of the ideas he could have been drawing from. Plutarch was writing in a particular time and place and he assumed his readers understood what he was writing about regarding moral improvement. However, because his notion of virtue is different from much of modern thought, it is helpful to re-examine Plutarch’s fundamental assumptions about moral and political behavior. By examining Plutarch’s historical and intellectual context, one will discover how individual virtue is related to the broader community and how different classical ethics are from modern American presuppositions.

Plutarch seeks the moral improvement of his readers but does not give a particularly philosophically rigorous ethical system as would Plato or Aristotle. Nonetheless, he does give some interesting and valuable ideas to think through when one is weighing ethical and moral systems. It is also important to understand the intellectual climate in which Plutarch wrote. Although there were many different ethical systems in fashion when Plutarch was writing (Epicureanism, Stoicism, and various mystery religions), his ethical ideas most closely parallel Aristotle’s teachings. Both Plutarch and Aristotle believed human beings were capable of rational ethical reflection and moral action. And they understood virtuous behavior, or its absence, to have ramifications for politics and community. Plutarch was not simply writing for the betterment of his readers, but for the improvement of the state.

Plutarch states in the opening paragraphs of his life of Pericles the moral purpose of his writing. He believes that by providing examples of good and noble deeds, his readers will be induced to similar great and good actions. In other words, he believes that by describing the noble deeds of the great men he is writing about his readers will intellectually ponder these deeds and then be prompted to act in morally excellent ways. Plutarch is a practical writer focused on human action and is convinced that moral reflection must be connected in some way to action. He is reflecting the classical idea that one’s words, thoughts, and deeds must be interconnected. Noble thought should be attached to noble action. If one’s words did not match their deeds, they were considered to be an inferior person or hypocrite. Also, Plutarch is concerned that many do not spend the kind of time on moral or ethical reflection that would be profitable to them. He believes human beings have a natural tendency for inquiry and observation but misuse these natural abilities. He explains,

…We blame those who misuse that love of inquiry and observation which nature has implanted in our souls, by expending it on objects unworthy of the attention either of their eyes or their ears, while they disregard such as are excellent in themselves, and would do them good. (121)

Plutarch is concerned that although humans have a capacity for moral reflection they may not use that natural ability for their own good. For various reasons, human beings seem to have a proclivity to either disregard genuine moral reflection or divert themselves from the great questions of life. Perhaps Plutarch is reflecting the ancient equivalent of T.S. Eliot’s poetic statement in the Four Quartets that as human beings, we distract ourselves from distraction by distraction. Often, we do not use our natural intellect for good, and we feel a need to distract ourselves from true and genuine intellectual reflection. This problem, however, seems to be inherent to the human condition itself judging from the fact that in no society do we find a majority of the population given over to important intellectual pursuits. (Philosophers and other intellectuals are often, with Socrates, in the minority.) Plutarch is merely pointing us to a very basic human element that transcends time and place. Nonetheless, if Plutarch is right in asserting that everyone has a natural capacity for intellectual inquiry and observation, then one wonders if it is possible to live an authentic or genuine existence by not pursuing intellectual and moral excellence. Plutarch shares this sentiment when he says, “He who busies himself in mean occupations produces, in the very pains he takes about things of little or no use, an evidence against himself of his negligence and indisposition to what is really good. (121)

Plutarch seeks to correct this human tendency by placing in front of his readers, great deeds that will cause moral reflection and virtuous actions. Though our senses take in everything from good to bad, he believes humans have an innate ability to discern good from bad and make value judgments. By focusing on the good, however, one may come closer to moral virtue. Plutarch writes “… It becomes a man’s duty to pursue and make after the best and choicest of everything, that he may not only employ his contemplation, but may also be improved by it” (121).

It is important to remember that ethical reflection is basic to human beings. It is part of what it means to be human. Ask anyone about any issue or news event of the day and you will find that they will immediately tell you what they find right or wrong about the situation. Moral reflection is a way of life whether we think it is or not. Plutarch is correct in pointing out that reflecting on moral excellence will aid us in exploring the deepest questions of human life and conduct.

Works cited:

Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 13, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1993.

Consensual Government, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Democracy, Part Eight

by Dave Seng

Part seven can be found here.

The Western ideas of legal restraint on majority rule, freedom, and equality are likely to impede and hinder the execution of the most extreme elements of human nature. Of course, when these values are discarded, ignored, or distorted the most probable result is terror, holocaust, or genocide. The absence of law, custom, and tradition does not produce a utopian paradise or more “individual” freedom, but chaos, destruction, and often, tragically, the loss of life. When people in a democratic society no longer believe in the institutions that have provided for a strong society, anarchy and all sorts of horrors are the ultimate end results. The veneer of civilization is frighteningly thin when it comes to human nature. Without custom, tradition, and a shared common culture based on law and accountability to hold human nature at bay a society is more likely to implode on itself than flourish. The ancient Greeks held a tragic and existential view of the world where human beings struggled for life in a fixed and absolute world rooted in human nature (a human nature mixed with virtue and vice) but understood that human nature itself had to be restrained. As Aristotle reminds us in his Ethics, “no moral virtue develops in us by nature; rather we have the potentiality for good implanted within us that can grow only through habit and custom.”1

In these earliest examinations of the idea of democracy, there are several important ideas that have continued throughout the ages that shape the discussion of Western liberal democracies. These ideas are the rule of law, education, the free exchange of ideas, and a tragic, existential understanding of human nature. Of course, these are not the only ideas essential to democracy, but the ancient Greeks understood these ideas as the most essential.

Herodotus explains that an important element of democracy is that everyone ought to be considered equal before the law. The Greek word isonomy conveys the idea that everyone is equal before the law. If someone places himself or herself above the law or discounts the written laws, then lawlessness and tyranny results. (Of course, a democracy may elect a tyrant or dictator that functions under the rule of law with the consent of the people – as the twentieth century witnessed with Hitler in Germany.) The presence of law does not necessarily make a government democratic but there is a democratic impulse if it is admitted that no person ought to be above the law. This democratic ideal is realized when everyone falls under and has recourse to the same laws. A poor citizen can, or ought to win any legal case against a wealthy person if he has the law on his side. Citizens must really believe this if it is going to work (again, if citizens no longer believe in the institutions of democracy a break down in that democratic society will occur). Historically, the West has provided ways and opportunities to correct bad laws while preserving the ultimate rule of law. Civil disobedience is a way to accept a law, and show that it is bad while at the same time honoring the rule of law. Dissent itself is a Western value.

The Greeks had a high regard for the rule of law. Socrates, rather than breaking the law when he was given the opportunity, chose to drink the hemlock. And when Xerxes asks one of his Greek assistants why the Spartans will not flee from him (due to his overwhelming army), Herodotus records, “For though they be freemen, they are not in all respects free; Law is the master whom they won; and this master they fear more than thy subjects fear thee.”2 In addition, the great historian Thucydides indicates the Greek respect for law and the abuses which occur when it is disregarded in his account of the revolt at Corcyra. He writes, “Indeed, men too often take upon themselves in the prosecution of their revenge to set the example of doing away with those general laws to which all alike can look for salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to subsist against the day of danger when their aid may be required.”3 When law is discarded it will be difficult to find help from it when it is really needed. The greatest of the Greek writers all understood the importance of the rule of law and how its presence could be a democratic influence in society and the state. Rome during its Republican phase understood this too. The Concilium Plebis, election of Tribunes, and the Law of the 12 tables all worked together to support the rule of law.

The Greek idea that everyone should be equal before the law is the basis of modern liberal constitutions. Of course, this ideal is rarely met in the course of human history, including the Greeks – the law in Athens was not always fair – but the mere idea that no one should be above the law and that laws need to be written to provide equal access to all is an idea that should be taken seriously. Isonomy was the Greek ideal that everyone was equal before the law. This idea occurred first to the Greeks and not with the Hittites, Assyrians, or Egyptians. Even Hammurabi’s elaborate code of ordinances and procedures gave preferential treatment to the wealthy. Nonetheless, the rule of law does permit a space to be made for all people to be considered equal.

As we saw earlier, Herodotus’ debate between Megabyzus and Otanes is the first in history to examine the charge that democracy is nothing more than mob rule. Megabyzus was concerned that democracy is rule by the mob. But Otanes was equally concerned with this and countered that a true democracy rested on the rule of law. It is the rule of law and the idea that everyone is equal under the law, that protects citizens from a tyrant and a lawless mob. This is why he used the word isonomy. The rule of law holds everyone accountable and protects the weak from tyranny. Democracies can become a form of tyranny but only if the rule of law is discarded. The charge that democracies can become a rule of the mob or a form of tyranny is a legitimate concern. Nevertheless, when reverence and respect for the rule of law exists among the common citizens, mob rule is impossible. Mob rule will only exist when others place themselves above the law. In ancient Greece, laws were written on tablets of wood or marble and posted so all could see them. Everyone had access and the benefit of written, public, and accessible laws. In order to read the laws, however, education was necessary.

Next time, we will explore how education benefited the earliest democracies and what that means for our own day.

1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 9, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 348.

2Herodotus., 233.

3 Ibid, Thucydides, 438.

Consensual Government, Intellectual History, Liberal Arts

On Democracy, Part Seven

by Dave Seng

Part six can be found here.

Although Otanes’ vision of consensual rule failed, his dream of democracy lived on. Euripides (485 – 406 B.C.) an Athenian playwright who often defended democracy in his tragic plays profoundly examines the idea of democracy in his play The Suppliants. In this play, Theseus comes to the aid of Adrastrus who wants to burry his fallen comrades. Adrastus (king of Arogos) tried to conquer Thebes but failed and appeals to Theseus (king of Athens) for help. Burial rights were very important to the ancient Greeks and sometimes resulted in war when these rights were not granted by the opposing army. In The Suppliants however, Euripides uses Theseus as a spokesman for democracy. Theseus claims that he can not do anything without the sanction of the city. He explains, “For them [the people] I made supreme, when I set this city free, by giving all an equal vote.”1 Then, Euripides provides a fascinating exchange between a herald from Thebes promoting monarchy and Theseus presenting and defending democracy. The herald asks to speak to the despot of Athens. Naturally, Theseus takes exception with this statement and corrects the herald. “Thou hast made a false beginning” states Theseus, “in seeking here a despot. For this city is not ruled by one man, but is free. The people rule in succession year by year, allowing no preference to wealth, but the poor man shares equally with the rich.”2 The herald answers Theseus with a critique of democracy. He says that the land he comes from is ruled by one man only, not by the mob. And further explains that the uneducated will not be qualified to govern a city. The uneducated would gain a reputation by beguiling with words the populace just to seek self enrichment. Theseus provides three arguments in favor of democracy. He believes the rule of law, free speech, and a consensus of the brightest and most talented citizens will work together to provide harmony, order and stability in a democracy. Theseus explains his first argument,

Naught is more hostile to a city than a despot; where he is, there are in the first place no laws common to all, but one man is tyrant, in whose keeping and in his alone the law resides, and in that case equality is at an end. But when the laws are written down, rich and poor alike have equal justice, and it is open to the weaker to use the same language to the prosperous when he is reviled by him, and the weaker prevails over the stronger if he have justice on his side.3

According to Euripides, the best and surest way to maintain equality, defend freedom, and protect from tyranny is the rule of law. Both constitutional and procedural law is necessary to democracy because, ideally, it will protect the commonality from tyranny, provide a barrier to mob rule, and make available a just legal standing for all citizens regardless of their economic status.

Theseus’ second argument for democracy is based on the notion of free speech, debate, and dissent. When citizens are considered equal before the law they have the freedom to provide a voice in their government. Citizens should be able to speak freely about the important political issues they face. Theseus explains how this should work,

Freedom’s mark is also found in this: ‘Who hath wholesome counsel to declare unto the state?’ And he who chooses to do so gains renown, while he, who hath no wish, remains silent. What greater equality can there be in a city? 4

Theseus indicates that those who have good counsel to offer the state are welcome to do so and those who wish to remain silent are free not to participate. Equality rests in the idea that all are free to either contribute to the betterment of the city or not. Theseus third argument is based on the idea that democracy requires young and intelligent citizens.

Again, where the people are absolute rulers of the land, they rejoice in having a reserve of youthful citizens, while a king counts this a hostile element, and strives to slay the leading men … for he feareth for his power. How then can a city remain stable, where one cuts short all enterprise and mows down the young like meadow-flowers in springtime?5

Theseus understands the value a young educated and intellectual class will bring to the state. And history has proven him correct. It is common knowledge that one of the attributes of tyranny is the elimination of the intellectual and educated class in society. Tyrants do not want to be challenged by those who can think independently or question the assumptions of a tribal or despotic regime. A democracy, however, thrives and succeeds on a reserve of young talented and enthusiastic independent thinkers. All regimes understand the power of ideas. Ideas move men and society more often than economics or government programs. No war is ever fought strictly on material grounds but on the ideas and passions that rightly or wrongly motivate armies to fight. Blaise Pascal once quipped, “opinion is queen of the world.”6 Ideas are important and most despotic regimes are atavistically afraid of an educated and articulate population. Tyrannies do not want the free exchange of ideas because they know that the power of ideas could remove them from rule. Democracies are not immune to bad ideas either but the rule of law, open debate, free exchange of ideas, and the values of discussion and dissent are more likely to provide a stable society where grievances can be addressed in a productive manner.

Next time we will explore how the Western ideas of legal restraint on majority rule, and the notions of freedom and equality are likely to impede and hinder the execution of the most extreme elements of human nature.

1 Euripides, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes., Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 5, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 261.

2 Ibid., 262.

3 Ibid., 262.

4 Ibid., 262.

5 Ibid., 262.

6 Pascal, The Provincial Letters, Pensees, Scientific Treatises, Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 33, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 228.