Not everything Professor Cocks writes about over at the Orthosphere is correct. With this one, however, he hits it out of the park. Enjoy!
Political Correctness and the Death of Education
On Democracy, Part Eleven
Part ten can be found here.
In this post I examine the classical influence on the founding of America and the vision of James Madison.
Now we must jump many years to the founding of the American republic. It is not surprising to find that the founders of America were influenced by classical thought – and all the values of the Western intellectual and political tradition can be seen in the American State Papers and Federalist Papers, including debate, dissent, civic virtue, and the free exchange of ideas. The classical influence of early America can be discovered from the works they read, the architecture they built, and the documents they wrote. One obvious piece of evidence rests in the fact that the authors of the Federalist Papers wrote under the names of significant Roman leaders. Furthermore, many of the founders such as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, were well versed in the classics and read Latin.
In America, constitutional government evolved from the idea of constitutional monarchy found in Europe. Although the founders envisioned a republic and not a democracy (they were very cautious of an extreme democracy), America finally became a popular democracy in 1828 with the election of Andrew Jackson. Nonetheless, at the beginning of American Republicanism was the conviction that consensual rule was possible and that governments existed to protect citizen’s natural rights and to promote the common good of all people.1 This is the idea of classical liberalism and has become the social-political theory that stresses freedom from undue governmental interference and views the state as the guarantor of the basic liberties and rights of the individual. This is basically a classical idea; however, a thinker like Aristotle would see a closer relationship between the individual and the state.
In the early days of the American republic, there was much debate about the constitution itself. The parties were divided between those who wanted a stronger national government, the federalists, and those who wanted more sovereignty among the individual states – the antifederalists. The friends of the Constitution (the federalists) had the advantage of superior intellectual firepower. Among the federalists were the two most eminent men in America at the time, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington.2 Washington himself declared that the choice lay between the Constitution and disunion. Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay, under the joint pseudonym “Publius,” wrote a long series of newspaper essays explaining and extolling the new document.3 These essays were later published in book form and are considered the greatest intellectual defense of the Constitution by some of the early Republic’s greatest thinkers.
For example, James Madison, one of the writers of the Federalist Papers, was very concerned about the role of human nature and the propensity for people to divide into factions. For Madison, factions are different than regular political parties. He defines a faction as, “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”4 In other words, factions are those groups which will seek there own power illegitimately and disregard the rights of others in the process. Factions do not regard the democratic principle of equality as an important ideal nor understand or value the idea that in a democracy harmony is essential. People have to be united – a government for the people and by the people must first of all be supported by the people and truly believed in if it is going to work. Madison understands the corrosive effects of factions on a consensual government. Nonetheless, it seems to be part of human nature to divide into factions as soon as individuals are given the freedom to do so. Madison was concerned about how to keep a faction from becoming a tyranny on one hand and how to maintain fair representation on the other. But Madison understood that factions would be a problem to any liberal republic because it is so basic to the human instinct,
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions and many other points as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment of different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their most violent conflicts.5
Madison understands that factions are a part of any liberal society. He is also aware that there are only two solutions to the problem of factions. The first is to eliminate the cause of factions. But this would require the elimination of liberty, an unacceptable option. The other is to give every citizen the same interests, passions, and opinions – and this option is clearly impossible. Madison knows there will always be independent thinkers. So the third option for Madison is to control the effects of factions. Madison believes the best possibility for this rests in the rule of law and to allow factions a voice in their own government.6 He explains, “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.”7 Much like Aristotle, Madison understands the value of allowing differing parties a voice in their own government functioning under legitimate legal protection and constraints (consensual government always seeks a check on majority rule to ensure the rights of the minority). Of course, when factions are in the minority they are less likely to prevail in their evil intentions. Madison’s concern rests in what could happen if a faction became a majority. Madison concludes that a pure democracy can not protect itself from this phenomenon. “From this view of the subject it may be concluded that pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.”8 He goes on to explain,
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.9
For Madison then, a pure democracy is a government in which every citizen participates, is small in size, and contains no check on majority rule. It is unclear, however, if any such government has existed because the ancient Athenians functioned under the rule of law, and was regulated by assembly, councils, and archons. Rome itself transformed from a republic (also under the rule of law) to an empire without becoming a direct democracy. Nonetheless, Athens was close to being a direct democracy and Thucydides does point out the mob mentality of the Athenians after the death of Pericles. But the point that a democracy can become a tyranny is a legitimate concern, the French revolution being the primary example. The ancient Greek political thinkers were all aware of the tyranny of the majority. And there was nothing more they hated than tyranny.
Next time, I will examine the particular definition of republic held by Madison.
1 Goodwin, Gerald, Richard Current, Paula A. Franklin. A History of the United States. 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985), 119.
2 Ibid., 131.
3 Ibid.
4 The Federalist, Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 43, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 50.
5 Ibid.
6 Hamilton believes most factions arise from differences between the propertied and non-propertied classes.
7 Ibid., 50.
8 Ibid. 51.
9 Ibid.
On Democracy, Part Ten
The palm of courage will surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. — Pericles of Athens
Part nine can be found here.
Historians and political philosophers have wondered exactly how educated the Athenian citizens were during the time of Solon or Pericles. Plato himself saw democracy as the rule of the ignorant. While a democracy based on the rule of the uneducated, would clearly be a disaster, it is unclear that Athens fits this description. In his famous funeral oration, Pericles calls Athens the “school of Hellas”1 (the school of all Greece). He states that education was offered to all foreigners even when it hurt Athenian national interests. He also explains that the average citizen was able to both pursue industry and be involved in the affairs of the state. The citizen was competent and educated enough to do both. Pericles tells us,
Our public men have, besides politics their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless. 2
In Periclean Athens, the educated citizen was required to take part in the governance of the city and his education was such that allowed him to be a competent judge in state matters. Pericles goes on to say, “We Athenians are able to judge all events and … instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.”3 An important part of Athenian education was dialectic in nature. Socrates with his students, would ask important questions, seek definitions, and rationally reflect on answers along with his students through a process of discussion. Athenian students would actively study the art of rhetoric (public speaking), memorize the works of Homer, and read poetry in public (as Herodotus did). This form of education not only prepared the student for public speaking and debate but also gave him a sense of his own history. Public speaking, debate, and discussion are essential elements of any democracy. Also, it is unlikely that many fools or incompetents played a significant role in public affairs, perhaps no more so than today.4 If a citizen attended no more than half the minimum number of yearly sessions, he would still hear twenty sets of debates by the ablest people in the state, chiefly elected officials or those formerly holding elective office, the leading politicians in all factions, and a considerable number of experts on a variety of subjects. Moreover, these were true debates in which it was impossible to hold prepared remarks.5 This would have led to an incredible education in itself. Many in the audience would have been previous officeholders and could draw from their experience, knowledge, and education to judge the debates.
The next post will explore the classical influence of the American founding.
1 Thucydides. The History of The Peloponnesian War, Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 6, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 397.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Kagan, Donald. Pericles of Athens And The Birth of Democracy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 59.
5 Ibid.
On Democracy, Part Seven
Part six can be found here.
Although Otanes’ vision of consensual rule failed, his dream of democracy lived on. Euripides (485 – 406 B.C.) an Athenian playwright who often defended democracy in his tragic plays profoundly examines the idea of democracy in his play The Suppliants. In this play, Theseus comes to the aid of Adrastrus who wants to burry his fallen comrades. Adrastus (king of Arogos) tried to conquer Thebes but failed and appeals to Theseus (king of Athens) for help. Burial rights were very important to the ancient Greeks and sometimes resulted in war when these rights were not granted by the opposing army. In The Suppliants however, Euripides uses Theseus as a spokesman for democracy. Theseus claims that he can not do anything without the sanction of the city. He explains, “For them [the people] I made supreme, when I set this city free, by giving all an equal vote.”1 Then, Euripides provides a fascinating exchange between a herald from Thebes promoting monarchy and Theseus presenting and defending democracy. The herald asks to speak to the despot of Athens. Naturally, Theseus takes exception with this statement and corrects the herald. “Thou hast made a false beginning” states Theseus, “in seeking here a despot. For this city is not ruled by one man, but is free. The people rule in succession year by year, allowing no preference to wealth, but the poor man shares equally with the rich.”2 The herald answers Theseus with a critique of democracy. He says that the land he comes from is ruled by one man only, not by the mob. And further explains that the uneducated will not be qualified to govern a city. The uneducated would gain a reputation by beguiling with words the populace just to seek self enrichment. Theseus provides three arguments in favor of democracy. He believes the rule of law, free speech, and a consensus of the brightest and most talented citizens will work together to provide harmony, order and stability in a democracy. Theseus explains his first argument,
Naught is more hostile to a city than a despot; where he is, there are in the first place no laws common to all, but one man is tyrant, in whose keeping and in his alone the law resides, and in that case equality is at an end. But when the laws are written down, rich and poor alike have equal justice, and it is open to the weaker to use the same language to the prosperous when he is reviled by him, and the weaker prevails over the stronger if he have justice on his side.3
According to Euripides, the best and surest way to maintain equality, defend freedom, and protect from tyranny is the rule of law. Both constitutional and procedural law is necessary to democracy because, ideally, it will protect the commonality from tyranny, provide a barrier to mob rule, and make available a just legal standing for all citizens regardless of their economic status.
Theseus’ second argument for democracy is based on the notion of free speech, debate, and dissent. When citizens are considered equal before the law they have the freedom to provide a voice in their government. Citizens should be able to speak freely about the important political issues they face. Theseus explains how this should work,
Freedom’s mark is also found in this: ‘Who hath wholesome counsel to declare unto the state?’ And he who chooses to do so gains renown, while he, who hath no wish, remains silent. What greater equality can there be in a city? 4
Theseus indicates that those who have good counsel to offer the state are welcome to do so and those who wish to remain silent are free not to participate. Equality rests in the idea that all are free to either contribute to the betterment of the city or not. Theseus third argument is based on the idea that democracy requires young and intelligent citizens.
Again, where the people are absolute rulers of the land, they rejoice in having a reserve of youthful citizens, while a king counts this a hostile element, and strives to slay the leading men … for he feareth for his power. How then can a city remain stable, where one cuts short all enterprise and mows down the young like meadow-flowers in springtime?5
Theseus understands the value a young educated and intellectual class will bring to the state. And history has proven him correct. It is common knowledge that one of the attributes of tyranny is the elimination of the intellectual and educated class in society. Tyrants do not want to be challenged by those who can think independently or question the assumptions of a tribal or despotic regime. A democracy, however, thrives and succeeds on a reserve of young talented and enthusiastic independent thinkers. All regimes understand the power of ideas. Ideas move men and society more often than economics or government programs. No war is ever fought strictly on material grounds but on the ideas and passions that rightly or wrongly motivate armies to fight. Blaise Pascal once quipped, “opinion is queen of the world.”6 Ideas are important and most despotic regimes are atavistically afraid of an educated and articulate population. Tyrannies do not want the free exchange of ideas because they know that the power of ideas could remove them from rule. Democracies are not immune to bad ideas either but the rule of law, open debate, free exchange of ideas, and the values of discussion and dissent are more likely to provide a stable society where grievances can be addressed in a productive manner.
Next time we will explore how the Western ideas of legal restraint on majority rule, and the notions of freedom and equality are likely to impede and hinder the execution of the most extreme elements of human nature.
1 Euripides, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes., Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 5, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 261.
2 Ibid., 262.
3 Ibid., 262.
4 Ibid., 262.
5 Ibid., 262.
6 Pascal, The Provincial Letters, Pensees, Scientific Treatises, Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 33, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 228.
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