Metaphysics, Philosophy

A Very Short Introduction To Aristotelian-Thomist Metaphysics: Act and Potency, Part. 1

by Dave Seng

Although Aristotle and Aquinas define the term “metaphysics” in various ways, one common rendering both use is “first principles.” For these thinkers, metaphysics is the study of the first principles of reality and how one views the world. One of the guiding first principles for Aquinas, especially in his metaphysics or understanding of reality, is his distinction between “act” and “potency.” Act and potency are not unique to Aquinas; these categories are first developed by Aristotle who uses these categories to describe how causation and change work in the physical world. Nonetheless, Aquinas, following Aristotle, applies the categories of act and potency to virtually every aspect of reality. In addition to act and potency, Aquinas also uses the categories of form and matter to make sense out of reality as Being. With the categories of act and potency and form and matter, Aquinas describes the immaterial structure and nature of all of reality and explains how potency accounts for change. He uses the categories of act and potency to such a degree, and so broadly, that they are among the most important principles for understanding Aquinas’s metaphysics and have broad implications to how one understands nature, science, and human potential.

For Aquinas, and many philosophers in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, the proper object of study for metaphysicians is the concept of Being1. In the simplest terms, Being is the study of all that exists, including concrete physical phenomena such as humans, tables, quadrupeds, things that can be discerned from the senses, and abstract mental concepts such as mathematics, goodness, and other ideas. Being, therefore, is the study of the nature and framework of all reality. It is important to note that Being is not a particular genus or species, but rather that in which all genera and species participate. That which exists and all that which stands out of non-being, participates in Being, but Being itself is not a genus or species. “Being itself is considered as formal, and as something received, and not as that to which Being belongs” (21). As Aquinas reminds us in the most general terms, “Being is common to all” (22). It is important to note that for Aquinas, the physical and metaphysical are not separated. The physical things that exist in act or being also participate in the metaphysical notion of potency. Through act and potency, Aquinas provides an important conceptual scheme for things which participate in being and also undergo change.

Much of philosophical history is an attempt to understand the mystery of change. Although Aquinas uses Aristotle’s categories of act and potency to reveal important insights about reality and to explain how change is possible, the discussion begins with Plato. Plato, following Parmenides, insisted that true Being implies permanence. Parmenides teaches that Being and Non-Being are the only genuine realities of existence, and change, therefore, is impossible because Non-Being cannot be the cause of Being. Change, although obvious to the senses, is an illusion. Plato, influenced by Parmenides, holds that the changing and mutable things of this world are not real Being or existence in the highest sense — only the Forms existing in a transcendent realm, participate in true Being. Aristotle, however, being firmly grounded in nature and the physical world, knows that change and motion are real and must be accounted for. In Aristotelian and Thomist terms, motion means change in the broad sense and not just movement from one place to another. Drawing on Aristotle, Aquinas explains, “For because ‘motion from place to place is naturally the first of movements,’ as is proved in the Physics, we use terms belonging to local motion in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds” (351). For Aristotle and Aquinas, physical things, existing in reality actually change. Change is part of Becoming. Influenced by Aristotle, Aquinas knows that things change according to their nature and he uses the concept of potency to explain how change is possible. Things do not change at random or whimsically, but according to their nature. For example, an acorn has the natural potential or capacity (if nothing hinders it) to become a mighty oak tree. In the case of natural or biological generation (a type of change) Aquinas states, “It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed…” (367). Just as biological matter has inherent tendencies towards life, Aquinas also explains that human beings have intrinsic potencies. Relating human potential to the “intellectual soul” (395) as that property humans have to comprehend universals and to use their reason to understand and create things, Aquinas explains, “Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of the body only, but ‘the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially’; and that this potency does not reject the soul’ … In like manner, the soul is said to be ‘the act of the body,’ etc., because by the soul it is a body and is organic, and has life potentially” (394). In other words, a student has the potential to become a doctor if she studies and applies her intellectual abilities. Potency, then, contains the possibilities that something can change into according to its nature.

1 Many philosophers in the Aristotelian and Thomist traditions prefer the term “ontology” in describing their approach to the study of Being.

Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica, Volume 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 17. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Metaphysics, Philosophy

More Than A Feeling: Metaphysical Intuition in Aristotle and Bergson, Part Three.

by Dave Seng

Part two can be found here.

Aristotle provides a framework for understanding reality based on foundationalism and the idea that the first principles of reality can be known, either through sense perception, empirically, or intellectually through reasonable demonstration. Intuition is the foundational aspect of sense data and non-discursive reasoning because it apprehends immediate self-evident truths. In Aristotle’s epistemology, human beings are hardwired with a latent ability or capacity to apprehend the world around them. Our rational abilities seem to be tuned to comprehending reality. When the mind is functioning correctly, it makes no sense for someone to assert that they are having a perception of an object and claim at the same time that it does not exist. In ordinary human sense experience, it is impossible to separate a perception from actual existence. The Aristotelian premise that the external world is knowable is based on the common sense judgment that perception is awareness of external objects. This human capacity of apprehending immediate self-evident truths is the rational intuition to which Aristotle points us.

Perhaps the Aristotelian position that describes human knowledge and the interaction between the self and the world can be understood as “embodied intuitive rationalism.” (Aristotle points us in this direction throughout his works but especially in his work On the Soul.) His argument suggests that humans have an inherent capacity through memory, imagination, the intellect, and use of sense perception (empiricism) to make meaning and intelligibility out of the world around them. If this is true, then in human cognition, the body and mind work together in a symbiotic relationship. If the nature of human beings is essentially rational, and dependent on and directed toward external reality, then a proper understanding of intuition is an essential element of embodied rationalism. To be embodied means to have an innate capacity of intuitive reasoning which allows one to grasp the fundamental first principles of reality.

If there is a kind of embodied intuitive rationalism that all humans possess, there might be a significant implication for Bergson’s approach to metaphysics. Some concluding thoughts are in order. While Bergson’s text An Introduction to Metaphysics can be read as an extended critique of Kant’s transcendental idealism, his description of metaphysics as the rejection of symbols and analysis is misplaced. If human beings are essentially rational, it is hard to figure out how analysis, reason, and symbols for communication are not helpful when struggling to think critically about the most important questions of life and reality. Language, analytical reasoning, and the examination of evidence are simply the ways human beings rationally make sense out of reality. Analysis and symbols are used in everyday life and it is impossible to imagine how anyone could live a significantly meaningful life without the use of symbols, analysis, and critical reasoning. It is why parents tell toddlers to “use your words.” Words provide meaning and structure to reality. If Aristotle is correct, all things tend towards their nature, including human nature. If the nature of human kind is to be rational then analysis, examination, evaluation, the use of symbols, and intellectual demonstration are essential and must be used to make sense and order out of the world. Reason is what human beings use to explore the ultimate questions and theories of reality. Discarding reason or throwing out the affirmation of rationalism is not the correct approach to metaphysics.

Bergson’s approach to philosophy is similar to Descartes. He starts with the immediate awareness of the self and distrust of sense data in providing a reliable understanding of reality. Bergson goes further than Descartes, however, and demonstrates an even stronger distrust of external reality than did Descartes. Even mental concepts, because they are products of analysis, render an artificial understanding of reality (74). Bergson explains that if metaphysics is to be a serious project, “it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition” (75). What is clear from Bergson, is that reason, abstraction, concepts, and analytical thought will never allow one to correctly understand reality. Intuition, for Bergson is the rejection of critical discourse, observation, evaluation, and reason in general. Bergson’s understanding of intuition is irrational and he says quite clearly that the correct way to understand reality is not through analysis or reason. On the other hand, Aristotle holds that intuition is that which apprehends immediate self-evident truths which provide the basis for interpreting reality to a very high degree of accuracy. Reason, whether it is understood as the evaluation of empirical evidence or through the cognitive intellectual processes of the mind alone, is an integral part of what it means to be human and should not be thrown out when examining the great questions of existence.

In some ways, Bergson lays the groundwork for the later twentieth century existentialists such as Martin Heidegger. These thinkers believe that human passions and moods are superior to reason in interpreting reality. Heidegger, in his work, What is Metaphysics? claims that the mood of dread is what opens one up to a proper understanding of being and non-being. Some of these philosophers put moods, intuition, and mystical experience into the category of the nonrational—that which is apart from reason, but not necessarily against reason. Even if the nonrational is a valid category for knowledge development, Bergson goes further and ultimately embraces the irrational. For Aristotle, intuition is not in the realm of the nonrational, or irrational, but a pre-discursive starting point for reason and science itself—and really for any body of knowledge that can be discovered, collected, categorized, and developed.

Bergson might be right in the sense that there could be things in life that are not completely rationally analyzable, such as human love, true friendship, great works of art, indescribable aesthetic or religious experience, but he goes astray by rejecting reason and substituting intuition as the only valid way to interpret reality. Bergson’s concept of intuition must be evaluated, checked, or modified by sound reason and empiricism. Many philosophers, including Aristotle, believe that there is an element of intuition in human knowledge. Aristotle’s approach, as it turns out, is correct. Intuition, sense experience, and reason must work together—not against each other—in the quest for knowledge.

Works cited

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 2. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 55. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999

Metaphysics, Philosophy

Descartes, Kant, and Why Metaphysics Matters

by Dave Seng

“Let us call to our aid those who have attacked the investigation of being and philosophized about reality before us.” – Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 3.

Being is the fundamental object of study for the metaphysician. In this essay, I will outline why the study of Being as Being is foundational, and perhaps the most basic to all other issues related to philosophy. This is not a purely academic question or one that is the sole concern of philosophers. As the Canadian philosopher George Grant reminds us, all civilizations have paradigms of knowledge and such paradigms dramatically shape every part of the society (36). The way we think about the ultimate issues and conditions of reality impacts the way we think and interact with each other in society. I have become convinced that the more I study the nature of Being, the more connections I find at the human level of technology, economics, law, and education.

To start, Being includes all reality including physical nature, conceptual abstractions, essences, and potentialities. In Aristotelian and Thomist terms, Being incorporates all that which is in act and potential, being and essence. The concepts of essence, act, and potency are the most helpful and importat for understanding reality. Philosophers from the time of Heraclitus to Martin Heidegger have tried to unlock the mystery of Being because it is believed that understanding Being leads one to what it means to be and become in this world. When one makes sense of Being, it is easier to make helpful judgments about reality, whether it is one or many, completely fluid or essentially static, ordered or chaotic, and good or bad, or perhaps both. If the world is essentially chaotic, as Heraclitus believed, how does one live meaningfully and “become” in such a world? Being includes both being and becoming, essences, values, and change and how one answers these questions have important implications for human life and activity. These questions are foundational to human flourishing. The philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) believed that these kinds of metaphysical questions are unavoidable. He tells us in the preface to the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason:

For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. (1, italics in original)

It is true that in today’s intellectual climate, Being is thought to be unimportant or impossible to figure out. But have you ever heard someone—perhaps Kant would call an indifferentist—turn around and give her explanation for doing something based on her understanding of reality? If someone were to tell you that all reality is simple matter and mechanics, you would have a good idea of what she thinks on other important issues. Metaphysical questions are unavoidable and everyone seems to have something to say about these ultimate matters even when they claim they are indifferent or agnostic to them. Our understanding of reality shapes many other things in our lives. The question is, “are we going to have a well-developed notion of Being or not”?

One way to evaluate a philosophy or particular philosopher is to examine how the concept of Being is handled. Does the philosophy illuminate and help us to understand the nature of Being or is the issue sidestepped or simply untouched? Does the philosophy help us to understand the nature of existence a little more or does the philosophy or philosopher think the attempt is futile? These are the questions we are going to keep in mind as we explore the philosophical assumptions of Rene Descartes in regards to his conception of Being. This time, however, we will use Kant and Aristotle as helpful guides.

Descartes was an interesting and important philosopher who contributed much to the rational approach to philosophy. And he really did not have that much to say about Being as Being in the way Aristotle did. Descartes’ main project was to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul. Since he was very skeptical of the fundamental principles of Being—act, potency, essences, and most of causation—he ended up painting himself into a corner, and the only way he could describe physical reality was by way of mechanism. In this aspect of his thought, he really is close to Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. When it comes to physical reality all we need to do is “render ourselves masters and possessors of nature” (285). (Along with Bacon and Hobbes, Descartes was very triumphant about the scientific “new method” and mankind’s newfound destiny to master nature. Today many philosophers of technology are exploring the question of whether or not something should be done simply because it can be done.) Descartes was very clear in his Meditations on First Philosophy that he was indifferent to matters of metaphysics or the claims of ultimate reality. If the issue was not immediately clear, certain, and indubitable, he would reject it. Of course, Descartes’ metaphysical skepticism was based on theological grounds because he did not want to assume the purposes or mind of God regarding nature. Nonetheless, his interpretive scheme has consequences. Metaphysics, according to Descartes is seen as doubtful. And those following Descartes believed that the project of laying out the first principles of reality was a worthless task.

This, however, brings us again to the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant’s entire project in his Critique of Pure Reason was to revive the corpse of metaphysics. He took upon the task of reviving metaphysics when in his day most scholars believed such a project was pointless. He reminds us,

Yet in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. (19)

For Kant, metaphysics is an innate natural disposition of every human being. It is unavoidable. It would be impossible to go into all of Kant’s philosophy at this point. But in summary, much of Kant’s thought highlights the importance of basic laws and principles that must be in place to render anything intelligible, including metaphysical knowledge. Aristotle says much the same thing in his Posterior Analytics and Analytics (and, of course, was the first philosopher to elucidate the human need to understand the first principles of reality in his Metaphysics). The philosopher Daniel Sullivan reminds us that, “our most commonplace expressions of optimism or pessimism, selfishness or high-mindedness, idealism or cynicism, carry along with them unacknowledged assumptions about the nature of the universe as a whole and man’s place in it” (7). Why does metaphysics matter? Because in unpredictable ways, an understanding of reality is assumed in the conversations we have, the books we read, the movies we watch and the political associations we keep. All these, and more imply a philosophy or perspective on reality and life.

Works Cited

Descartes, Rene. Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 28. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Grant, George. Technology & Justice. House of Anansi Press, 1986.

Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgement. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 39. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.

Sullivan, Daniel J. An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition. Tan Books, 1957.

Culture, Metaphysics, Philosophy

Does Ontology Matter?

by Dave Seng

Due to my teaching load and doctoral research, I won’t be able to give the follow up to my previous post regarding the nature of wisdom right now. However, I hope to do so in a week or two. In light of that, I’ll just present this thought …

Making the case that metaphysics—or more specifically—that ontology matters in our current cultural climate can be a tricky affair. Not many have the patience or interest in such things. And most, I imagine, are caught up in daily concerns that take up their time and energy. This is completely understandable. Nor is everyone called to be a philosopher. But there are those who believe that Max Planck was correct when he said, “there is a metaphysical reality behind everything that human experience shows to be real.” He also explained that, “metaphysical reality does not stand spatially behind what is given in experience, but lies fully within it.” There seems to be a fixed order of reality that lies within the sequence of phenomena in experience (what Aristotelian-Thomists call hylomorphism and we’ll get to that term later). How we understand these first principles determine how we understand and live in the world around us. What the great metaphysicians of the Western intellectual tradition are trying to get at is this—reality is the determinate of order, and understanding this order has implications for our personal lives, social concerns, and what it means for civilization to genuinely thrive. Wisdom is the virtue of using our metaphysical and ontological knowledge well.