Being, Epistemology, Logic, Ontology

On the Law of Noncontradiction

by Dave Seng

The law of noncontradiction states that nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same relationship. Put more formally, “A” can not be “B” at the same time and in the same relationship. The first part of the law is pretty straight forward. A fish can not be a cat or a frog can not be a table, at least at the same time. Being can not be nonbeing at the same time. Opposites can not be true at the same time and in the same relationship. It is contradictory to say that nonbeing is being at the same time. Contradictories can not both be true. One must be false, while the other is true.

Sometimes, however, the relationship part of the law is not understood. For example, I can be both a father and a son at the same time but not in the same relationship. I am my father’s son, and my son’s father but those are different relationships. Further, I can be my son’s biological father but not my son’s legal father if he were to be legally adopted. That, too, is a different relationship.

A basic feature of reality is that opposites can not exist in the same way and same relationship.

Because the law of noncontradiction is a basic property of being (reality), we learn that it is foundational to a proper understanding of metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology (theory of knowledge). Truth is clarified when the law on noncontradiction is properly understood.

The law of noncontradiction is a metaphysical first principle because it speaks to basic nature of reality. It helps us understand what is or is not so.

The law of noncontradiction is an ontological first principle because it points to the act or type of being a thing is–what can or can not be.

The law of noncontradiction is an empistemological first principle because it tells us what can or can not be known.

Finally, the law of noncontradiction helps us determine what is true and false, because opposites can not both be true. At the most fundamental level one statement or act of being can not be both true and false at the same time and same relationship.

Logic, Ontology, Uncategorized

Mortimer Adler on The Correspondence Theory of Truth

by Dave Seng

I do not remember when I first learned learned that the laws of logic are properties of being but they are, nonetheless, intuitively and metaphysically correct. Mortimer Adler provides a clue for why this is the case as he connects the law of noncontradiction with the correspondence theory of truth (truth is that which corresponds to reality):

The correspondence theory asserts (1) that there is a reality independent of the mind, and (2) that truth (or, what is the same thing, knowledge) exists in the mind when the mind agrees with, conforms or corresponds to, that independent reality. When what I assert agrees with the way things really are, my assertions are true; otherwise they are false. . . . The principle of noncontradiction is both an ontological principle (the principle that contradictories cannot coexist in reality) as well as a logical rule (the rule that thinking cannot be correct if it is self-contradictory).

Mortimer J. Adler, Intellect: Mind over Matter (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 98 – 99.

The law of noncontradiction is both a property of being (ontology) and logic (correct reasoning) which is perhaps one reason why it is true (corresponds to reality).

Being, Metaphysics, Ontology

A Philosophical Reflection on Sir Roger Penrose and Jordan Peterson

by Dave Seng

[Note: For the conversation between Sir Roger Penrose and Dr. Jordan Peterson, click here. What follows is my reflection on the conversation.]

The deepest of all philosophic problems: Is the Kosmos an expression of intelligence rational in its inward nature, or a brute external fact pure and simple? – William James, Principles of Psychology

I recently viewed this discussion between Sir Roger Penrose and Dr. Jordan Peterson on the nature of consciousness which ultimately expands to philosophical reflections on some interesting qualities and characteristics of time and the origin of the cosmos. I am not a trained physicist and I understand that Penrose may not reflect the consensus of his field. Nonetheless, Peterson and Penrose present a rational discussion of the most perennial and foundational ideas surrounding the nature of the consciousness and the universe. I also think that Penrose presents some thought provoking ideas about the world we inhabit and should be given rational and careful consideration.

Penrose and Peterson are an interesting pairing and it reflects some foundational issues regarding the relationship between science and philosophy. One thing I noticed in the discussion is that Peterson is a very much a global thinker or a speculative philosopher in the manner of Whitehead or many earlier classical philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, among others). These philosophers seek a unifying whole to all of reality and want to connect all the sciences and human experience into a consistent world view. This kind of philosopher, according to Plato “is the spectator of all time and all existence” … and will intellectually “move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.”1 As C. D. Broad explains about the nature of speculative philosophy, “The hope is that, by this means, we may be able to reach some general conclusions as to the nature of the universe, and as to our position and prospects in it.”2 In this conversation, however, we see Peterson pursuing deeper unifying metaphysical themes that focus on the nature of reality, while Penrose simply stops at the theoretical physical level. I think the reason for this is that Penrose understands that physical inductive science can only go so far. He stops at the end of his field and what it can do. On the other hand, philosophical inquiry resists empirical solutions because philosophers are seeking the meaning, truth, and logical connections of reality as a whole. Philosophers want to know what the foundation of empirical truth is and what makes it possible in the first place. These are not empirical questions. I believe this is the source of the slight frustration that Peterson demonstrates. (For what it’s worth, I thought the conversation turned much more friendly after it moved to art, which both have a love for.)

Regarding induction and observational science, Alfred North Whitehead put it this way,

Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations.3

Science itself is based on metaphysical and theological principles. (I’ve written about this in the context of Lucretius, here. And professor Ken Samples has made important insights here.) Peterson was simply asking questions that physics can not answer.

A really interesting point made in the discussion, is the fact that consciousness is not computational. If consciousness is not computational, hard AI (computational self-consciousness) will ultimately fail. Researchers are still not sure how to define consciousness, or really understand what it is at all. Nonetheless, Peterson and Penrose seem think that Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems support the non-computational nature of consciousness. Briefly, Gödel’s first theorem states that there will always be statements about natural numbers that are true, but are unprovable within the system. Gödel’s second theorem states that the system itself cannot show its own consistency. What this means is that there must be an axiom outside the system that makes sense of the system in the first place. For a more practical illustration, Gödel uses the “liars paradox” to support his theorems. The paradox in its simplest form arises from considering the sentence “This sentence is false.” If the sentence is true, then it is false, and if it is false, then it is true. A computer can be programmed to write the sentence but it has no resources within its own system to make sense out of it. It takes a human outside the system to understand the sentence is logically self-contradictory. The earliest pioneers of programmable logic—Alfred Tarski, Alonzo Church, and Turing’s Halting Problem—all deal with aspects of this important problem. The human will never be replaced. Further, there must be something outside the system which makes sense out of the system itself. In other words, the system is ontologically dependent on an axiom outside itself that gives it meaning and significance. It appears that Peterson is acutely aware of this situation.

So what does this have to do with the discussion of cosmology at the end of the dialogue? First, I’m not really sure about Sir Roger Penrose’s conception of time and his cosmological model. I need to look into it a bit more. If he is right, however, it might pose a problem for the Kalam cosmological model. The Kalām cosmological argument runs this way:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence.

Proponents of the Kalām cosmological argument (Craig, Koontz, Pruss and others) rely on space and time as having a definite starting point and draw heavily on scientific evidence (such as the Big Bang). If Penrose is correct, however, then the universe is an infinite, which might undermine the Kalām argument. Of course, Craig and others will point to the impossibility of traversing an infinite and perhaps the second law of thermodynamics to make their case for the beginning of the universe. These are fine points points, indeed, and along with the principle of causality, do hold some significance. In the end, however, the Kalām cosmological depends on a very specific model of the universe for its validity.

There are other ways to formulate a cosmological argument that does not rely so much on one particular interpretation of the science. The Thomistic way of arguing is valid whether or not the universe is finite. This cosmological argument is sometimes called the argument from Being. It looks like this (taken from Norman Geisler’s book, God: A Philosophical Argument from Being):

1. Something exists (e.g., I do)

2. Nothing cannot produce something.

3. Therefore, something exists eternally necessarily.

A. It exists eternally because if ever there was absolutely nothing, then there would always be absolutely nothing because nothing cannot produce something.

B. It exists necessarily because everything cannot be a contingent being because all contingent beings need a cause of their existence.

4. I am not a necessary and eternal being (since I change).

5. Therefore, both God (a Necessary Being) and I (a contingent being) exist. (= theism)

It is not necessary to go into the principle of existence, or the principle of identity and the rest of the first laws of metaphysics here. What is important to note are two things—the ontological dependence of reality on God as Necessary Being and the absence of temporality as a starting point.4 The ontological dependence is necessary regardless whether or not time is infinite. On the substance of Thomistic argumentation, one philosopher puts it this way,

We know from experience that the world is contingent, that is, it depends on something outside itself for its existence. And this would be true even if the world has always been here, for an infinite collection of contingent things is no less contingent than a finite one. But there must be some unconditional, ultimate being upon which the world depends, otherwise it would have no final basis for existence.5

Aquinas argues against an infinite series, but the series he thinks is impossible is a per se series, or one that extends infinitely upwards in being. The argument from being focuses on contingency and ontological dependence and does not rely on one particular model of the universe. So if the science changes, an explanation for being is still necessary. This might be one advantage that this argument has over the Kalām cosmological argument. If Penrose is correct, time may not be the most fundamental element of reality and it seems to do some pretty strange things both at the quantum level and the macro or cosmic levels. But no one can deny that being is and it stands in front of us as a mystery which is truly one of the most enduring questions of human existence.

In the final analysis, Penrose may or may not be right in his arithmetic regarding the infinity of the universe, but he still misses the ontological weight of the issue.

I’d like to thank my friend Dr. Derek Gardner for pointing me to this video and providing inspiration for this post.

1 The Dialogues of Plato. Translated by J. Harward. Vol. 6. Great Books of the Western World. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990. 374 – 375.

2Scientific Thought. New Yourk: Harcourt, Brace, 1923. 20.

3 Science and the Modern World, vol. 55, Great Books of The Western World Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993. 156.

4 I am always reminded of Exodus 3:14 – one translation of the Hebrew reads of God’s self-description “I am who causes to be” or “He who causes to be”.

5 Miller, Ed L., and Jon Jensen. Questions That Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy. 5th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 276.

Being, Intellectual History, Metaphysics

Hegelian Idealism and The Modes of Existence: Conclusion

by Dave Seng

Part three of three.

Part one can be found here.

Part two can be found here.

Other philosophers, such as Aristotle, disagree with Hegel and think that is important to maintain the being of the mind and the being of concrete physical reality. The distinction between the being of the mind and the being of physical reality aids in understanding what ideas are and how they help one in understanding reality and the various modes or “acts” of existence. It is important to understand what an “act” is according to classical metaphysics. Aristotle uses the notion of “act” to describe things that exist in reality. Things of the mind, such as ideas, memories, fictional characters in narrative or verse, concepts, perceptions, and things of the imagination like unicorns, are objects or “acts” of the mind. Things that exist external to one’s mind exist as an “act” of physical reality. Both mental and physical objects are real acts of existence. That which is in act is simply that which exists. An act of the mind is real because the individual has real existence. In external existence, the act of a physical thing is its primary way of being or its objective existence. Aristotle points out that mental existence, or things of the mind, are different in kind from physical existence yet, both ways of being are real because they are in act (here, Aristotle is applying the term “movement” to that which physically undergoes change):

The word ‘actuality’, which we connect with ‘complete reality’, has, in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement. And so people do not assign movement to non-existent things, though they do assign some other predicates. e.g. they say that non-existent things are objects of thought and desire, but not that they are moved; and this because while ex hypothesi they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually if they were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but do not exist, because they do not exist in complete reality. (572)

Aristotle points out that the objects of the mind and objects of physical reality do not exist in the same way. That which exists in “complete reality” is different from the existence of the things of the mind. The being of mind and being of objective reality are a basic feature of reality, and should not be overlooked or confused, because the distinction points to the plurality of existence and, what will be developed, the foundation for intentional existence. Aquinas makes the point that the knower and the thing known are not the same, “…the eye knows the stone according to its being outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the thing known according to the being it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its being outside the knower, the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible being it has in the intellect …” (81). The knower and the thing known, then, are not the same. They have actuality in different ways. Hegel, however, rejects this distinction, “…philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas, without reference to actuality” (163). According to Hegel, then, there is no need to reference external reality because all of reality consists of mind and is mind-dependent. Nonetheless, because the being of reality and the being of the mind are real, and exist in different ways, there must be a better way of understanding the nature of idea. Ideas are that which signify something. Ideas point to something that is, or has being. They signify something that exists either in the mind or objective reality, and it is conceptually incoherent to confuse the two aspects of being, or make them one. Idealism is ultimately circular in nature because it assumes the ultimate nature of mind before concluding that mind is ultimate in reality. In such a system, one could never grasp the nature of physical reality. If all is mind and there is no reference to actuality, one is forever locked inside Plato’s cave.

Two points need to be clarified. The first is the fact of being. The preceding, of course, assumes the existence of an external reality. It is unnecessary to prove the existence of external reality. The starting point that classical metaphysicians use is—being is. It is impossible to deny reality or the fact that something exists. Even the solipsist has to admit that, “I exist.” Further, there are several modes of being at work should the solipsist write a sentence. Both the solipsist and the sentence, itself, would have different kinds of being. Something exists. The second point is that mental existence does not necessarily mean subjective existence. It is a mistake to confuse mental existence with that which is subjective because not all things of the mind are subjective or person-relative. Subjective experiences are those that belong to the individual alone, things like memories, personal and bodily feelings, and personal experience. Mental existence such as characters like Hamlet or Tom Sawyer are not subjective but objective through imagination and the written word. (If this were not so, there would be no point in having literature classes in universities. Many wonderful works of literature can be discussed objectively.) Similarly, historical figures that live on in memory like Benito Mussolini or Abraham Lincoln are not subjective, but objective. They once existed in reality but now live in the mental reality of memory. They have left objective effects of their lives for historians to discover and explicate. Furthermore, one can make a subjective experience objective as when a husband explains to his wife that she hurt his feelings, making the subjective experience objective through intentional existence (more on that below). Subjective existence belongs to the individual alone, but has mental existence because the individual is real. To be clear, subjective existence has real being, but is different in kind from other types of mental existence like historical figures and characters of fiction. The overall point, however, is that reality has a structure to it. There is a composition to Being that involves both the mind and physical reality. An object of being can be said to exist in many ways, and to reduce reality to one thing, as Hegelian idealism does, does nothing to help one understand the essential structure and nature of reality. Monism cannot account for the plurality of existing things or the way they exist (modes of existence).

Reality has three modes of being or existing. To quickly summarize the first two modes of being, there is objective existence and rational or mental existence. Objective existence is real existence. It is the physical world of mountains, animals, trees, and buildings. It is the world outside one’s head—independent of the mind and unaffected by it. It would exist even if there were no humans on the planet. The second mode of being is mental existence or that which exists in the mind. Since individual minds are real, mental existence is a type of real existence. The being of the mind and the being of reality are two different modes of being. The third modality of being is intentional existence. Intentional existence brings both the mental and physical ways of being together. Intentional existence points to the fact that the mind can be “about” something, it can describe something, or communicate something to another mind. Intentional being depends on a plurality of minds, but not on any one in particular. An intentional object can be real existence or mental existence. Intentional being can be anything discussed or communicated based on shared experience and existence. Intentional being shares both real and mental properties, but depends on a plurality of minds for existence. Intentional being is an act of existence that is dependent on minds in general. It is different in kind from strictly real or mental existence. If there are no minds in existence, there is no intentional existence, only real existence. If there was only one mind on the planet, there would be mental and real existence, but no intentional existence. For example, three scientists are discussing an atom. The three scientists are discussing the same atom existing in real existence. Their communication with one another indicates that they are discussing the same atom based on their shared perceptual experience. There are three individual and particular mental existences of the same atom, yet the atom is one intentional existence among the three scientists. Intentional being makes possible the fact that three different individual mental experiences can communicate about one object. The multiplicity of shared experience makes this possible. Long ago, Plato was among the first philosophers to point this aspect of reality out, “…if every man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to another” (270). Intentional existence has its foundation in things and is communicable through a plurality of minds based on objectively shared real existence. Hegelian idealism, on the other hand, reduces all reality to mind and ideas, and therefore collapses the structure of reality. Hegel reduces being and becoming, the subjective and the objective, real and mental existence to one construct of the mind.

The scope and breadth of Hegel’s philosophy is admirable. The attempt to organize all reality into a systematic whole that makes sense of all experience is a project which many philosophers in the speculative tradition engage in, from Plato and Aristotle to Aquinas and Whitehead. Hegel certainly has a high regard for philosophy and believes in mankind’s innate rationality to discover the ultimate truths of reality. He believes that metaphysics can unlock the deepest and most perennial questions and was correct in pointing out that there is a mental or nonmaterial aspect to reality. Hegel’s mistake, however, is making all reality into an immaterial mind. Immaterial monism fails to make sense out of the plurality of existence and the modes of being. A true speculative philosophy, one that seeks to make sense out of reality as a whole, needs to correctly explicate all the ways something can exist. Hegelian idealism and monism are too simplistic and does not properly make sense out of reality.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 7. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Aquinas. The Suma Theologica. Translated by Father Laurence Shapcote. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

— Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 43. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 21. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.

Plato. Georgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Great Books of the Western World, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 6. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1996.