Part one can be found here.
Part two can be found here.
The law of noncontradiction holds primacy in another way as well. Aristotle believes that the law of noncontradiction is self-evident and it must be assumed before any other study, or science can get started:
For a principle which every one must know who knows anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect. (524)
The law of noncontradiction and the resulting axioms of logic are self-evident, just as being is the first thing one experiences when waking up in the morning, and the first thing a baby experiences when he or she is born. Being is undeniable, and so are the laws of logic. (Even Descartes, with his systematic doubt, ultimately concludes that being can be known.) Aristotle believes that the law of noncontradiction “is the most certain” principle one can know and, in fact, is prior and foundational to all other knowledge and learning. It is important to note, however, that the basic law of noncontradiction cannot itself be proven. Because it is self-evident, one must have to assume the law of noncontradiction in order to deny it. In other words, one must rely on the law of noncontradiction if one were to try to disprove it, which is ultimately circular and self-refuting. The basic principles of logic are among the transcendent first principles of reality. Being cannot both be, and not be at the same time and same way. Further, Aristotle claims that there must be some basic first principles of reality in order to prevent an endless regression of explanations that ultimately lead nowhere. He believes it was the mark of an uneducated person to not understand this point:
But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles. Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident that the present one. (525)
The laws of logic are important when one gives reasons why something is true or not, or demonstrating why something is, or is not the case. They simply provide the rational grounds for avoiding definitional equivocation1. These laws are foundational when trying to understand being because they indicate what can or cannot be, (they also help us understand what we can or cannot know). They are transcendent in nature because they are part of being. They indicate truths which all things participate in if they exist at all. Nothing whatsoever can both be, and not be in the same way and same relationship. In a very real way, the laws of logic are part of being and help one to know and understand truth, because they are fundamental properties of reality. Aristotle refers to the laws of logic in many places, primarily in his works of logic, called the Organon (Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and On Sophistical Refutations), and in his Metaphysics. Regarding the laws of logic themselves, he says that, “these truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others” (524). In other words, the truths of logic reflect the order of being as a whole and hold for everyone regardless of time, place, or perspective.
Not surprisingly, Augustine takes a more theological position regarding the laws of logic and applies the laws of logic to science, ethics, and the existence of God2. Although Augustine rarely explicates the laws of logic directly, he does believe that logical reasoning deals with the question of how truth may be discovered (319). He thinks that the Greek philosophers who first discovered the laws of logic are essentially correct because they “made efforts to discover the hidden laws of nature and the right and wrong in ethics, and in dialectic what was consequent according to the rules of logic and what was inconsequent and erroneous” (191). He also believes that philosophy has three branches or areas of investigation and that logic is one of these fields of study: “…philosophers have aimed at a threefold division of science, or rather, were enabled to see that there was a threefold division (for they did not invent, but only discovered it), of which one part is physical, another logical, the third ethical” (389). The natural (physical), rational (logical), and moral elements of philosophy have being in focus in some way, just as the field of ethics has to do with the discovery of right or wrong actions, the possibility of natural law, and the being of moral life—questions about whether or not humans are moral beings, rests upon metaphysical assumptions of freedom, the will, and what it means to be human and to flourish in this world. (Although it is beyond the scope of this essay, both Aristotle and Augustine believe that there are metaphysical foundations to the science of ethics.) For Augustine, however, the ultimate ground of all reason, logic, and ethics is found in the existence of God and is in agreement with the ancient Jewish understanding of God as the “ground of being3.” Augustine explains this position when he says, “And yet the validity of logical sequences is not a thing devised by men, but is observed and noted by them that they may be able to learn and teach it; for it exists eternally in the reason of things, and has its origin with God” (734). Augustine believes that logic is a natural part of reality.
Interestingly, Augustine applies the law of noncontradiction when it comes to the nature and existence of the universe. He believes that the universe did not create itself:
Earth and the heavens also proclaim that they did not create themselves. “We exist,” they tell us, “because we were made. And this is proof that we did not make ourselves. For to make ourselves, we should have had to exist before existence began.” And the fact that they plainly do exist is the voice which proclaims this truth. (114)
Augustine is simply making the point that something cannot exist before it exists. If something did exist before it existed, it would have to be, and not be at the same time and same way, which is impossible according to the law of noncontradiction. In order for the universe to create itself, it must be before it is. Augustine thinks that self-creation violates the law of noncontradiction. But in a larger perspective, Augustine agrees with Aristotle, that the principles of logic are properties of being because they exist eternally in the “reason of things” (734). For each thinker, at least one way being corresponds to reality is through the laws of logic, the first metaphysical principles of existence.
Why does one find so much overlap and commonality between Augustine and Aristotle? It is important to note that Augustine does not always follow Plato exactly. (I have written more about how Augustine modifies his Platonism, here.) As with Plotinus, he makes changes to his Platonism to better take account of reality. Augustine modifies his Platonism by placing forms or essences in the particular things—at least when it comes to describing change in physical reality4. Augustine believes that the form must be in the material object itself in order to account for change. “There can be no change where there is no form” (129), according to Augustine. This parallels exactly what Aristotle holds about nature and reality in general. Augustine realizes that without the potentiality of form, something can not change. If the acorn does not have the form and potency of the oak tree, it will not grow into a majestic oak tree. Augustine, then, has a higher respect for physical reality than Plato. That is why he can conclude that logic and truth are properties of being which reside in the nature of things. Aristotle, of course, agrees with this line of thought. Plato, however, would disagree due to his strict emphasis on the Forms and his “divided line” of reality5.
Questions of being, truth, and correct reasoning underlie humanity’s most important concerns and conversations about the meaning of reality and one’s place within it. Without the ability to reason correctly, investigations and discussions of perennial questions would lapse into conceptual incoherence, and it would be impossible to discuss anything in a meaningful way. In different ways, both Aristotle and Augustine help one to realize that truth is essential when it comes to understanding reality, and logic is a helpful tool that allows one to discover these most basic and ultimate concerns.
Works Cited
Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle: 1. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
Augustine. The Confessions, The City of God, On Christian Doctrine. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 16. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1999.
1 Although there are places when much common ground is possible in different positions, the laws of logic simply point out that only one thing or concept can be what it is at a time. If equivocation occurs the argument or discussion looses conceptual coherence and language becomes meaningless.
2Aristotle, however, believes that theology is a branch of metaphyics, see his Metaphysics, book I.3 and book VI.1.
3God’s self-disclosure to Moses in Exodus 3:14, “I am who I am” is generally understood to mean that God is the ground of all being. Another valid translation of the verse is “I am who causes to be.”
4While it is true that Augustine, as a Platonist, places the ultimate forms in the mind of God, in several places he has to modify his Platonism to account for physical change, which Plato is unable to do. For the brevity of this essay, I can only provide one example from Augustine here.
5Plato’s “divided line” is in book six of the Republic, Vol. 6, pages 386 – 387.
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